Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports
2021

Shutting the Door on Voting: The Effects of "The Great Poll
Closure"
Joshua Matthew Squires
West Virginia University, jsquire2@mix.wvu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd
Part of the American Politics Commons

Recommended Citation
Squires, Joshua Matthew, "Shutting the Door on Voting: The Effects of "The Great Poll Closure"" (2021).
Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports. 8294.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/8294

This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by the The Research
Repository @ WVU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that is
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you must obtain
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license
in the record and/ or on the work itself. This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in WVU Graduate Theses,
Dissertations, and Problem Reports collection by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU.
For more information, please contact researchrepository@mail.wvu.edu.

Shutting the Door on Voting:
The Effects of “The Great Poll Closure”

Joshua Matthew Squires

Dissertation submitted
to the Eberly College of Arts and Science
at West Virginia University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
a Ph.D. in Political Science

Matthew L. Jacobsmeier, Ph.D., Chair
John C. Kilwein, Ph.D.
Erik S. Herron, Ph.D.
Rachael A. Woldoff, Ph.D.

Department of Political Science

Morgantown, West Virginia
2021

Keywords: election administration, voter turnout
Copyright 2021 Joshua Matthew Squires

Abstract
Shutting the Door on Voting:
The Effects of “The Great Poll Closure”

Joshua Matthew Squires

The 2016 election was the first presidential election following the landmark Shelby County v.
Holder (2013) case that invalidated Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The decision
in Shelby meant that certain jurisdictions with histories of racial discrimination no longer needed
permission or “preclearance” from the federal government before making changes to election
administration procedures. Perhaps not coincidentally, voting jurisdictions across the United
States also saw a record number of polling place closures - especially in formerly preclearance
areas. Past research has studied the effects of precinct closures on voter turnout in individual
counties and at the state level, but never nation-wide – which is where this research differs.
Using precinct data from over 2,270 voting jurisdictions across the United States, I answer the
following questions: (1) who determines the location of polling places?; (2) which jurisdictions
are more likely to close polling places?; (3) what types of citizens are most affected by the
location and relocation of polling places? The goal of this project is to better our understanding
of the causes of precinct closures, the types of jurisdictions that close precincts most frequently,
and the characteristics of citizens who are most affected by precinct closures. I expect my work
to make significant contributions to the study of electoral administration, constitutional law,
voting behavior, and racial and ethnic politics.
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction
The 2016 presidential election was the first general election following the landmark
Shelby County v. Holder (2013) case that invalidated the 4th section of Voting Rights Act (VRA)
of 1965. For the first time since 1964, the United States held elections without the full protection
of the VRA. Perhaps not coincidentally, 2016 also saw a record number of polling place closures
across the United States. The Leadership Conference Education Fund (LCEF) named this
phenomenon “The Great Poll Closure”.1 Of the large number of closures, the LCEF found that
roughly 800 belonged to counties that were formerly under preclearance. To analyze The Great
Poll Closure, I draw from three different areas of study within political science: constitutional
law, political institutions, and political behavior. My first research chapter outlines the processes
of closing precincts according to each states’ election statutes. My second chapter determines
which factors contributed to voting jurisdictions’ closing polling places following Shelby. My
third (and final substantive chapter) looks at the effects of poll closures on county-level turnout.
Shelby County v. Holder
In terms of ensuring the voting rights for non-white2 citizens, many scholars have argued
that the 4th and 5th sections of the VRA were the act’s most important sections (MacCoon 1979;
Motomura 1982); they were also the sections that were up for debate in Shelby. Both sections
worked in tandem to ensure that certain states and counties with histories of voter discrimination
would uphold the standards of the Voting Rights Act. Section 5 (also known as preclearance)

1

The Leadership Conference Education Fund. 2016. “The Great Poll Closure”. http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/reports/2016/poll-closure-report-web.pdf
According to the most recent American Political Science Association style guide, names of ethnic and national groups are capitalized. Black and Indigenous, when
referring to race, are also capitalized. With that, I will be capitalizing Hispanic and Black in this dissertation. White will be lowercased which is also stated in the
updated APSA style guide. Please see this link for other questions: https://mk0apsaconnectbvy6p6.kinstacdn.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2020/07/Style-Manualfor-Political-Science-July-2020-Revision.pdf.
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required that areas with histories of discrimination receive federal approval by either the U.S.
Department of Justice- Civil Rights Office or the District Court for the District of Columbia for
all election administration changes, whereas Section 4(b) (also known as the coverage formula)
created a “coverage” formula to determine which states/counties would need to receive
preclearance. If a state/county met the criteria set forth by the coverage formula, that jurisdiction
would be referred to as a preclearance jurisdiction.
To provide some context as to how preclearance and the coverage formula of the VRA
were challenged in front of the Supreme Court in 2013, I believe it is necessary to first
understand why Shelby County became the plaintiff and the poster-county for the unraveling of
the nation’s most important piece of voter discrimination legislation. In the next chapter, I
provide a summary on the history of voting rights in the United States that describes several
important pieces of legislation and the major players in election administration. I provide a much
briefer summary here for the purposes of this introductory chapter.
The coverage formula of the VRA required that states and/counties receive federal
preclearance on all election changes if, as of November 1st 1964, it used voting tests such as a
poll tax or literacy test and exhibited low voter registration rates or low voter turnout in the 1964
presidential election. The VRA banned the use of voting tests, and over time, voter registration
and turnout in many jurisdictions identified by the coverage formula increased substantially. As
such, especially in more recent years leading up to Shelby, voter registration and turnout rates
had surpassed the thresholds that the VRA set forth for quite some time. Anticipating changes in

2

conditions related to voting rights over time, legislators had built a “bailout” option,3 into the
VRA through which states and counties that showed strong records meeting the requirements of
the VRA, could have the opportunity to “bailout” of the coverage formula. However, one issue
with bailouts that they are difficult to secure. For example, the burden of proof was on state
governments, not the county jurisdictions, which made it difficult to convince judges to allow
statewide bailouts, especially when a state had a history of discriminatory practices. In the 1982
revision of the VRA, Congress relaxed the qualifications for bailout which then allowed county
and city jurisdictions the opportunity to prove that they no longer needed preclearance. Even
with the relaxed bailout options, counties were still not able to be granted bailouts in practice.
There were several attempts by counties in the deep South to escape preclearance,4 but always
came up short – with Shelby County, Alabama – being one of the counties that requested but was
denied a bailout.
Shelby County is located in Appalachian Alabama. Because of its location in the
mountains, it is not known for the old slave plantations found in counties located in the southern
part of the state. However, its geographical location did not exempt the county from a history of
voter discrimination. Like it’s southern county neighbors, voter discrimination laws such as the
poll tax or the literacy test were frequently used in Shelby County specifically to keep the Black
vote down. Because of this, the Black population in Shelby County began to dwindle each
decade following the rise of Jim Crow. In 1960, the Black population was roughly 18%, and by
2010, it had dropped to 11%. In addition to becoming whiter, Shelby also became relatively

Under Section 4(a), a covered jurisdiction may seek exemption from coverage through a process called "bailout.” To achieve an exemption, a
covered jurisdiction must obtain a declaratory judgment from a three-judge panel of the District Court for D.C. that the jurisdiction is eligible to
bail out - https://www.justice.gov/crt/section-4-voting-rights-act.
4
Here is an example of a Texas School District: Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009)
3
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wealthy, suburban, and modern. In 2012, it ranked among the hundred most affluent counties in
the United States with 90% of the residents having at least a high school degree. The average
household also ranks relatively highly compared to other counties across the United States.
In terms of its history with the VRA and preclearance, Shelby County has generally
complied. In its time under preclearance, its proposed elections administration changes have
been objected a total of 5 times– three of which involved the city of Alabaster in the 1970’s
(Bullock, Gaddie, and Wert 2016). Because of Shelby’s economic success since the 1960s and
its near perfect record with the Department of Justice regarding submissions for election
procedure changes, the county election officials felt that in more recent years, it had the right to
be bailed out of the coverage formula (and preclearance). In 2011, the county sued the U.S.
Attorney General in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on the grounds that the
coverage formula and preclearance provision were unconstitutional. The District Court upheld
the provisions, stating that they were still necessary to secure voting rights. A few years earlier in
2006, the VRA had been up for renewal. The District Court used the evidence presented during
those Congressional hearings to provide evidence that the coverage formula and preclearance
were still constitutionally valid.
In 2012, Shelby County appealed the ruling to the Court of Appeals in the D.C. Circuit.
As with the ruling in the District Court, the appellate court also ruled that Section 4(b) and
Section 5 were still valid. Finally, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to question whether
Congress’ decision on the 2006 renewal of the VRA may have exceeded its power under the 14th
and 15th amendments and thus violated the 10th amendment, which states that powers not
delegated to the federal government by the Constitution are reserved to the states.
4

On June 25th, 2013, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Shelby County, stating that the
coverage formula was no longer necessary, “making it no longer responsive to current needs”
(Department of Justice 2015). The decision was controversial and fell along ideological lines in a
five to four vote. The Court’s conservative bloc made up the majority opinion and, the liberal
bloc constituted the minority. The ruling received mixed reaction from parties on opposite sides
of the political aisle. Most Republican states were in favor of the ruling, while most Democratic
states were not. For example, within hours of the Shelby ruling, Texas and North Carolina passed
election laws with more stringent voter identification laws.5 In closing, as scholars Bullock,
Gaddie, and Wert (2016) stated the Shelby ruling was “the last act in the play of the second
Reconstruction, and of the Voting Rights Act” (xiii).
Polling Place Closures
Another popular election law change that states enacted following Shelby involved the
closing, relocating, or changing of precincts and polling places. For background purposes, it is
important to understand the difference between a precinct and a polling place and how they can
relate to one another. A precinct is the smallest geographic unit of the electoral system. Local
governments divide up their jurisdictions into these precincts to administer elections and collect
votes. Within a precinct, election officials normally place at least one polling place. By
definition, a polling place is a building where voting takes place during an election. These
polling places are usually in churches, gymnasiums, firehalls, or other widely recognized
buildings in the communities.

5

This link provides more information on this: https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/effects-shelby-county-v-holder.
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The act of changing, closing, and/or consolidating precincts takes place at the local level.
In the beginning of most election years, a local government official or election official will
determine whether changes in a precinct would benefit the voters. In local governments, it is
often the local election official’s (or LEOs) or the county commissioner’s job to determine
precinct boundaries. However, in most cases, it is LEOs set precinct boundaries with county
commissioners granting them unquestioned approval.
As stated in the last section, the first presidential election following Shelby saw a record
number of polling place closures, especially in locations that were formerly under preclearance.
The Leadership Conference Education Fund (LCEF) coined this closure phenomena “The Great
Poll Closure.” In their 2016 report, the LCEF finds that jurisdictions in formerly preclearance
areas tend to share socioeconomic characteristics such as large non-white populations, low
income levels, and low average levels of formal education. As extant voting literature has shown,
socioeconomic factors are often associated with citizens not casting votes because they lack the
resources to do so (Leighley and Nagler 2014; Verba et al. 1995). Closing polling places further
reduces the likelihood that citizens with low socioeconomic status will turn out to vote.
The LCEF used a variety of different sources to gather the data on poll closures. For the
2012 baseline data, it used the Election Assistance Commission’s Election Administration and
Voting Survey (EACS). The EAVS asks three questions about the total number of polling places
in a jurisdiction: (1) physical polling places other than election offices; (2) election offices; and
(3) other. The LCEF tallied up the three answers and used that as the total number of election
day polling places for jurisdictions in 2012. In 2016 it asked each local government for the total
number of polling places. As shown in Table 1.1, of the 874 total preclearance jurisdictions, the
6

sample included 425, which is roughly half. It found a total of 868 polling place closures
between 2012 and 2016.
Table 1-1. Comparison of Polling Place Closure Data in Two Preclearance County (PC) Samples.
LCEF Data
My Data
State
PC Counties in Number of
State
PC Counties Number of
Sample by
Closures
in Sample
Closures
Actual Number Between
by Actual
Between 2012
of PC Counties 2012 & 2016
Number of
& 2016
PC Counties
Alabama
18 of 67
66
Alabama
67 of 67
144
Alaska
0 of 1
------Alaska
0 of 1
------Arizona
15 of 15
212
Arizona
15 of 15
182
California
0 of 3
------California
3 of 3
1
Florida
0 of 5
------Florida
5 of 5
2
Georgia
0 of 159
------Georgia
159 of 159
422
Louisiana
64 of 64
103
Louisiana
64 of 64
107
Mississippi
59 of 82
44
Mississippi
29 of 82
9
New York
0 of 3
------New York
0 of 3
------North Carolina
40 of 40
27
North Carolina 40 of 40
27
South Carolina* 46 of 46
12
South Carolina 46 of 46
103
South Dakota
0 of 2
------South Dakota
2 of 2
------Texas
134 of 254
403
Texas
185 of 254
318
Virginia
0 of 133
------Virginia
0 of 133
------Totals
425 of 874
868
Totals
615 of 874
1,315
(49%)
(70%)
*South Carolina was 2014 to 2016, rather than 2012 to 2016 – which may explain the large difference in my data and the
LCEF.

In terms of my sample, I followed the same procedure as the LCEF in 2012, utilizing the
EAVS. However, our data differed in 2016. I was able to gain access to the 2016 EAVS dataset,
so I followed the same procedure as in 2012 and summed the three questions regarding election
day polling places. Because of this, I was able to find data in about 200 more preclearance
jurisdictions, 615 in all and about 70% of the total number of preclearance jurisdictions. I also
identified roughly 1,315 poll closures, roughly 500 more than in the LCEF sample. I believe the
differences in the number of closures between the two datasets is due to the data I was able to
use for the 2016 election, which was not readily available to the LCEF. Also, the LCEF was
7

requesting polling place data from local jurisdictions, so there may be some biased answers
caused by that, as well. Regardless of where the data’s origins, the results from both datasets
suggest that many poll closures occurred in formerly preclearance areas following Shelby.
In addition to the descriptive data in table 1-1, I believe a “real-world” example may also
provide a better understanding of how detrimental The Great Poll Closure was to voting rights
following Shelby. One of the four Arizona counties that border Mexico, Cochise County, has
continually been under siege by the Department of Justice over VRA Section 5 violations. As
recently as 2006, the county government violated Section 5 by not providing election materials
to Spanish and Spanish-speaking poll workers at local precincts. In preparation for the 2016
presidential election, the election officials of Cochise County decided on a new polling place
plan such that the traditional election day precincts would turn into county-wide voting centers.
Based on my data, the number of traditional polling places went from 49 to 20 between 2012 and
2016. Local election officials stated that the switch to county-wide voting centers involved
identifying locations based on “easy public accessibility, Internet connectivity, and the proximity
to former polling places.”6 One reason that was not mentioned: ensuring access for Hispanic
voters (LCEF 2016).
I believe the Cochise County case is useful for two reasons. First, it shows that the
closure of polling places can be a valid legal process. In other words, based on state laws (which
will be described in chapter 2), the law allows the changing of precinct locations and polling
places. Closures are normally caused by factors such as population change, lack of traditional
election day voters, or lack of funds for poll workers and voting locations. In the case of Cochise,

6

County Adopts 18 Voting Centers,” Cochise County Herald/Review Media, August 26, 2015. https://www.myheraldreview.com/county-adoptsvoting-centers/article_2c8f2594-4c02-11e5-822f-1f313c861e8a.html.
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local officials’ arguments were valid in terms of making the change from polling places to voting
centers, but the effects on non-whites were not discussed. This is where the coverage formula
and preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act would come into play. For example, when a
formerly preclearance jurisdiction election official wanted to make a change in the pre-Shelby
era, they would submit the proposal to the Department of Justice. The Department of Justice
would then determine if the change would harm the voting opportunities for non-whites.
Normally, the DOJ would consider factors such as population size and turnout in previous
elections when making its determination. However, with preclearance no longer required, cases
like Cochise are starting to become more frequent.
Second, the Cochise County example also shows how socioeconomic status plays a role
in the closing of former preclearance jurisdictions with large non-white populations. As I will
show in the chapters to follow, polling place closures can be burdensome on voters with lower
socioeconomic status. For example, citizens affected by a polling place change are often notified
via mail, or the change will be posted at the local county courthouse; but if a citizen does not
have a permanent mailing address or is unaware of the posting, it is more difficult for a citizen to
cast a vote. Another issue is distance. Non-white citizens are less likely to have access to a
personal vehicle or even public transportation than white citizens, making arrangements to get to
the new polling place and one that may be further away is a burden; this was a major complaint
in Cochise County example.
One important problem, however, with the accounts of polling place closures described
thus far is that they are no accompanied by statistical analyses that establish whether former
preclearance jurisdictions were closing precincts more frequently in areas with large non-white
9

populations, all else equal. This is where the research described in this dissertation is important.
In the next section, I discuss the inconsistencies in some of the major studies conducted on
polling places, and then conclude by explaining how my work fills those gaps.
Poll Closures in Political Science
In terms of political science research, precinct relocation and closure has been studied but
not as exhaustively as other election administration processes like voter ID laws and
redistricting. There have been four major studies on the effects of polling place closures. In 2005,
Haspel and Knotts looked at two elections in the city of Atlanta. They found that poll changes
increased voter turnout throughout Atlanta. However, the authors attribute their surprising results
to two factors. First, local election officials sent out reminder postcard to all voters roughly 30
days prior to the election so voters would not forget about the changes. Second, the city of
Atlanta added eight precincts from the first to the second election, giving more voters places to
vote. Essentially, Haspel and Knotts showed that adding more precincts (which changes where
people vote) had a positive influence on voter turnout.
One of the first studies to find that polling place closures can cause a decrease in turnout
was Brady and McNulty (2011). These scholars looked at the effect of poll closures in the 2003
Los Angeles gubernatorial recall election. They found that citizens who had their polling place
moved were 1.85 percent less likely to vote than those whose polling place remained the same.
Originally, Brady and McNulty found this 1.85 percent to be much higher, but part of the
original figure was offset by accounting for absentee and early voting. In other words, they
concluded that moving or closing a precinct does result in people not turning out to vote, but it
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also increases the chances in non-traditional forms of voting (i.e. absentee ballots and early
voting).
Brady and McNulty also found that the effect of closures was different for Democratic
and Republican voters. Democrats were more sensitive to the poll changes compared to
Republicans. While these effects did not determine the outcomes of the election, they are
worrisome enough “to make it possible for someone to affect outcomes by more extensive
manipulation of polling place locations” (Brady and McNulty 2011 115). Amos, Smith and Ste.
Claire (2017) takes this partisan concern to the next level by studying reprecincting as a partisan
act. In their experiment, they looked at a 2014 midterm election in Manatee County, Florida.
They chose this location because the local election official prior to the election was a Democrat,
and the one during the election was a Republican. They found that when the Republican LEO
was in office, precincts in Manatee County that were predominately non-white, younger, and
Democratic were the most likely to be consolidated or closed. When looking at voter turnout,
citizens with those demographic characteristics were also the least likely to cast a ballot. In short,
Amos, Smith, and Ste. Claire (2017) provides evidence that polling change can be a partisan act
that are detrimental to democracy in America.
One limitation of the literature I have discussed to this point is that each individual study
has only dealt with one specific jurisdiction or one election. However, Clinton et al. (2020)
changed the political science landscape by looking at the effect of poll closures throughout the
whole state of North Carolina across three general elections (2008, 2012, and 2016). They find
that voters who had their polling place shut down or relocated were less likely to vote than those
whose polling places remained the same, but this finding is completely offset when they
11

accounted for early voting. In other words, when a person’s polling place changes, it discourages
them from turning out on election day but not from voting entirely; they just vote earlier.
Goals of the Dissertation
The contributions made by the scholars I have referenced so far had significant effects on
the election administration literature, but there are still some gaps that need to be filled, and my
dissertation will attempt to fill those gaps. First, my research will be the first to study polling
place closures from a nation-wide standpoint. Using county election data, I compile polling place
data from roughly 2,270 voting jurisdictions across the United States for each of my analyses.
Second, my research will also provide rigorous statistical analysis in attempt to determine the
causes (and effects) of The Great Poll Closure. As I mentioned in an earlier section, journalistic
reports have noted that poll closures were especially prominent in areas with large non-white
populations that were formerly subject to preclearance. While the importance of those
descriptive findings should not be downplayed, they were not accompanied by statistical
analyses that accounted for legally valid reasons for closing polling places. Third, I also provide
a unique measure of polling place closures called the percentage change in voters per precinct (or
PCVPP). PCVPP allows for scholars to compare the effects of poll closures across voting
jurisdictions of differing population sizes. My hope is that this measure will be used in future
research when studying the impacts of polling place closures specifically at the state or national
level.
The discussion above has provided a brief introduction to the central issues addressed by
this dissertation. I now provide a brief description of what is to follow.

12

Chapter 2 discusses the laws regarding the establishment, modification, and
consolidation of precincts in each state. This chapter was created to lay the groundwork for my
quantitative chapters to follow. I believe it is important to understand the basics of polling place
closures before empirically analyzing the factors associated with such closures.
Chapter 3 examines polling place closures from an institutional point of view. This
chapter seeks to determine the main factors that play a role in jurisdictions’ decisions to close
polling places. As chapter 2 will explain, there are several constitutionally valid, if perhaps
unfortunate, reasons for jurisdictions to close precincts such as reduction in the number of voters
and fiscal constraints. Controlling for factors that legitimately influence decisions to close
precincts is necessary when determining whether precincts are closed for reasons that are
potentially problematic in terms of voting rights, and the voting rights of members of racial and
ethnic groups. I attempt to determine what the main causes of The Great Poll Closure were. Did
the Shelby decision result in a rash of polling places closures that disadvantaged non-white
voters, or did jurisdictions close polling places mainly for constitutionally allowable reasons?
Chapter 4 takes a more behavioral approach in studying The Great Poll Closure.
My goal in this chapter is to answer one important question: does closing precincts deter
citizens, and especially citizens who are members of non-white populations, from
voting? Using aggregate data from the 2008, 2012 and 2016 presidential elections, I
implement difference-in-difference analyses to explore the effects of changes in polling
places on the change in county-level voter turnout between 2008-12 and 2012-16. The
findings of this chapter have important implications for the current literature on nonwhite voter turnout and election administration.
13

Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation and summarizes each chapter’s main findings. It
also discusses the important real-world implications of the research described in the dissertation
and suggests avenues for future research.
While political scientists have examined the effect of poll closures at the precinct, county,
and state level, my work addresses this issue at the national level by identifying patterns in each
state law, looking at a large sample of voting jurisdictions over a period of three elections, and
then testing the effects of precinct changes on voter turnout. I believe that through my analyses,
the discipline will better understand how the process of changing polling places works, which
jurisdictions conduct this process most frequently, and who is most affected by it. I expect my
work to make significant contributions to the study of electoral administration, voter turnout, and
racial and ethnic politics.

14

CHAPTER 2: The Legal Aspects of Closing Polls
This chapter discusses the laws regarding the establishment, modification, and
consolidation of precincts in each state. I believe that this is an important aspect of my
dissertation because precinct formation tends to be one of the more overlooked procedures of
election administration. One other reason for the importance of these laws is that “reprecincting”
is often conflated with “redistricting.” Although both processes involve drawing boundaries,
precincts and districts are established in much different ways. In this chapter, I am going to
summarize the “reprecincting” laws of each state. I am also going to compare the states’ laws
while also identifying patterns in that legislation. For example, most states from the South make
it harder for people to vote early and use absentee ballots while Pacific states such as
Washington and Oregon do not even have traditional election day voting and require their
citizens to vote by mail. In short, I expect to see patterns in precinct laws like those we see in
early voting laws and laws related to other voting procedures.
This chapter is divided into three parts. First, I provide a “legal primer” of non-white
voting rights in the U.S. I begin with the period of Reconstruction and conclude with the Shelby
v. Holder case. I believe it is necessary to understand the progression of voting rights for
members of non-white populations before discussing the process of reprecincting and other
election administration processes. Second, I will discuss how election administration works and
how local, state, and federal governments are connected in the process. This section also
analyzes the differences between reapportionment, redistricting, and reprecincting. Last, I
compare each state’s laws regarding reprecincting using the criteria I created. The goals of this
chapter are to not only provide the reader with background on reprecincting but also to help
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make sense of the findings of my final two quantitative chapters regarding the large number of
polling place closures since Shelby.

Voting Rights Legislation: From Reconstruction to the VRA
Prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, there were few specific laws
regarding federal oversight of elections.7 State and local governments essentially had free reign
in terms of election administration. Article 1, Section 4 of the constitution gives Congress “broad
power over federal elections while the 14th and 15th Amendments give it power to legislate for
any elections where relevant rights are affected” (Hale, Montjoy, and Brown 2015). The 14th
amendment (passed in 1868) clarified that every person naturalized or born in the U.S. is a
citizen and the 15th (passed in 1970) guaranteed all U.S. citizens the right to vote regardless of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude (U.S. Commission of Civil Rights 2018). These
amendments were initially successful in “expanding access to the ballot box for recently freed
slaves, and in providing voter protections for African-American citizens by outlawing any action
taken to suppress their vote” (U.S. Commission of Civil Rights 2018 16). In the election of 1868,
700,000 Blacks voted for the first time. In Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina, Black
registration rates exceeded that of white registration. By 1869, over 20 Black citizens were
elected to the U.S. Congress. During the period of Reconstruction (1865-1877), Black turnout in
elections increased significantly, but this revolution in political participation among Black
Americans did not last long.

7

Once example was the Enforcement Act of 1870; It was the first comprehensive federal statute that dealt with elections. Acts such as bribery,
interference, false voting, etc. were made federal offenses. Federal judges would visit voting locations to see whether the voting actions warranted
federal offenses. However, most parts of the Enforcement act were overturned by a Democratic Congress following the period of Reconstruction.
To see a comprehensive breakdown of pre-1965 voting rights legislation, please visit:
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI_S4_C1_1_1_1_2/.

16

In spite of the 14th and 15th amendments, southern states quickly began to find ways to
slow the progression of Black political power. In the election of 1876 (often referred to as the
Second Corrupt Bargain), Rutherford B. Hayes was elected President through what became
known as the Compromise of 1877. This compromise officially ended the period of
Reconstruction by leaving the South to govern itself for the first time since the conclusion of the
Civil War. In Hayes’ first act as commander-and-chief, he withdrew the Northern troops from all
Southern capital cities. This move almost single-handedly halted any progression Blacks had
made in terms of political power at that time. The Northern troops had been in the South to make
sure that local and state governments below the Mason-Dixon line followed the laws put forth by
the 14th and 15th amendments. With the removal of Northern Troops, the Compromise of 1877
ended the Reconstruction period and ushered in the era of Jim Crow.
Jim Crow typically refers to the period of time between the collapse of
Reconstruction and the start of the Civil Rights Era in the 1950s. During this period, racial
segregation under the law prevailed in the Southern part of the United States. Jim Crow
laws mandated that separate public facilities (e.g., parks, bathrooms, swimming pools,
schools) must be maintained for Blacks and whites. Ten of the eleven former confederate
states created new constitutions or amendments that mandated “separate, but equal”
guidelines. As expected, Jim Crow also had a large effect on voter registration and turnout
among Blacks.
In the late 1800s, many former confederate states began to implement certain types of
voter suppression methods such as poll taxes, literacy tests, and grandfather clauses. For
example, a poll tax could cost a citizen in some places $1.50 to $1.75 to vote, which was a large
amount of money for sharecropper in the nineteenth century (Texas Politics 2012). In
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Mississippi, the literacy test required citizens to read and explain parts of the state constitution to
the local county clerk. County clerks would pick difficult passages for Blacks to interpret while
picking simple sentences for whites to explain (U.S. Commission for Civil Rights 2018).
If poll taxes and literacy tests were not enough to disenfranchise Blacks, election officials
(specifically in the South) found other unique ways to stop Blacks from voting. In South
Carolina, election officials created an indirect literacy test called the “eight box law” (Holt
1979). Under this requirement, voters had to cast a vote in separate ballot boxes for the eight
types of offices. If a ballot was put in the wrong box, that ballot would not count. The only way
to identify which ballot box represented which office was by the labels placed on them. Election
officials would read the correct names to illiterate whites but the wrong ones to illiterate Blacks.
Although the 14th and 15th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution were created to alleviate the
barriers Black Americans had to overcome to participate in politics, these amendments, did not
address racial discriminatory practices such as the use of literacy tests and poll taxes.
Another way whites’ discouraged Blacks from voting during the Era of Jim Crow was by
creating “sundown towns” throughout the United States. Sundown towns had very few Black
households’ decade after decade, with a sharp drop in Black populations between two censuses.
In these sundown towns, white residents and lawmakers would force the Black population to
leave by enforcing laws that made living conditions unbearable. For example, some sundown
towns made Blacks pay a fee to send their kids to public school. Some made it a crime for a
Black person to be out “after sundown”. This would not only encourage Black residents to leave,
but also Black motorists as well. One common misunderstanding made by filmmakers, the
media, and the public is that these sundown towns took place s only, or at least largely, in the
South. According to Loewen (2009), sundown towns were more likely to be found in the North
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and Midwest. The South seldomly designated towns as sundown towns this because they needed
Blacks for cheap labor on plantations. “Among the 204 towns known to have displayed sundown
signs, only 9 were in the plantation South” (Loewen 2009 27).
Another way in which Blacks and other non-white populations were disenfranchised was
through felon voting restrictions. In their event-history analysis from 1850 to 2002, Manza and
Uggen (2004) found that while controlling for factors such as time, region, and economic
competition between Blacks and whites, states with larger proportions of non-whites in their
prison populations were more likely to pass restrictive laws such as prohibiting ex-felons from
voting. This was especially relevant in the deep South following the Civil War, especially
regarding types of crimes that Blacks were more likely to be found of committing.
The early 20th century was not entirely discouraging for non-white political power. In
1944, Smith v. Allwright was one of the first Supreme Court cases that challenged the legality of
Jim Crow election administration laws. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, there were few
guidelines in place that allowed the federal government to intervene when election practices
(such as poll taxes) were becoming more separate than equal. However, Texas’ “all-white
primary” elections created one of the first opportunities for the Supreme Court to intervene. The
Court ruled in Smith v. Allwright that these “all-white” primaries restricted access to only white
voters. The Court also stated that all primary elections must be open to citizens of all races. The
federal court concluded that these all-white primaries were unconstitutional and violated the 14th
and 15th amendments.
Following Smith v. Allwright, Black registration rates increased by 6% percent from 1947
to 1950 across the South (U.S. Commission for Civil Rights 2018 19). However, despite the
Court’s decisions in cases successfully litigated by parties aiming to advance voting rights, there
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were still no permanent guidelines put in place and racially discriminatory practices continued.
By the mid-fifties, the voting registration rates of Blacks in the South was only 15%. States like
Mississippi and Alabama had Black registration rates under 5%. It was not until 1957 that federal
legislation was enacted which to prohibit state governments from implementing racially
discriminatory election laws.
Finally, in 1957, Congress passed the first Civil Rights Act (CRA) which gave the
Attorney General the authority to stop local election officials from implementing discriminatory
practices that would hinder minorities voting. The CRA of 1957 also created the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, which conducted studies of discriminatory electoral practices in the
South. The Commission would send officials to observe the election practices of areas that have
had reports of voter discrimination. However, those observers received backlash from the
counties, specifically from the local election officials themselves. For example, some states even
created legislation to require the local registrars to burn registration lists so that, members of the
commission could not access them. Another obstacle the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights faced
was that lower courts (specifically in the South) ruled that the Civil Rights Act was
unconstitutional, in that it violated a state’s individual right to rule.
Congress attempted to plug the holes of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 by creating
amendments with the Civil Rights Act of 1960. The new legislation required that local election
officials keep a record of election activity up to 22 months after an election and that they make it
available to federal officials. The CRA of 1960 also assigned federal officials to register Blacks
in a county if a judge found a local jurisdiction to be using discriminatory registration practices.
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Despite the efforts of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and 1960, both pieces of legislation
proved to be largely ineffective. One of the biggest issues was that both versions of the CRA did
not provide “specific authority for the Attorney General to enforce its own provisions” (U.S.
Commission for Civil Rights 2018). Because of this, racially discriminatory practices continued
into the 1960’s. In the Spring of 1963, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC),
led by Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., began to bring attention to the integration campaign through
several non-violent protests in Birmingham, Alabama. Dr. King and his followers organized sitins and marches that brought media attention from across the country. On live television,
American citizens witnessed Black teenagers and young adults get mauled by large police attack
dogs and sprayed with giant firehoses. The Birmingham Campaign (as it is often referred to)
acted as a lightning rod for the Civil Rights Movement prompting President John F. Kennedy to
propose an updated version of the Civil Rights Act to Congress. Kennedy stated there needed to
be legislation “giving all Americans the right to be served in facilities which are open to the
public as well as the greater protection to vote” (Kennedy 1963). Unfortunately for Kennedy,
Congress did not share his enthusiasm on a new Civil Rights Act. Most members of Congress
could get on board with most aspects of Kennedy’s proposal, but many would not accept the
provisions guaranteeing equal access to public facilities. In October of 1963, there looked to be
no hope for the new Civil Rights Act.
However, following Kennedy’s assassination in November of 1963, the political climate
began to change in favor of Kennedy’s civil rights proposal. In his first address to a joint session
of Congress on November 27th, 1963, Lyndon Johnson, Kennedy’s successor, urged Congress to
pass the new Civil Rights Act as a tribute to Kennedy’s legacy. As Johnson (1963) put it, “No
memorial oration or eulogy could more eloquently honor President Kennedy's memory than the
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earliest possible passage of the civil rights bill for which he fought so long.” After a series of
filibusters by the “Southern Bloc”8 which resulted in a substitute version of the bill9, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was finally approved by both houses of Congress and signed into law by
President Johnson on July 2nd.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 has a total of six provisions. In terms of voting rights, the
first provision (Title I) was the most important. It made sure that voting rules and procedures
would be equally applied to all races. However, Title I did not discuss the idea of voter
qualification. In other words, states could still deny people the right to vote if they did not meet
the appropriate qualifications (i.e. poll taxes and literacy tests). As one Congressman stated,
“While it can be truly said that present laws [Civil Rights Act] have proved to be effective tools
to deal with discrimination in voting, the tools are limited in scope; there is no widespread
remedy to meet what is still widespread discrimination” (U.S. Commission for Civil Rights 2018
21). In short, despite the momentous efforts by the Johnson administration, Blacks in the South
were still being discouraged from voting through the use of discriminatory practices such as the
poll tax and the literacy test.
Following the 1964 presidential election year, during which the Democrats won the
presidency an overwhelming majority in both houses of Congress, President Johnson began to
question the strength of the Civil Rights Act. Although the act made sure that voting rules were
administrated equally to all races, voting jurisdictions were still using discriminatory voting
practices such as poll tax and the literacy test. Johnson was not alone on this observation, Dr.
Martin Luther King and the SCLC also believed that more legislation needed to be passed to

8
9

19 Senators from the South created a 54-day filibuster that resulted in a substitute version of the bill.
The bill was weaker than the original proposal especially dealing with government enforcement within private businesses.
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achieve voting equality for all races. A few months after the 1964 election, King and the SCLC
took part in several protests in Southern cities where voting discrimination was most prominent.
On March 7, while protesting in Selma, Alabama, King and Congressman John Lewis were both
beaten at the foot of Edmund Pettis Bridge. One significant element of this was that it was seen
on national television. People from all over the United States witnessed the horrifying event,
which immediately caused an outcry to Congress that additional action needed to be taken
regarding civil rights. Roughly five months later, on August 6th, 1965, President Lyndon B.
Johnson signed the Voter Rights Act (VRA) into law. The VRA is a general prohibition of all
state and local election laws that have discriminatory intent. It made it illegal for state and local
election officials to deny anybody the right to vote because of the color of their skin. Essentially,
the VRA was a much stronger version of the voting rights provision contained in the Civil Rights
Act of 1957, 1960, and 1964.

One important facet of the VRA was that required federal oversight of election law
changes in certain regions of the United States. Section 5 of the VRA required certain states and
counties to receive permission for any type of election procedure change. There were two ways
to receive preclearance: (1) a jurisdiction could submit their election change to the Department of
Justice and have the Voting Rights division determines whether the election change had
discriminatory intent, and (2) a jurisdiction could submit their proposal to the U.S. District Court
for D.C., and which determined whether the electoral change qualified for preclearance. The
counties and/or states required to receive preclearance were determined by the “coverage
formula” created in Section 4(b) of the VRA. “Covered” jurisdictions were identified by the
following: (1) the use of voting “tests” such as the poll tax and literacy test and (2) low voter
registration or voter turnout among minorities.
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The original requirements resulted in coverage of the entire states of Alabama, Alaska,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia; and some subdivisions (usually
counties) in Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, and North Carolina. It also created partial coverage of
Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
York, and Wyoming. By 1975, the coverage formula covered the whole of Alaska, Arizona, and
Texas, and parts of California, Florida, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, and South Dakota
(Department of Justice 2015). Figure 2-1 shows a representation of preclearance distribution. As
one can tell, covered jurisdictions (except for some county/township jurisdictions) were highly
concentrated in the South.
Figure 2-1. Section 5 Covered Jurisdictions (From the Department of Justice)10

As expected, the VRA and the preclearance provision were highly successful through the
first years following its conception. By the late 1960’s, federal examiners (granted permission by

10

About Section 5. Department of Justice. https://www.justice.gov/crt/jurisdictions-previously-covered-section-5

24

the VRA) “registered more than 150,000 Black southerners to vote in 58 counties covered by
Section 5” (U.S. Commission for Civil Rights 2018 23-24). For example, in states that were still
segregated (i.e. Mississippi and Alabama), the Black registration rates were more than eight
times the pre-VRA average. Even white voting registration rates even increased by almost 20
percent in some covered states. In short, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was a tremendous
success at the onset. However, as time progressed, litigation surrounding the language of the
Voting Rights Act began to increase while the influence of its special provisions (i.e. coverage
formula and preclearance) began to decrease.

The Rise and Fall of Sections 4 & 5

Because Section 2 of the VRA outlawed the use of blatant discriminatory practices such
as the poll tax and literacy test, the coverage formula and preclearance provision were relatively
dormant in the first couple years of the VRA’s existence. In other words, covered jurisdictions
did not have to send their electoral changes to the Department of Justice (DOJ) or the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia (DC) because those changes were not blatantly
discriminatory changes to electoral procedures such as the implementation of a poll tax, there
was no reason to submit them for preclearance. This changed, however, following the Allen v.
State Board of Elections Supreme Court case in 1969. In this case, the Court held that any
changes, even if minor, must be submitted for approval. The number of covered jurisdictions’
submissions to either the DOJ or DC increased significantly following the Allen case. According
to the Justice department, there were roughly 130 preclearance submissions in 1969 and by 1971,
that number rose to over 1,000 (Department of Justice 2015). One problem with the DOJ
increasing its voting law scope, was pushback by jurisdictions’ election officials, specifically
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regarding the language of the purpose and effect prongs of Section 5. In other words, because of
the ambiguity surrounding these terms, jurisdictions began challenging how the Courts could
reject their election law proposals on the grounds that the VRA itself was not clear.
For a jurisdiction to receive preclearance, the DOJ and/or DC must find that the
jurisdiction’s proposed election law changes do not have discriminatory “effect” and/or
“purpose.” Discriminatory effect means that any voting change “cannot result in more
discrimination than before the change was made” and discriminatory purpose means that any
voting change “cannot have been intended to increase existing discrimination when
implemented” (Department of Justice 2015). Because of the vagueness of these two terms,
“effect” and “purpose,” jurisdictions began challenging how the courts can reject their election
law proposals. The existence and ambiguity of the discriminatory effect and purpose prongs has
resulted in several Supreme Court cases, with perhaps none more significant than Beer v. United
States (1976) and Reno v. Bossier Parrish (2000).
In Beer v. United States, the city of New Orleans sought out preclearance for their
redistricting plan in the early 1970s. The District Court for the District of Columbia refused to
preclear the plan on the grounds that the redistricting would seriously abridge the right to vote on
account of race or color. Following an appeal, the Supreme Court heard the case and reversed the
outcome in favor of the City of New Orleans. The Court ruled that the proposed electoral change
did not make minorities worse off than they were before the electoral change. The Court referred
to this as a “retrogression standard.” In other words, “changes that do not make matters worse for
minority voters are entitled to preclearance, even where the new method of election appears
likely to dilute minority voting strength” (McCrary et al 2006 283-4). This court case seriously
weakened the effect of the preclearance provision. Following the Beer case in 1976, preclearance
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objections based on discriminatory effect or “retrogression” were becoming fewer and fewer.
According to the Department of Justice, 40% of preclearance objections in the 1970s belonged to
“retrogression”, but as time progressed into the 80’s and 90’s, retrogression objections were
reduced to less than 10% (McCrary et al. 2016).
Despite the precedent set by the Beer case, Section 5 of the VRA remained effective
through the “discriminatory purpose” prong. Discriminatory purpose is defined as the
administering of any election process “with any purpose of denying or abridging the right to vote
on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority group” (Department of Justice
2015). According to the Department of Justice, only 11% of objections in the 70’s belonged to
the purpose prong, but that number quadrupled by the 1990s with over half of the objections
having to do with discriminatory purpose (2015). Despite this success, the purpose prong, like
the effect prong, was also rejected by the Supreme Court.
In the early 1990’s, a Louisianan parish (Bossier Parish) proposed a redistricting plan that
created no majority Black districts, even though Blacks made up 20 percent of the parish’s
population. Because of the history of discrimination in Bossier, it was a covered jurisdiction
(under the formula in Section 4(b) of the VRA). When Bossier parish proposed their redistricting
plans to the Attorney General, they were denied preclearance on the grounds of discriminatory
purpose. The parish then filed the preclearance action in the District Court for D.C. The District
Court granted Bossier Parish preclearance for their redistricting plan because the proposed plan
did not have the intent of making things worse or “did not have a retrogressive purpose” for
minorities in that parish. This District Court ruling was heard by the Supreme Court, but the high
court remanded the case back to the District Court for a retrial, where they ruled, yet again, in
favor of the “retrogression standard”. Because of the decisions in the Beer and Bossier cases, the
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discriminatory “effect” and “purpose” prongs of Section 5 were now difficult to enforce. They
both required evidence that election procedure changes were “designed not merely to
discriminate against minority voters but to make matters worse for them” (McCrary et al. 2006
302).
The number of preclearance objections declined drastically following Bossier. According
to the Yale Law Review, there have been a total of 92 objections from 1996 to 2006, that is an
objection rate of roughly 0.02% (2007). It appeared the pre-clearance provision was destined for
irrelevance, but in 2006, new life was granted to Section 5 of the VRA.
On May 2nd, 2006, President George W. Bush signed into law the Fannie Lou Hamer,
Rosa Parks, and the Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act
(or the VRARA). The VRARA extended the special provisions that had been set to expire in
2007 for another 25 years (U.S. Congress 2006). This included the coverage formula as well as
the preclearance provision. The VRARA also addressed the Bossier ruling, making preclearance
easier to deny. The language of the VRARA specifically states “that any voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting denies or
abridges the right to vote if its purpose is or its effect will be the diminishment of the ability of
any U.S. citizens on account of race or color, or in contravention of certain guarantees, to elect
their preferred candidates of choice” (U.S. Congress 2006). In other words, the retrogression
standard was no longer needed for the Attorney General or District Court to deny preclearance. If
a covered jurisdiction changes an election process with “any discriminatory purpose or effect”,
that jurisdiction will be denied preclearance and those changes will not happen.
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The passage of the VRARA helped clear up the confusion surrounding the purpose and
effect prongs of Section 5 of the VRA, but it did not deal with any uncertainty surrounding
Section 4, especially the bailout provision. Bailout is a clause that allows jurisdictions the
opportunity to prove in front of a three-judge panel (the District Court for D.C.) that they no
longer needed to receive federal preclearance on any voting procedure changes. The bailout
procedure was provided for in the original Voting Rights Act in 1965 but was rarely
implemented due to the criteria for a bailout being difficult to meet. The burden was on state
governments to prove a that the criteria for bailout were met in the entire state, and it was
difficult to convince judges of this, especially when the state had a history of discriminatory
practices. In the 1982 revision of the VRA, Congress relaxed the qualifications for bailout and
allowed county and city jurisdictions, rather than only states, the opportunity to prove that they
no longer needed preclearance. Even with this change, however, jurisdictions were still not
“bailing out” of the coverage formula. According to Herbert (2007), following the 1982
amendment, only 12 jurisdictions bailed out. All of them belong to the state of Virginia. Scholars
argued that even with the relaxed qualifications, the Department of Justice still made it difficult
for jurisdictions to bail out.
Shortly after the passage of the VRARA in 2006, a Texas utility district sought to bail out
from Sections 4 and 5 of the VRA. The district argued that because they did not register voters
that they did not need to seek preclearance for any election changes. Their case was heard in
front of the Supreme Court in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. 1 v. Holder in
2009. In 9-0 decision, the Court ruled that covered jurisdictions shall be allowed to receive
bailout if they met the specific criteria set forth by the Attorney General’s office (the bailout
requirements set by the 1982 amendment). For example, the jurisdiction must eliminate those
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election procedures that “dilute or inhibit equal access to the electoral process” as well as
providing evidence of minority electoral participation (Department of Justice 2015). Due to the
verdict in the Northwest court case, jurisdictions began challenging the constitutionality of the 4th
and 5th sections of the VRA, which eventually led to the official downfall of preclearance.
In September of 2011, Shelby County, Alabama sued the U.S. Attorney General for
denying the county preclearance on an election law change. Shelby County argued that sections
4 and 5 of the VRA – and specifically the coverage formula defined by Section 4 – were
“facially unconstitutional.” The District Court for D.C. ruled to uphold the two provisions, ruling
that the VRARA of 2006 was enough evidence to prove that the coverage formula and the
preclearance provision were not unconstitutional. Unhappy with that decision, Shelby County
took their case to the U.S. Courts of Appeals the following year. On May 12th, 2012, the
Appellate court upheld the District Courts’ ruling that Congresses reauthorization of the VRA in
2006 was enough to justify the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 5.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the case to question Congress’s decision to
reauthorize Section 4(b) and 5 of the VRA in 2006. In the landmark case, Shelby County v.
Holder, the Court argued that Congress may have exceeded its power under the 14th and 15th
amendments and thus violated the 10th amendment, which states that power not delegated to the
federal government by the Constitution is reserved to the states. On June 25th, 2013, the Court
declared Section 4(b) of the VRA to be unconstitutional because the coverage formula was based
on 40-year-old data, “making it no longer responsive to current needs” (Department of Justice
2015). The Court did not rule Section 5 (the preclearance provision) unconstitutional because no
jurisdiction can be subject to preclearance without a coverage formula. Members of the majority
opinion stated that the coverage formula was “based on 40-year-old facts with no logical
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relationship to the present day” (Shelby v. Holder 2013). In the 2006 VRARA, Congress did
reauthorize the Voting Rights Act for another 25 years but did not update the coverage formula,
which had not been changed since 1975 (McCrary et al. 2006). Because of Shelby, voting
jurisdictions that were previously covered by Section 4(b) of the VRA were now allowed to
make changes to their voting procedures without receiving the federal government’s approval.
It is important to note that other sections of the VRA are meant to prevent drastic
discriminatory procedural changes from being made. Section 2 of the VRA, allows to the federal
government to file lawsuits against voting jurisdictions alleging that voting changes would
reduce non-white turnout. This process, however, is expensive, fraught with uncertainty, and
often takes years. Section 2 also does not prevent elections from occurring under procedures later
found to be discriminatory (U.S. Commission for Civil Rights 2018).
In conclusion, the Shelby decision limited the tools that the federal government has in
terms of addressing potentially discriminatory voting procedures. The next section will examine
the effects of the Shelby decision and how it has opened the door for jurisdictions to create new
ways to slow or even reverse the progression of non-white voting rights.

The Major Effects of Shelby

Before discussing the major effects of Shelby, I believe it is important to understand how
Sections 4 and 5 operated and how effective (or ineffective) they prior to the invalidation of
Section 4 by the Court. As explained in the previous sections, Section 4(b) is the coverage
formula provision of the Voting Rights Act. It established which jurisdictions would have to
receive preclearance from the federal government on proposed voting procedure changes.
Section 5 added the preclearance provision, which set the guidelines to how that process was
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conducted. There were two ways in which a jurisdiction could receive preclearance: (1)
administrative preclearance and (2) judicial preclearance. Administrative preclearance was the
most common practice. Local jurisdictions would submit their voting changes to the Department
of Justice (DOJ) who would then have 60 days to determine the legality of the voting change
under the VRA. Through judicial preclearance, a local jurisdiction would submit their voting
change to the District Court for the District of Columbia (DC), and a three-judge panel would
determine if the local jurisdiction would receive preclearance.
Table 2-1. Section 5 Submissions and Objections, 2000-2012
Change Type11 Submissions
Objections
%
Annexations
49,221
3
0.00%
Elections
27,436
25
0.00%
Redistricting
4,132
39
0.94%
Ballot Access
72,218
9
0.00%
Other
55,040
0
0.00%
Totals
208,047
76
0.04%
Source: Pildes, Rick and Dan Tokaji. 2013. “What Did VRA Preclearance Actually Do?”

Pildes and Tokaji (2013) examined the number of submissions and objections to the DOJ
and DC between 2000 and 2012 (see table 2-1 above). Of the 208,047 submissions, only 76 were
objected to, which equated to a 0.04% objection rate. In recent years, scholars have debated the
causes of Sections 4 and 5’s apparent irrelevancy. Some scholars argue that the small number of
objections is a result of “voluntary compliance” with the preclearance provision on the part of
jurisdictions (Fraga and Ocampo 2016; Ball et al. 1982). Once the DOJ or the DC objected a
voting change, the local jurisdiction must comply with the result; however, there is no way for
DOJ or DC to enforce it other than the hope that the local jurisdiction will support the objection
(Fraga and Ocampo 2016; Ball et al. 1982). Whether they actually want to protect the voting
11

The Change Types are different than the ones presented in Pidles and Tokaji (2013). They had 15 categories which I condensed into 5:
Annexations (dealing with any type of land consolidation), Elections (election methods, special elections, selection type, & bilingual procedures),
Redistricting (reapportioning & redrawing of congressional districts), Ballot Access (voter registration, qualification, & voting venue), and Other
(miscellaneous procedures).
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rights or all citizens or they anticipate that proposed changes that are discriminatory in nature
will be objected to, state and local election officials may avoid proposing chances that they
anticipate will have discriminatory results.
Other scholars believe that Court cases such as Beer and Bossier made it difficult for the
DOJ and the DC to object to even the most obviously discriminatory voting change (McCrary et
al. 2006). As shown in in table 2-2 below, there were nearly six times as many objections in the
1970’s as there were in the 2000s. McCrary et al. (2006) attribute this decline to the litigation
surrounding the discriminatory purpose and effect prongs in Beer and Bossier. Following Beer in
1976, it became harder for the DOJ or the DC to prove that a jurisdiction’s proposed changes
were discriminatory under the “effect” prong, which explains the decline in objections from the
1970’s to the 1990’s. Comparing the 1990s to the 2000s, the number of objections decreased
from 402 to 76. McCrary et al. blame this decline in objections on the “purpose” prong
restrictions set forth by the Bossier case.
Table 2-2. Type of Objections by Decade12
Change Type

1970s

%

1980s

%

1990s

%

2000s

%

Totals

Annexations
Elections
Redistricting

34
292
86

7%
59%
17%

47
150
165

11%
35%
38%

24
104
209

6%
26%
52%

5
23
35

4%
29%
51%

108
569
499

Ballot Access
Other

77
9

15%
2%

64
5

15%
1%

56
9

14%
2%

12
1

16%
0%

209
23

Totals

498

100%

431

100%

402

100%

76

100%

1407

Source: McCrary, Patrick, Christopher Seaman, and Richard Valelly. 2006. “The End of Preclearance as We Know It” & About Section 5 from the
Department of Justice

12

The decades of 1970 & 2000 have additional years that do not belong to their respective categories: 1970 includes 1965-1969 & 2000 includes
2010-2013.
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Scholars also observed that when the DOJ or DC objected a local jurisdiction’s
submission, that objection normally dealt with redistricting, and not ballot access (Bullock et al.
2016; Pildes and Tokaji 2013). Redistricting is any voting change that has to do with the
redrawing of congressional district lines, whereas ballot access deals with voter registration,
voter qualification, and changes in precincts. As can be seen in table 2-2, redistricting generated
more objections than any other type of change in every decade except for the 1970’s. At its
conception, the Voting Rights Act was created to ensure equal opportunities at the voting booth
for all races. Based on table 2-2 and the work of other researchers (Bullock et al. 2016; Pildes
and Tokaji 2013), however, it is evident that Section 5 was used primarily in cases for
redistricting and other matters of vote dilution than protecting the right of eligible citizens to cast
a vote (Bullock et al. 2016 35).
In short, the merits of the Shelby ruling have been extremely contentious. Some scholars
believe the Court made the right decision because Sections 4 and 5 have been irrelevant in recent
years (Bullock et al. 2016; Pildes and Tokaji 2013), whereas scholars on the “anti-Shelby” side
believe that Sections 4 and 5 should have been upheld, as although they were rarely used, they
did prevent many discriminatory practices from being implemented (McCrary et al. 2006). In my
opinion, the wisdom of the Court’s decision in Shelby depends on whether formerly covered
jurisdictions implement discriminatory voting practices in the future. Based on events that
transpired immediately after the Shelby ruling, I argue that if presented with an opportunity to do
so, the Supreme Court should reconsider its position on the constitutionality of the coverage
formula established by the Voting Rights Act. Moreover, those events suggest that if Congress
wishes to protect the voting rights of citizens of all races and ethnicities, it may need to pass
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legislation that revises the coverage formula in a way that is likely to pass constitutional muster
according to federal courts.
In the years following Shelby v. Holder, states began implementing voting changes that
otherwise would have been blocked by the preclearance provision if it were still in effect.
According to the Brennan Center, within 24 hours after the Shelby case concluded, Texas
announced that it would implement a strict photo ID law. This was the same strict photo ID law
that was declined preclearance several years earlier on the grounds that it “imposed strict
unforgiving burdens on the poor, and racial minorities in Texas’ who disproportionally live in
poverty” (U.S. Commission for Civil Rights 2018 76). As stated in the previous section, voting
changes by jurisdictions (that seem to be discriminatory like this one) can be challenged by the
federal government or by the private sector in a court of law. For instance, those who are
challenging the legitimacy of a voting change often argue the jurisdiction violated Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act, a provision that was not affected by the Shelby decision. In the Texas case
under consideration here, the NAACP filed a complaint over the Texas voter ID law. In NAACP
v. Steen, the District Court ruled that the law did, in fact, violate both Section 2 of the VRA and
the 14th and 15th Amendments of the Constitution. However, litigation can only go so far, and
shortly after that, Texas passed on another law regarding strict voter ID that was upheld as
constitutionally valid in the Veasey v. Abbot (2016) case (Brennan Center 2018).
Another example of Shelby’s immediate impact could be seen in North Carolina. Less
than two months after the landmark case ended, the Tar Heel State instituted several voting
changes, including a strict photo ID requirement, a shortening of the early voting period, and the
elimination of same-day registration. As it did in the Texas case, the NAACP filed a complaint
against the state of North Carolina on the grounds that their voting change bill violated Section 2
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of the VRA. In July of 2016, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the NAACP, saying that the
North Carolina’s House Bill 589 “targeted African Americans with almost surgical precision”
(Brennan Center 2018). Even though the voting change was not implemented, legislation like
that enacted in Texas and North Carolina continues to appear across the United States, especially
in former covered jurisdictions.
Other voting procedure changes that occurred more frequently following Shelby v.
Holder were polling place closures. More specifically, voting jurisdictions were closed and
consolidated polling places in areas with substantial non-white populations. Between the 2014
midterm election and the 2016 general election, there were over 800 polling place closures in
areas formerly under preclearance that has particularly large non-white populations. According
to the LCEF, the 2016 general election took place in the wake of the largest number of closures
in United States history.13
The determination of the location of polling places is done through the process of
reprecincting, which is the process of closing, moving, or reconsolidating precincts.
Reprecincting is often overlooked by scholars and commentators because it happens at the
county level (or at the city level, depending on how elections districts are divided). In the
following section, I discuss how the reprecincting process works as well as how it differs from
other election processes like reapportionment and redistricting. I believe that it is important to
understand how reprecincting works, because doing so allows one to better understand the causes
and effects of The Great Poll Closure.

13

The Leadership Conference Education Fund. 2016. “The Great Poll Closure”. http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/reports/2016/poll-closure-report-web.pdf

36

Understanding Reprecincting
Reprecincting is the act of moving, consolidating, or changing a precinct within a voting
jurisdiction (Amos, Smith, and Ste. Claire 2017). A precinct is the smallest geographical unit of
an electoral system (Hale, Montjoy, and Brown 2015). Within each precinct, there is at least one
polling place which the voters within the precinct boundaries can place their ballot. Maintaining
this standard requires those in charge to choose polling locations that are easily accessible to all
voters in the precinct. As explained in the last section, political considerations have led to the
violation of this principle especially following Shelby. Reprecincting is one of many election
administration processes in the United States, and it is important to understand its relationship
with other processes.

The first step in understanding reprecincting is to understand that election administration
operates on two levels: state and local. At the state level, election administration starts with each
states’ Chief Election Officer (or CEO). Some states combine the duties of the CEO with those
of some other high-ranking position such as the Secretary of State or Lieutenant Governor. States
also vary when it comes to selection method; some states directly elect their CEOs, while others
appoint them. In terms of duties, States’ CEOs tend to have similar responsibilities:
implementing uniform election laws, maintaining a central registration file, and approving voting
equipment used by the local jurisdictions.
In terms of the elections themselves, the CEO’s have little to no authority. That power is
wielded by Local Election Officials (LEOs). In fact, most states assign the primary responsibility
for the conduct of elections to LEOs. States vary in terms of how these LEOs are selected. For
example, in Florida, local election officials are elected on a partisan ballot. In other states,
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however, LEOs are appointed and non-partisan. Like the CEOs, the duties assigned to LEOs may
also be part of the job description of a more prominent position. According to Hale, Montjoy,
and Brown (2015), LEOs are most commonly county clerks, recorders, and/or registrars. In
California’s 58 counties, 60% of the LEOs have duties beyond that of election administration. In
terms of selection method, roughly half the states elect their LEOs, while in the other half of
states, LEOs are appointed by the mayor or the local governing body (i.e. city council or county
commission).
Each LEO has authority over his or her own voting jurisdiction. Jurisdiction boundaries
are created based on the boundaries of counties, cities, and/or townships (mainly in New England
states). There are other localities that conduct elections such as school districts and city council
districts, but these elections are for district-specific positions such as city-council representative
and mayor and not for state and local offices14. Each jurisdiction varies in size. For example,
Rhode Island has a town with roughly 300 registered voters, whereas a Los Angeles County has
over 4 million registered voters. Within these jurisdictions, LEOs determine the rules and
regulations of elections such as creating or changing the boundaries of the voting precincts (or
reprecincting). In some states, the local governing office has the final say regarding precinct
design, but the LEO provides significant input. Either way, the LEOs play a key role in the way
the precincts are designed in voting jurisdictions. LEOs determine precinct boundaries after the
process of reapportionment and redistricting following the decennial census. Before I describe
the legal landscape of reprecincting, it is important to understand the relationships that it has with

14

For the purposes of this dissertation, when I refer to voting jurisdictions, I am referring to jurisdictions that elect state and local
office positions.
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reapportionment and redistricting as well as the roles federal and state governments have in these
matters.
Table 2-3. The Differences between Reapportionment, Redistricting, & Reprecincting
Jurisdiction
Process
Frequency
Federal
Reapportionment – Determines Every 10 years (following
the number of Congressional
census)
seats each state is entitled too
State
Redistricting – Sets up the new Every 10 years (following
district lines following
census)
reapportionment
Local
Reprecincting – Boundaries
Every 10 years, but; also, the
are determined by the lines
beginning of every election
drawn by the state; most often year if deemed necessary by
reflect voter turnout in
county or city governments
previous elections

Reapportionment takes place every ten years following the census. The federal
government oversees this process. With the data gathered from the census, members of Congress
determine the total number of representatives each state should receive in the House as well as
the total number of electoral college votes that each state will have. Based on each census, some
states may gain seats while others may lose seats, depending on relative population growth (or
decline). Once the reapportionment process is complete, each state legislature is notified of the
number of seats they are entitled too, and then redistricting begins.
Redistricting is the (re-)drawing of electoral district boundaries in each state. This
process takes place every ten years following the congressional reapportionment process
mentioned in the last paragraph. According to the Constitution (Article I, Section 4), “The
Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.” In 37 states, redistricting is conducted by the
state legislature, whereas four states use independent commissions, and two use political
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commissions. Alaska, North Dakota, Wyoming, South Dakota, Vermont, and Delaware do not
currently redistrict because they each have only one congressional district. Despite what the
constitution says, the states do not have complete free reign over the drawing of districts. In fact,
the federal government can (and will) intervene if it is deemed necessary. In the case Baker v.
Carr (1962), the Court ruled that the federal courts now had jurisdiction to hear challenges (from
citizens) to state redistricting plans. Federal courts can also intervene when state redistricting
plans are redrawn to disadvantage a racial group or, in some cases, a certain political party (a
process known as gerrymandering). Regardless, redistricting takes place at the state level with
federal oversight if need be.
So, where and when does reprecincting fit in? First off, a precinct is the smallest
geographic unit of the electoral system. Local governments (counties and cities) divide up their
jurisdiction into precincts in order to administer elections and collect votes. Election officials
normally place at least one polling place within each precinct. In most states, this process takes
place at the beginning of each election year when a local government official or election official
feels that it would benefit the voters if a precinct were opened, closed, etc. However, when
county or city governments re-draw precinct lines, they are required by state law to stay within
the boundaries already set up by the states in the redistricting process. As shown in table 2-3
(above), all three processes (reapportionment, redistricting, and reprecincting) are connected.
With the ruling in Shelby, now, more than ever, those in charge of drawing electoral districts and
voting precincts have the freedom and ability to move them in almost any way they wish. In this
next section, I am going to discuss how precinct laws vary across states and discuss the
implications of reprecincting for the chapters that follow.
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Reprecincting Laws in the States

Reprecincting takes place immediately following the federal decennial census as well as
in the early months of primary and general election year. After careful examination of each state
law, I found other patterns that states share regarding reprecincting. In total, I identified four
criteria that each state requires their local jurisdictions to follow in terms of reprecincting:
authorization of the process, time restrictions, size limitations, and state regulation (see table A
in Appendix II for a full breakdown by state).
Authorization. Each state is responsible for identifying the official(s) who will be
responsible for overseeing the establishing, creating, and/or changing of the boundaries of
precincts. In most states, those who authorize the changes in precincts are either local election
officials or local governing authorities. Thirty-one states (plus D.C.) require voting jurisdictions’
local governing authorities to make any the precinct changes. Local governing authorities range
from town councils, to city council, to county commissioner’s board. Seventeen states require the
voting jurisdiction’s local election officials (LEOs) to make the changes regarding precincts. A
LEO can be a single official or multiple officials serving on a board. Two other states, Hawaii
and Delaware, have their chief election officer (CEO) conduct the alteration of precinct
boundaries because of the limited number of counties in both states.
Time Restrictions. Each state’s government requires their local government to follow a
specific timeline when reprecincting. As noted in the previous section, reprecincting takes place
every ten years following the federal census. However, reprecincting can also be conducted in
other years as well. For non-census years, the timelines for most local governments to conduct
reprecincting varies by state. For example, some states require their local governments to have
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the precinct process completed 2-3 months before an election, whereas other states set specific
dates, normally at the beginning of the general or primary election year (e.g. January 15th or
March 15th).
Size Limitations. Each state requires local governments to place precincts within the
boundaries of the legislative district created by the state legislatures (or commissions). States
also recommend that their local governments provide “clearly observable boundaries using
visible ground features which meet the requirements of the federal bureau of the census and
which coincide with census block boundaries as established by the federal bureau of the census”
(Kansas Code 25-26a02). In short, the boundaries must adhere to the guidelines established by
the Federal Census Bureau. Most states also recommend that local governments take the number
of voters per precinct into consideration when changing or closing precincts. Some states were
more specific than others when defining their population parameters. For example, Georgia
requires that there be a minimum of 100 voters per precinct whereas Iowa provides both a
minimum and a maximum. Another option that states consider in to determining precinct size is
turnout in previous elections. For example, if the voter list was smaller than it was in previous
years, the local governing body can change or consolidate the precincts. In short, states provide
local governments with population criteria to follow when determining precincts.
Regulation. The states require their local governments to send their proposed precinct
boundaries to the Secretary of State’s (SOS) office (or to the State Board of Elections if it is not
a part of the state’s SOS) for approval or notification. Most states require a written description of
changes made to precincts as well as a detailed map illustrating those changes. In Table 2-4,
there are two copies of state laws on reprecincting. Example 1 is from a large state from the
Northeast (New York) and example 2 is from a small state from the West (Idaho).
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Table 2-4. Examples of Reprecincting State Laws
Example of State Statute 1: New York
1. The State of New York shall be divided into election districts which shall be the
basic political subdivision for purposes of registration and voting as provided in
this chapter.
2. General Information:

[The

creation, consolidation, division or alteration of

election districts shall be done by the board of elections.]
3. Boundary and Size Guidelines: [a. Each election district shall be in compact form
and may not be partly within and partly without a ward, town, city, a village which
has five thousand or more inhabitants and is wholly within one town, or a county
legislative, assembly, senatorial or congressional district. Except as provided in
paragraph b of this subdivision, election district boundaries, other than those
boundaries which are coterminous with the boundaries of those political subdivisions
mentioned in this paragraph, must be streets, rivers, railroad lines or other
permanent characteristics of the landscape which are clearly visible to any person
without the need to use any technical or mechanical device. An election district shall
contain not more than nine hundred fifty registrants (excluding registrants in
inactive status) or, with the approval of the county board of elections, not more than
eleven hundred fifty registrants (excluding registrants in inactive status), but any
election district may be divided for the convenience of the voters.] b. An election
district in a city or town may divide a block, provided that the board of elections
prepares an alphabetical list of all the streets in such city or town with the
election district for each such street. If any such street is divided between two or
more election districts, then such list must contain the lowest and highest street
numbers in each such district and if the odd and even numbers on a street are in
different districts, such list must contain separate listings for such odd and even
numbers and if there are both odd and even numbers in such different election
districts, such list must contain separate listings for such numbers. Copies of such
lists shall be filed and kept open to public inspection in the offices of such board.
Regulation: [One copy of each such list shall be delivered, upon request, to the state
board of elections and to a person or officer designated jointly by the speaker of the
assembly and the temporary president of the senate.] Surplus copies shall be sold at
cost.
4. Any election district must be realigned when the total number of registrants,
excluding registrants in inactive status, at the time of the preceding general
election, exceeds the maximum number permitted by this section by at least fifty
registered voters.
5. Time Restrictions: [Any creation, consolidation, division or alteration of election
districts in any calendar year shall be made on or before February fifteenth, and
shall take effect on April first, except that when required by the creation or
alteration of a political subdivision, other than an election district, in which
candidates are to be voted for at the next election, such creation, consolidation,
division or alteration shall be made and shall take effect immediately upon creation
or alteration of such political subdivision. No such creation, consolidation, division
or alteration shall be made between February twentieth of a calendar year ending in
seven and December first of a calendar year ending in zero unless required by the
creation or alteration of a political subdivision.]

Example of State Statute 2: Idaho
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34-301. ESTABLISHMENT OF ELECTION PRECINCTS BY COUNTY COMMISSIONERS -- LISTS AND MAPS
TO BE FURNISHED TO SECRETARY OF STATE. General Information: [The board of county
commissioners in each county shall establish a convenient number of election precincts
therein.] The board of county commissioners may establish an absentee voting precinct
for each legislative district within the county. Boundary and Size Guidelines: [The
boundaries of such absentee precincts shall be the same as those of the legislative
districts for which they were established. The board shall have the authority to
create new or consolidate established precincts only within the boundaries of
legislative districts. No county shall have less than two (2) precincts.]
Time Restrictions: [This board action shall be done no later than January 15 in a
general election year. The January 15 deadline shall be waived during a general
election year in which a legislative or court ordered redistricting plan is adopted.
In such cases, any precinct boundary adjustments shall be accomplished by the county
commissioners as soon as is practicable.]
Regulations: [The county clerk of each county shall provide, and the secretary of
state shall maintain in his office, a current and accurate report of the following:
(a) A list of all precincts within the county; (b) A map of all precincts within the
county; (c) A count of voters registered for the latest general election, by precinct;
(d) A count of votes cast at the latest general election, by precinct.

In the two examples provided in table 2-4, all four criteria that I mentioned above are
codified. However, some of the language may differ. Take boundary and size guidelines, in the
first example, New York, the law specifies the minimum and maximum number of voters
allowed in each precinct, whereas in the second example, Idaho, did not mention a requirement
for the number of voters per precinct but provided information on the minimum total number of
precincts per county. The reason is the difference in the sizes of the two states. For example,
New York has one of the largest populations in the United States, which means there are many
voters, and thus the precincts need to be big enough to accommodate everyone and allow them to
vote within a reasonable amount of time. In short, stating a minimum and maximum number of
voters makes sense for a state as large as New York. Idaho, on the other hand, has one of the
smaller populations in the United States, so precincts being over-crowded with voters is most
likely not a priority. In short, the wording may be different in each state’s laws regarding
precinct changes, but the criteria remain the same.
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Reprecincting in a Post-Shelby America
As I mentioned in the last section, understanding how precinct boundaries are
drawn is important because those boundaries affect the location of the traditional polling
place for that precinct. For example, suppose that prior to an upcoming election, precinct
A was closed due to low voter turnout in the previous election. The registered voters of
what formerly precinct A will now have to cast votes at a polling place located in the new
precinct that their previous precinct was merged with, precinct B. Precinct B’s polling
place may be 5 miles away from where precinct A’s polling place was originally located.
Because of this decision by local election and government officials to consolidate
precincts, the registered voters who previously voted in precinct A must now travel an
additional 5 miles to vote. Despite this being a hypothetical example, precinct changes
like this have become more common since the Shelby ruling in 2013. For example, The
Leadership Conference Education Fund (LCEF) identified several former preclearance
states (Arizona, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina, North Carolina,
and Georgia) as having made significant numbers of precinct changes following Shelby.
Arizona led the way in poll closures, leaving it with 212 fewer places to vote in
2016 than in 2012.12 Maricopa County accounted for a large percentage of the 212
closures. In the weeks leading up to the March primary, Maricopa County’s Board of
Supervisors announced a new precinct plan that would close almost half of the precincts
that were open during the 2012 election cycle. As a result of this poorly executed plan,
wait times to vote sometimes exceeded five hours, and turnout rates were lower among
poorer citizens and residents of more rural areas. In defense of the plan, a member of the
Supervisor’s Board stated that “it isn’t a big deal if you have to drive five miles to get to a
45

polling place in Buckeye [rural town in Arizona], because you have to drive 5 miles to get
to the grocery store” (O’Dell and McGlade 2016). Public outrage, media attention, and
litigation eventually led the County Supervisor’s Board to reopen the polling places that
were available in 2012.
Maricopa County was not the only county in Arizona to cut its number of
precincts in half. Pima County, the state’s second largest county (behind Maricopa),
closed more polling places than any other jurisdiction in the LCEF sample. Since Shelby,
62 polling precincts have been shut down in Pima County, a county that happens to have
one of the largest Latino populations in the United States. In 2012, there were 280
precincts, but by 2016, there were only 216.
Though not every county in North Carolina was a covered jurisdiction, the state
also saw controversial precinct changes since Shelby. As mentioned earlier, hours after
the Shelby decision was made, North Carolina passed an expansive voting law that
affected voter ID requirements and wait-times. A U.S. Court of Appeals Judge called it “a
monster voter suppression law” and argued that it discriminated against voters with
“almost surgical precision” (LCEF 2016). There were 40 formerly preclearance districts
in North Carolina, and across 12 of those districts roughly 12 percent of precincts were
closes, resulting in there being roughly 27 fewer places to vote in the 2016 election
(LCEF 2016). For example, in Cleveland County, which is 40% Black, local election
officials merged five precincts into two in an urban area. A local NCAAP leader stated
that “we know that this is part of a bigger trend – a movement to suppress people’s right
to vote” (LCEF 2018).
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Many polling places also closed in Georgia following Shelby. Since 2012, Georgia has
closed over 200 precincts, especially in more rural areas (Niesse 2019). In 15 of Georgia’s 159
counties, citizens only have one precinct in which to cast their votes. This is problematic for
those citizens who live far from polling locations or do not have easy access to transportation.
Local election officials argue the changes were necessary because they helped the counties save
money, but advocates say otherwise. A member of the Georgia ACLU, Sean Young, argued that
“the reason so many polling place closures have happened is because election officials no longer
have to get them precleared” (Niesse 2019). According to the Atlanta-Journal Constitution, in
2015, the former Secretary of State, Brian Kemp, reminded the local election officials in a
memo, that “counties are no longer required to submit precinct changes to the federal
government because of the Supreme Court decision” (Niesse 2019). Kemp, who is now the
current governor, later stated that he did not encourage LEOs to alter precincts a certain way and
that his memo reminded local election officials “to follow the law when considering polling
place changes” (Niesse 2019).
The Georgia example as well as the other examples provided in this section are
microcosms of the potential voting rights issues associated with reprecincting. Is it a coincidence
that when the preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act became inactive, the number of
traditional polling places decreased, especially in areas that were in former pre-clearance states,
especially in areas with large non-white populations? Alternatively, do declining numbers of
voters who vote at traditional polling places explain election officials’ decisions to consolidate or
close precincts? In the next chapter, I answer these questions by looking at polling place data
from over 2,270 voting jurisdictions. I test whether each of several factors, including LEO
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selection method and the size of the non-white population are significantly associated with
polling place closures.
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CHAPTER 3: Explaining “The Great Poll Closure”
As stated in the previous chapters, due to the invalidation of the 4th and 5th sections of
the Voting Rights Act by the Shelby case, the 2016 election was the first presidential election
held in over 50 years during which the full protection of the VRA was not guaranteed. As a
result, there were over 800 precinct closures in formerly preclearance areas prior to that
election. The Leadership Conference Education Fund (LCEF) coined this precinct closure
phenomena as “The Great Poll Closure” in their 2016 study.15 Because The Great Poll Closures
is still relatively new, political science scholarship on the phenomenon is scarce. However,
news outlets and organizations such as the LCEF,16 the Thurgood Marshall Institute,17 and the
Washington Post18 have published several descriptive reports regarding the closing of polling
places. For example, in September of 2019, the Leadership Conference Education Fund (LCEF)
updated their 2016 study by analyzing the number of poll closures from the 2012 general
election to the 2018 midterm election.19 They found that on average, former preclearance
jurisdictions were more likely to close precincts than jurisdictions in non-preclearance states.
In total, they found over 1,100 fewer polling places in 2018 than in 2012.
In both its 2016 and 2019 reports, the LCEF also identified another pattern in polling
place closures. Counties who closed precincts in both 2016 and 2018 were more likely than
other counties to have large non-white populations. Both the preclearance and non-white
population patterns can be seen in table 3-1. The 15 counties that experienced the most poll
closings between 2012 and 2016 were all in states formerly subject to preclearance and had

The Leadership Conference Education Fund. 2016. “The Great Poll Closure”. http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/reports/2016/poll-closure-report-web.pdf
The Leadership Conference Education Fund. 2016. “The Great Poll Closure”. http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/reports/2016/poll-closure-report-web.pdf
Thurgood Marshall Institute at LDF. “Democracy Diminished: State and Local Threats to Voting”. https://www.naacpldf.org/wp- content/uploads/DemocracyDiminished-State-and-Local-Threats-to-Voting-Post-Shelby-County-Alabama-v.-Holder.pdf
18
Ingraham, Christopher. 2018. “Thousands of Polling Places Were Closed Over the Past Decade. Here’s Where”. Washington Post.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/10/26/thousands-polling-places-were-closed-over-past-decade-heres-where/
19
The Leadership Conference Education Fund. 2019. “Democracy Diverted”. http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/reports/Democracy-Diverted.pdf
15
16
17
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relatively large non-white populations.
Table 3-1. The 15 Counties with the Most Polling Places Closures
State
Arizona
Texas
Arizona
Arizona
Arizona
Texas
Texas
Texas
Louisiana
Texas
Texas
Arizona
Alabama
Texas
Texas

County
Pima
Williamson
Maricopa
Mohave
Cochise
Nueces
McLennan
Brazoria
Jefferson
Fort Bend
Jefferson
Gila
Elmore
Smith
Travis

Total Change
-62
-35
-33
-32
-31
-29
-27
-24
-23
-18
-17
-16
-14
-14
-14

% Non-white
48%
40%
44%
23%
45%
70%
44%
52%
59%
66%
59%
37%
27%
40%
51%

Though journalistic reports do an excellent job of providing a reader with a basic
understanding of The Great Poll Closure, they do miss some important aspects of the causes
of polls closures following the Shelby case in 2013. As I explained in chapter 2, there are
constitutionally valid reasons for jurisdictions to close or relocate a polling place such as a
lack of voters, fiscal constraints, or the abundance of early voting options. The goal of this
chapter is to establish why polls are closing more frequently following the Shelby case, and
to do that, I must account both for constitutionally valid reasons for closures and for changes
to election procedures that may have been enacted with discriminatory intent or had
discriminatory effects. The chapter illustrates that voting jurisdictions previously subject to
preclearance are in fact closing precincts more frequently following Shelby.
Effects of Poll Closures
Before explaining why poll closures take place, I believe it is important to discuss why
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these closures are significant and how they can affect voters. Based on previous research, there is
a consensus that polling place closures do cause a significant decrease in turnout (Dyck and
Gimpel 2005; Brady and McNulty 2011; Amos, Smith, and Ste. Claire 2017; Clinton et al.
2020). These scholars attribute the decline in turnout to the search and/or travel costs that poll
closures entail. However, due to the typically relatively small distances between the new and old
polling locations, scholars have found that the search costs seem to be the most important factor
related to polling locations when citizens decide whether to vote in jurisdictions that have new
polling places.
There are also several indirect effects of polling place closures on turnout. When closing
or consolidating a precinct, there is a good chance that the new location will have to service a
larger number of voters, which can ultimately lead to a number of problems that are detrimental
for voter turnout. These problems include longer wait times (Herron and Smith 2016; Fortier et
al 2018; Stein et al 2019), inadequate poll workers (Burden and Milyo 2015; Claasen, Magelby,
Monson and Patterson 2008, 2013; Hall, Monson and Patterson 2009; Atkeson and Saunders
2007) and difficulties with voting equipment (Spencer and Markovits 2010). In short, polling
place closures are significant to voters because they can cause a decrease in political
participation. I will be taking a deeper dive into understanding how polling place closures affect
voter turnout in chapter 4.
Measuring Polling Places Closures
In measuring polling place closures between elections, I will not be using a straight
comparison of the raw number of precinct closures that occur in counties. I believe that it would
be difficult to meaningfully compare precinct closures between jurisdictions of very different
sizes, such as one jurisdiction with 400 voters and another with 10,000 voters. The impact of
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the number of closures would not be the same. For example, if we stick with those two
hypothetical counties and they both had 10 closures, I would expect that citizens in the former
jurisdiction would be affected by the closings to a much greater extent than citizens in the latter.
To account for the population size problem, the number of voters per precinct is
measured in each county in each election year – 2008, 2012, and 2016. This value is the total
number of active voters divided by the total number of traditional polling places. To measure
precinct closures across the elections, I create a differenced variable referred to as the
“percentage change in voters per precinct” or PCVPP. PCVPP is calculated by finding the
percentage change in voters per precinct between the former and latter elections. In my
analyses, there will be two PCVPP variables: one for percent change from 2008 to 2012 and
another for percentage change from 2012 to 2016 (see the Appendix for more details). In sum,
those voting jurisdictions with significant amounts of poll closures between elections will
typically have positive values of PCVPP and voting jurisdictions that open many new polling
places will typically have negative values.
Why Do Polling Place Closures Occur?
As noted in chapter 2, there are several reasons that a polling place might be shut
down. I sort those reasons into two categories: (1) constitutionally valid reasons and (2)
politically motivated reasons. Constitutionally valid reasons are ones that are “by the book”
according to state and county laws and regulations (see chapter 2 for more details). These
reasons include budgetary issues and the expansion of alternative voting options.
I label the second category of reasons for closures politically motivated because this
category of reasons includes decisions to close polling places in order to further advance
political agendas. One example would be related to the selection methods of the local
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election officials (LEOs), who play a large role in decisions related to precinct boundaries
and polling place locations.20 If an LEO is elected, an example of a political motivation
would be to appease the electorate in hopes of being re-elected, whereas if an LEO is
appointed, that LEO might have a political motivation might to appease the officials who
appointed them. I believe this dichotomy in selection method between elected and appointed
officials is important to explaining polling place closures.
Another politically motivated reason for closing polls might be to discourage
members of non-white populations from voting in ways that were not possible in the decades
prior to the Shelby decision. As previously mentioned, the 2016 election was the first
presidential election without the coverage formula and preclearance provision of the VRA
being in effect since the early 1960’s. Local lawmakers in these formerly preclearance areas
now had the opportunity to make election law changes that they could not make in the preShelby era. I will explain whether election officials intended to discourage non-whites from
voting or not by testing whether the size of jurisdictions’ non-white populations was
associated with decisions to close polling places in these areas. In the following paragraphs,
I discuss each reason in turn and describe my expectations regarding poll closures from
2008-12 and 2012-16.
Budgetary Constraints
As explained in chapter 2, a number of budgetary factors play into decisions regarding
creating and closing or moving precincts. These factors include costs associated with (1) poll
workers, (2) voting machine equipment, and (3) polling place housing. In terms of election

20

As described in chapter 2, the county governing body usually determines the boundaries of the precincts in each jurisdiction. The LEOs are
usually consulted in the precinct process and oversee determining the location of the action polling place.
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administration spending, states normally require local jurisdictions (i.e. counties and cities) to
cover the expenses of elections. However, in more recent years, some states have offered to help
jurisdictions with the large costs of elections in several different ways. For example, in Delaware
and Alaska, where election administration is highly centralized, the state department handles all
expenses surrounding elections. Some states pay a flat rate to jurisdictions for each election. For
example, Kentucky reimburses each county’s precincts for the costs of elections at a set rate of
$255 annually. Rhode Island covers the costs of their local jurisdictions’ polling place supplies,
ballots, and voting equipment (Hubler and Underhill 2018).
Some states are not as generous and have conditional relationships with local
jurisdictions. For example, Alabama, Colorado, Hawaii, and Louisiana cover election expenses if
there are state contests or issues on the ballot. Other states only pay for special state-wide
elections that do not coincide with general or primary elections. In short, despite the efforts of
particular states to cover all or most of their localities’ election costs, most election
administration expenses are still burdens on local jurisdictions, and this explains why budgetary
constraints are important when it comes to determining whether to close polling places.
The first budgetary issue related to polling places is the cost associated with poll workers.
In most cases, poll workers are registered voters, and some jurisdictions even require workers to
be voters in the precincts in which they work. In terms of the relationship with poll closures,
often the states require that there be a specific number of workers per polling station as well as
an equal number of members of all major parties (Hall, Montjoy, & Brown 2015). Along with
these such guidelines, poll workers are often paid a small wage. Not only are poll workers
difficult to find, they are also hard to retain given the small amount of pay. When local election
officials make decisions on polling locations, one major consideration is the necessity of finding
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and paying for poll workers. Research has shown that poll worker staff quality can be
detrimental to a voter’s confidence (Hall, Monson, & Patterson 2009). The inability to provide
sufficient staffing can be one reason a polling place closure will take place.
The availability of sufficient numbers of voting machines can also play a role in poll
closures. Two types of voting machines are used in American elections: paper ballot
scanners and configured computers with touch screens that allow voters to record their
choices electronically (Hale, Montjoy, & Brown 2015). Both types of machines are
purchased by local election jurisdictions (i.e. counties or townships). Following the voting
controversies that arose during the 2000 presidential election,21 the federal government
created the Help America Vote Act (or HAVA), which worked to standardize election
administration. Jurisdictions benefited from HAVA in the early 2000s, when they received
federal funds allocated by the act, but those funds have all but disappeared. Now, local
jurisdictions are running into budgetary issues with the maintenance of voting machines.
HAVA also required that jurisdictions have at least one machine accessible to people with
disabilities. If jurisdictions cannot afford the new updates to machines, polling place
locations will have to close or relocate.
The last budgetary issue that causes polling places to close is the high cost of renting
polling place locations. In most cases, local jurisdictions rent locations for their election day
polling places. For example, churches and volunteer fire halls are often used. With large
sums of money going to poll workers, voting machine equipment, and rent, jurisdictions
often have to close polling places and consolidate them with other precincts, which can lead
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Between four and six million votes were discarded in the 2000 election. Of those votes, roughly two million votes were not counted due to
faulty, aged equipment, or poorly designed ballots in the 2000 election. For more information on this, see this article:
https://www.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/07/16/voting.problems/index.html.
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to a number of different problems, such as long check-in and wait-times. In short, a major
reason for closing precincts stems from budgetary issues. To account for this in my
nationwide analysis, I use each jurisdiction’s median household income, taken from the U.S.
Census.22 I expect poorer jurisdictions (with smaller median incomes) to have more polling
place closures in each election analyses. In sum, I believe poorer jurisdictions will see larger
values of PCVPP in both the pre- and post- Shelby analyses.
Alternative Voting Options
Some of the most important things that a local election official must consider when
altering precincts are the limitations on precinct size set forth by the state. For example, some
states establish a minimum number of voters that must reside in a precinct for the precinct to
remain open. Other states specify a maximum number to avoid overcrowding. One major factor
that plays into the number of precincts set by local election officials each election year is the
availability of alternative voting options. According to McDonald (2012), the percentage of the
electorate in 2012 who cast a ballot before election day was up to 30%, including a majority of
voters in 9 states. If a state issues laws making it easier to vote early, by-mail, or absentee, there
is a good chance that the number of traditional election day voters will decrease.
According to data reported by the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), over
130,000 traditional polling places were used nation-wide during 2008 while only 119,968
traditional polling places were used in 2012, meaning that the number of precincts declined by
over 13,000. 3,000 fewer precincts were used in 2016 than in 2012, a smaller but still
significant decrease. When factoring in alternative voting opportunities (as discussed above),
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I would have liked to have used election budgets for each jurisdiction, but unfortunately, within the scope of the project, I could not find the
data for all 2,270 jurisdictions. I discuss this and other limitations of this variable in more detail in the discussion and conclusion sections of this
chapter.
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these decreases do make sense in light of financial constraints. For example, as shown in table
3-2, states with stricter laws regarding early voting and absentee balloting (those with no early
voting and excuse-only absentee balloting) had smaller values of percentage change in voters
per precinct in 2012 and very small values in 2016. This makes sense given the lack of
opportunity to cast votes outside of traditional polling places on election day in those states.
Table 3-2. Average PCVPP by States’ Types of Early Voting and
Absentee Voting Laws*
2012
2016
No Early Voting/Excuse Only Absentee
8%
5%
Early Voting/Excuse Only Absentee
15%
13%
Early Voting/No-Excuse Absentee
20%
14%
*This table features 41 states plus D.C. Reliable precinct data for at least one of the three election years in the
analysis (2008, 2012, & 2016) was unavailable for Alaska, Utah, Illinois, Wisconsin, New York, and New Mexico.
Colorado, Washington, and Oregon are omitted because they do not have traditional polling places; all their elections
are administered by mail.

On the other hand, states with more relaxed laws towards early voting and absentee
balloting (those that allowed early voting and no-excuse absentee balloting) saw larger values
of PCVPP, with + 20% in 2012 and +14% in 2016 on average. In short, based on the evidence
from table 2, the more relaxed states are in terms ofnon-traditional precinct voting, the more
likely those states will close polling places.
Outside of early voting, some states also introduced voting centers to replace traditional
polling places. Voting centers are “fewer in number than precinct-voting stations, centrally
located to major population centers (rather than distributed among many residential locations),
and rely on county-wide voter registration databases accessed electronically at each polling
site” (Stein and Vonnahme 2008 489). In other words, voters can cast votes in any voting center
inside their jurisdiction regardless of residential address. In the 2012 election, ten states passed
legislation to allow voting centers (NCSL 2019). Like relaxed early voting laws, the opening of
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voting centers could also be contributing to precinct closures.
I also expect relaxed early voting laws and voting centers to have similar effects in
2016. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, 39 states and the District of
Columbia began to offer early voting options by 2016. All 50 states and the District of
Columbia also offered some form of absentee balloting. Voting centers also gained traction in
2016, with six more states adding county-wide vote centers (NCSL 2019). In short, with the
rise in non-traditional election-day voting opportunities in each election year, I expect the
number of precincts to decrease, thus resulting in an increase in numbers of voters per precinct.
Local Autonomy with Respect to Poll Closures
In terms of election administration, one function that is often overlooked is the operation
of elections at the local level. This includes decisions such as where elections will be held and
who will work the polls. Local election officials often find public buildings such as schools or
firehouses to serve as polling places to avoid the need to spend money on renting buildings. In
short, although local election officials have to follow state or federal law when it comes to
certain aspects of election administration, they do get to make key “nuts and bolts” decisions
(e.g., decisions regarding precinct boundaries and polling place locations) that may influence
voter turnout or even the outcome of an election itself.
In their seminal work, Kimball and Kropf (2006) identified four types of local election
officials based on the method of selection: single individuals elected by voters; boards of
individuals elected by voters; appointed boards of elections; and appointed individuals.
Essentially, there are two types of features that make up the selection method: whether the
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official(s) are elected or appointed and whether there are individual officials or boards of
officials.
Should we expect a strong relationship between how LEOs are selected and how
effective they are in their roles? Based on past research, the selection method of a political
official can play a significant role in political decision-making. For example, elected judges are
more likely than their appointed counterparts to be tough on crime (Besley & Coate 2003). The
reason is that judges who are elected are more concerned with the opinion of the people in the
electorate. Burden et al. (2013) found that selection methods also affect the preferences of public
officials who decide election laws on ballot access and electorate size. The authors interviewed
thousands of LEOs in Wisconsin and found that those who were elected were more concerned
with voter access and making ballots more available to their constituents, whereas appointed
LEOs were more concerned with administrative costs and ballot security (Burden et al. 2013).
In line with the theory discussed in Burden et al. (2013), I believe that because elected
and appointed election officials are held accountable by different methods, they may “face
different returns on policy performance and will pursue different goals” (907). I expect to see a
substantial difference in the number of precinct closures between jurisdictions run by elected
LEOs and those run by appointed LEOs. One reason is the difference in relationships the two
types of LEOs have with voters.
Because of their indirect relationships with the public, appointed officials may be more
inclined to make policy decisions that may not favor their constituents, but rather benefit the
administration (or county government). The reason is that those who appoint local election
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officials (i.e. county executives and county commissions) are more concerned with the costs and
security of elections rather than the overall experience of voting (Burden et al. 2013).
In contrast, elected LEOs, because they are chosen by the people, are more concerned
with the opinions of the average voter rather than the county government. Katosh and Traugott
(1982) found that in terms of election administration policies, voters are more concerned with
shorter lines and convenient practices such as election day registration and early voting than the
costs and security of elections. As such, I expect the value of PCVPP to be much greater in
jurisdictions with appointed officials than in jurisdictions with elected LEOs. I argue that
jurisdictions with appointed officials will be more likely to favor saving money, and thus close
more polls, whereas jurisdictions with elected officials will be more likely want to keep voters
happy and not close any precincts.
The Effect of Shelby on Poll Closures
Section 4(b) and 5 of the Voting Rights Act ensured that voting jurisdictions with
histories of voting discrimination would have to receive preclearance from the Department of
Justice (DOJ) or federal judges in the District of Columbia (D.C.) for any electoral
administration change. However, the provisions in Sections 4 and 5 of the VRA were invalidated
by the Supreme Court in Shelby v. Holder in 2013. Since Shelby, former preclearance
jurisdictions have no longer needed to receive permission from the DOJ or D.C. to make election
changes. In examining changes in precincts from 2012 to 2016, reports have found that former
preclearance jurisdictions were 20 percent more likely to close precincts than non-preclearance
jurisdictions (Arthur and McCann 2018). In my analysis, I will be examining the effect of the
invalidation of the preclearance provision on the percentage change in voters per precinct. I
compare changes that occurred from 2012-16, the period during which the preclearance was
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invalidated by Shelby, to changes that occurred from 2008-12, when the preclearance provision
was still in effect. I expect jurisdictions that were subject to preclearance to see smaller (or even
negative) values of PCVPP in the 2008-12 period. As for 2012-16, I expect the opposite to occur
because the preclearance provision was no longer enforced.
Another important aspect of jurisdictions formerly subject to preclearance is that they
also tend to have large non-white populations – specifically Black and Hispanic populations. To
capture the possibility that the racial composition of jurisdictions had different effects on poll
closures from 2012-16 than it did from 2008-12, I interact a dummy variable denoting (formerly)
preclearance jurisdictions with the percentage of a district’s population that was Black and the
percentage that was Hispanic. In addition to not facing repercussions from the DOJ or the D.C.
court, I believe another reason we may see poll closures in these particular areas is that local
election officials (or local governments) may deliberately close polling places to hinder nonwhites from voting. Some scholarship has examined this possibility. For example, Amos, Smith,
and Ste. Claire (2017) looked at polling place closures in Manatee County, Florida in 2014. They
found that Black and Hispanic communities were much more likely to have their precincts
changed than white communities. 57% of Black and 47% of Hispanic registered voters but only
41% of white registered voters had their polling places changed. Amos, Smith, and Ste. Claire
also found that of those who had their polling places relocated, white respondents were more
likely to find an alternative method to cast a ballot, whereas Black and Hispanic respondents
were not as fortunate. In the next chapter, I dive further into the effects of poll closures on
turnout.
Even when accounting for the constitutionally valid factors that can lead to polling
closures, I hypothesize that having large non-white populations is one of the main reasons that
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jurisdictions formerly subject to preclearance experience so many closures following Shelby. In
the 2012-16 (post-Shelby) analysis, I expect that both preclearance/non-white population
interactions will have positive coefficients. For the 2008-12 period, I predict that both interaction
terms – preclearance/Black and preclearance/Hispanic – will have small (or even negative)
coefficients. The preclearance provision was still active from 2008-12, and that is why I expect
to see a very small number of closures (or potentially even see openings) in these areas.
The last aspect of the effects of Shelby decision that I examine is the fact that
jurisdictions with large non-white populations typically share similar socioeconomic
characteristics such as having low median income levels, fewer residents with college degrees,
and more young people. These socioeconomic factors are also some of leading causes of lower
turnout rates (Verba et al. 1995; Leighley and Nagler 2014). Citizens with lower socioeconomic
status may be less readily able to overcome hurdles – in this case polling place changes – that
can keep citizens from casting votes. Amos, Smith, and Ste. Claire (2017), in addition to finding
that Black and Hispanic voters were more likely to see their polling place change, also find that
younger citizens were also most likely to experience polling place change. In terms of how this
relates to the effects of Shelby, local governments may attempt to close precincts that have
similar socioeconomic characteristics because voter turnout tends to be particularly low in areas
where socioeconomic status levels tend to be lower. However, in doing so, local officials may
also unintentionally hinder the ability of non-whites to vote in the process, because they nonwhite citizens tend to be concentrated in such jurisdictions.
In my analyses below, I control for socioeconomic factors other than race to see how they
affect values of PCVPP in (formerly) preclearance jurisdictions with large non-white
populations. Doing this allows me to show that the racial composition of jurisdictions may affect
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the number of poll closures in a jurisdiction not only directly through intentional efforts of
election officials to deter non-white voting, but also indirectly. If LEOs close polling places for
reasons related to socioeconomic status, such as low voter turnout levels being more common in
poorer localities, the association between the socioeconomic characteristics of localities and the
racial composition of localities means that polling changes made for reasons other than race and
ethnicity may nonetheless have disparate effects on white and non-white citizens.
In my analyses of factors that influence PCVPP, if I were to observe a statistically
significant coefficient on the racial composition variables when controlling for other
socioeconomic factors, that would suggest that there is a direct relationship between racial
composition and PCVPP. However, even if the coefficients on the racial composition variables
were not significant, if the coefficients on the socioeconomic status variables are significant, and
if Black and Hispanic citizens tend to live in districts with lower average levels of
socioeconomic status, Black and Hispanic citizens may still be more likely to face polling place
closures than white citizens.
To account for this possibility, I create predicted PCVPP values for hypothetic
jurisdictions with different racial compositions while setting the values of the SES variables at
the lowest observed values in the dataset. This allows me to illustrate what happens to the
predicted number of poll closures when I allow for race to have both direct and indirect effects.
Due to the strong association between levels of socioeconomic characteristics and racial
composition, I expect that lower median income levels, lower percentages of residents aged 65 or
older, and lower percentages of residents with college degrees will result in formerly
preclearance jurisdictions with large non-white populations having higher values of PCVPP than
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in non-preclearance jurisdictions in 2012-16. I expect this difference to be muted for the 2008-12
period because election officials in jurisdictions subject to preclearance could not make many of
the changes to election procedures that they would be allowed to make after Shelby.
Data and Methods
I use ordinary least squares regression analyses to model the percentage change in
voters per precinct in roughly 2,270 voting jurisdictions across two different presidential
election cycles: 2008-12 and 2012-16. In this analysis, voting jurisdictions are counties. I
analyze the number of voters per precinct by utilizing data collected by the Election
Administration Commission (EAC). After each midterm and general election, the EAC creates
the Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS). It polls each voting jurisdiction across
the United States on election administration procedures and voting registration. In this survey,
the EAVS asks three questions about the total number of polling places in a jurisdiction: (1)
physical polling places other than election offices, (2) election offices, and (3) other (see
Appendix I for more information). For my research, I tally up the three answers and use that as
the total number of election day polling places for jurisdictions for 2008, 2012, and 2016.
For this paper, I used the 2008, 2012, and 2016 EAVS datasets. One issue with the
EAVS data is that states and their local jurisdictions are not required to complete the survey,
and thus some states are missing from the dataset. Alaska, New York, Utah, Illinois, Wisconsin,
New Mexico, and Virginia failed to complete the survey in at least one of the three years. I
omitted Colorado, Washington, and Oregon because they do not have traditional polling
places; all their elections are administered by mail. Figure 3-1 provides a visualization of my
dataset. Altogether, I gathered precinct data for 40 states plus D.C. which equates to roughly
2,270 voting jurisdictions.
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Figure 3.1. Jurisdiction Sample

Included
Omitted

Polling Place Closures. To calculate PCVPP (percentage change in voters per
precinct), I take the difference between the voters per precinct in 2016 (2012) and the voters
per precinct in 2012 (2008) and then divide it by the voters per precinct in 2012 (2008). I then
simply multiply the change in VPP by 100. I rounded all values to the nearest tenth of a
percent (see the Appendix for more information).
Despite sharing a similar average, this does not necessarily mean that 2008-12 had
more polling place closures than 2012-16. As I mentioned earlier, PCVPP is not a direct
measure of polling place closures, rather it measures the change in number of voters per
precinct (VPP) between election years. Voters per precinct is made up of two important
values in each year: citizen voting-age population and number of polling places. To
understand how the percentage change in VPP works, I provide two hypothetical examples in
tables 3-3a and 3-3b. As one can tell, Jurisdiction I and Jurisdiction II both had the same
number of polling places in 2008, 2012, and 2016, but the values of PCVPP for 2008-12 and
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2012-16 differ significantly (although both show positive signs).
Table 3-3a. Understanding PCVPP: Hypothetical Jurisdiction I
Election Year

CVAP

Polling Places

Voters Per Precinct

PCVPP

2008

4,000

10

400

------

2012

6,050

8

756

+89%

2016

7,500

5

1,500

+100%

Table 3-3b. Understanding PCVPP: Hypothetical Jurisdiction II
Election Year

CVAP

Polling Places

Voters Per Precinct

PCVPP

2008

7,500

10

750

------

2012

6,050

8

756

+0.8%

2016

4,000

5

800

+6%

How can this be? Jurisdiction I noted a steady increase in population during each election
year, whereas Jurisdiction II saw a decrease in population. In other words, Jurisdiction I did not
account for the population increase when determining the number of polling places, whereas
Jurisdiction II did. In short, PCVPP is a useful measure not only for understanding how many
polling place closures took place between elections, but it also accounts for population change as
well. PCVPP values for each jurisdiction in the sample along with population and polling place
data in 2008, 2012, and 2016 are available in the supplementary data file.
Budgetary Constraints. To account for jurisdiction budgetary constraints, I use the
median household income (in thousands of dollars) from the 5-year American Communities
Survey from the U.S. Census Bureau. I expect jurisdictions with larger median incomes will
have less severe fiscal constraints when it comes to election administration and will be better
positioned to keep existing polling places open in the same locations from one election year to
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the next. I expect jurisdictions with smaller median incomes to have more severe fiscal
constraints and thus struggle to keep polling places open. In terms of PCVPP, I expect wealthier
jurisdictions to have smaller values of PCVPP, whereas poorer jurisdictions should have larger
values of PCVPP, all else equal.
Implementation of Alternative Voting Methods. The best way to assess the effect of
alternative voting methods is to create a measure that accounts for each state law regarding
voting centers, early voting, and absentee balloting. Each year, the National Conference of State
Legislatures (NCSL) identifies which states offer alternative voting options. I created a dummy
variable for each law (1 = implemented; 0 = not implemented). I expect that jurisdictions with
early voting periods will have higher values of PCVPP in both election cycles, all else equal. I
also think the same relationship will appear for jurisdictions with no-excuse absentee balloting.
As I explained in the theory section, states that make it easier to vote non-traditionally will see a
significant decrease in the number of traditional polling places. In terms of voting centers, I also
expect jurisdictions with voting centers to have positive values of PCVPP when compared to
jurisdictions without across both election analyses. As explained in the theory section, voting
centers are centrally located voting locations at which citizens can cast votes regardless of their
residential address. However, one potential downside of these voting centers is that they lessen
the need for traditional election-day polling places (Hale, Montjoy, & Brown 2015), that some
voters may find more accessible. In short, I believe that when there are more voting centers,
there is less need for traditional election-day polling places.
The Effects of the Shelby Decision. To account for post-Shelby effects, I create a
dichotomous preclearance variable which isolates the effect of a jurisdiction being subject to
preclearance (or formerly subject to preclearance in the 2012-16 analysis). I expect large values
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of PCVPP in the former preclearance jurisdictions when looking at the difference between 201216. However, when looking at the 2008-12 analysis (when preclearance was still in effect), I
expect covered jurisdictions to have smaller (or even negative values) of percentage change in
voters per precinct.
I also expect (formerly) preclearance jurisdictions with large non-white populations to
fall victim to a particularly large number of poll changes following Shelby. To account for this, I
create two interaction terms: jurisdiction percent Black x preclearance and jurisdiction percent
Hispanic x preclearance. The necessary population data was drawn from the 5-year population
estimates of the American Communities Survey (ACS). Both variables capturing the size of nonwhite populations are defined as the percentage of the county’s population that is either Black or
Hispanic. I expect both interaction terms to be associated with small values of percentage change
in VPP between 2008-12, but to be associated with large values of percentage change in VPP
between 2012-16. This is because the preclearance provision of the VRA was still active in the
former period, but inactive in the latter.
Selection Methods of LEOs. To obtain data on the selection method of local election
officials across jurisdictions, I used Kimball and Kropf’s (2004) dataset on selection methods for
LEOs. The authors contacted the offices of most states’ secretaries of state or contacted county
governments (or cities) directly. Kimball and Kropf categorize the selection method of LEOs
into four groups: elected board, elected individual, appointed board, and appointed individual.
However, for this analysis, I am only interested in the selection method, whether the LEO is
elected or appointed, so I reduced the number of categories to two (appointed and elected). 65%
of the jurisdictions have elected LEOs while the other 35% have appointed ones. My variable is
coded 1 in jurisdictions with elected LEOs and 0 in jurisdictions with appointed LEOs. As stated
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in my theory section, I expect that jurisdictions with elected LEOs (rather than appointed LEOs)
will experience decreases (or smaller increases) in the number of voters per precinct, thus
reporting smaller (or even negative) values of PCVPP.

Table 3-4. Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables
Categorical
Categories
Early Voting Period

0 – no early voting period
1 – early voting period

2008
Freq.
35%
65%

2012
Freq.
37%
63%

2016
Freq.
28%
72%

No-Excuse Absentee

0 – excuse only absentee
1 – no-excuse absentee

40%
60%

47%
53%

44%
56%

Voting Centers

0 – state doesn’t allow voting centers
1 – state does allow voting centers

95%
5%

88%
12%

83%
17%

Formerly Preclearance

0 – formerly not subject to preclearance
1 – formerly subject to preclearance

68%
32%

68%
32%

68%
32%

Strict ID Laws

0 – no photo-id required
1 – photo-id required

87%
13%

78%
22%

60%
40%

Method of LEOs

0 – LEO is appointed
1 – LEO is elected

35%
65%

35%
65%

35%
65%

Continuous
2012
% Black
% Hispanic
% GOP Support
% Over 65
% Bachelor’s Degree
Median Income
Residents Per Sq. Mile

Mean
9.8%
8.7%
59.8%
16.8%
12.8%
$45,508
266.4

2016
S.D.
14.7%
13.4%
14.7%
4.2%
5.4%
$11,794
1774.4

Mean
10.1%
9.4%
64.6%
18.4%
14.1%
$47,821
272.7

S.D.
14.7%
13.7%
15.6%
4.5%
5.6%
$12,490
1803.1

Controls. I control for several demographic variables that could potentially play a role in
a jurisdiction’s decision to close precincts. I use estimates of the values of following variables in
each jurisdiction from the 5-year American Communities Survey in both 2012 and 2016: percent
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college-educated, and percent over 65. These variables are important because they help identify
how socioeconomic factors play into the closing of polling places before and after Shelby, and
they also are important to account for when attempting to determine why precincts close in
jurisdictions with large non-white populations. I also utilize the 5-year American Communities
Survey to control for the number of residents per square mile (population density). I control for
jurisdiction partisanship by measuring the county’s two-party vote share for the Republican
presidential candidate (percent for Romney in 2012 and percent for Trump in 2016). Finally, I
control for the implementation of strict photo ID laws as well. Table 3-4 shows the descriptive
statistics for each variable.
Model Specification. I estimate two models. They are simple linear regression models
predicting the percentage change in voters per precinct from 2008 to 2012 and from 2012 to
2016. The models are also difference-in-difference (DID) models. DID models model the change
over time of an outcome variable as a function of explanatory variables that may influence such
change. In the models, I observe the change in voters per precinct between two sets of election
years (2008-12 and 2012-16). Because I am using difference-in-difference estimation, I also
must account for the change (or “differences”) in my independent variables. For example, I took
my dummy variables for state laws and create differenced variables for both the 2008-12 and the
2012-16 models. In other words, in my 2012 analysis, the early voting variable is accounting for
those states who implemented (or eliminated) an early voting period between 2008 and 2012. I
also created differenced variables for the absentee and voting center dummies. However,
variables such as jurisdiction Black population and Hispanic population (and other
demographics) evolved too slowly over the four-years to have much effect on the dependent
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variable. The levels of these variables, however, are included, as they may account for crossjurisdiction changes in VPP.
Another important aspect of model specification for these analyses is the standard errors.
In most analyses where there is mixed-level modeling, the standard errors are normally clustered
at the aggregate level. For example, if there is both county and state level data in the model, the
standard errors should be clustered at the state level. However, in terms of my analyses, this is
not the case. If I were just implementing cross-sectional analyses (rather than DID), I could
cluster the standard errors at the state level, but because I am using DID, clustering the standard
errors at the state level would not account for the county-level correlated errors over time (Primo,
Jacobsmeier, & Milyo 2007; Burden et al. 2014; Burden et al. 2017). In other words, because
each county is observed at two points in time (i.e. the 2008-12 and 2012-16 election cycles), the
standard errors must be clustered at the county level.
Explaining “The Great Poll Closure”
Before describing the results, I believe it is important to discuss the interpretation of the
regression coefficients. For example, suppose the variable Trump had a coefficient of +0.58. This
would suggest that the larger the jurisdictional support for Donald Trump in 2016, the larger the
jurisdictional value of PCVPP. In other words, jurisdictions that had a larger proportion of
Trump voters in 2016 tended to see significantly more polling place closures than jurisdictions
with smaller proportions. In terms of the dummy variables, take the variable preclearance and
suppose that its coefficient was -9.8. This would mean that the PCVPP in jurisdictions that were
formerly under preclearance would be predicted to be 9.8 percentage points higher than nonpreclearance jurisdictions in 2016. This finding would suggest that compared to non71

preclearance jurisdictions, preclearance jurisdictions were expected to experience significantly
larger numbers of poll closures in the 2012-16 period. In short, the coefficients below represent
estimated effects of unit changes in the independent variables on percentage change in voters per
precinct (PCVPP) and should be interpreted as such.
Table 3-5. Regression Results: Percentage Change in VPP
from 2008-12 & 2012-16
(1)
(2)
PCVPP
PCVPP
(2012)
(2016)
Δ Early Voting
21.11***
3.25
(4.16)
(11.33)
Δ No-Excuse Absentee
-5.92*
-1.07
(3.18)
(11.20)
Δ Voting Centers
-1.25
12.51
(3.88)
(10.21)
Median Income (Per Thousand U.S.
-0.15*
0.21*
Dollars)
(0.08)
(0.09)
Preclearance
-5.41
11.44*
(3.84)
(5.19)
Preclearance x % Hispanic
0.32
-0.01
(0.17)
(0.13)
Preclearance x % Black
-0.01
0.08
(0.13)
(0.16)
Elected LEO
-1.64
5.43*
(1.50)
(2.12)
% Hispanic
0.13
0.04
(0.10)
(0.07)
% Black
0.16
-0.01
(0.11)
(0.10)
Residents Per Sq. Mile (Per
-1.49*
0.14
(0.62)
(0.40)
Thousand People)
% Support for GOP
0.21**
0.14*
(0.07)
(0.08)
% 65 or Older
0.71***
-0.30
(0.22)
(0.18)
% College Degree
-0.11
0.78***
(0.24)
(0.23)
Δ Strict ID Laws
-11.81*
1.10
(5.15)
(2.25)
Constant
-13.78
-7.60
(7.92)
(8.18)
2
0.04
0.03
R
Observations
2,266
2,266
Statistics in parentheses* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard Errors are by
clustered by county.
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Table 3-5 displays the OLS results from both 2012 (compared to 2008) and 2016
(compared to 2012) difference-in-difference estimations. Starting with the state election law
variables, I find mixed results with respect to my predictions. In the 2008-12 analysis, states who
adopted early voting were predicted to have much larger values of PCVPP than states that did
not adopt early voting laws. In other words, states that made it easier to vote before election day
were predicted to close precincts more frequently between 2008-12. This finding was consistent
with my predictions. However, in the 2012-16 model, there was no relationship between the
adoption of early voting laws and precinct closures. The adoption of no-excuse absentee
balloting had no significant effect in either model, which did not align with my predictions. This
surprising finding may have to do with the relative lack of importance absentee balloting plays in
the creation (or consolidation) of polling places. For example, if a voter were to cast an absentee
ballot, they may still need to drop the ballot off at the election day polling location.
Lastly, the adoption of voting centers by states was expected to result in polling places
being closed more frequently in jurisdictions in those states than in jurisdictions in states
without voting centers. This expectation was borne out in the 2012-16 model but not in 200812. The PCVPP of jurisdictions in states that adopted voting centers was predicted to be 12.51
percentage points higher than in jurisdictions without voting centers in 2016. This finding
makes sense given that voting centers are created to eliminate traditional neighborhood
precincts and transition to one or two centrally located precincts where every voter in the
county can cast a ballot.
As I mentioned in the theory section, among the primary reasons that polling places
close are budgetary reasons. To account for this, I include each jurisdiction’s median income
in the models. In model 1, I find that jurisdictions that are poorer (or with smaller median
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incomes) saw larger values of PCVPP between 2008-12. This finding is congruent with my
expectations that jurisdictions that have fewer financial resources may find it difficult to pay
staff, rent polling place venues, and update voting equipment, and may therefore have to
consolidate or close precincts. In the 2012-16 analysis, I find the opposite to be true.
Wealthier jurisdictions were predicted to have larger values of PCVPP, whereas poorer
jurisdictions were predicted to have smaller ones. This finding suggests that the budgetary
issues may not have been the main reason for closing precincts following Shelby. However, I
believe there needs to be some further exploration of the relationship between budgetary
issues and The Great Poll Closure. For this reason, I take a deeper dive into the effects of
jurisdictions’ election budgets on PCVPP by conducting a small-N analysis that is described
in the discussion section.
I now turn to the results regarding variables that capture politically motivated reasons for
poll closures. In my theory section, I argued that jurisdictions with appointed LEOs would see
more poll closures when compared to jurisdictions with elected officials. Appointed officials are
more concerned with financial constraints of election administration and not as concerned with
pleasing the electorate as elected officials are. This is because appointed officials are usually
granted re-appointment by the decision of a governing body, whereas elected officials must be
re-elected by voters to maintain their positions. Looking at the results from models 1 and 2, I find
that jurisdictions with appointed officials were predicted to see larger values of PCVPP than
jurisdictions with elected officials between 2008-12. The sign of the coefficient was consistent
with my hypothesis but was statistically insignificant. In 2012-16, I find a significant relationship
between LEO selection method and PCVPP, but in the wrong direction. The value of PCVPP for

74

jurisdictions with elected officials was predicted to be roughly 5.43 percentage points higher than
for jurisdictions with appointed officials.
One of the potential reasons for my inconsistent findings with LEO selection method was
that partisanship may have been factor. Outside of selection method, election administration
scholars have also focused on how the partisanship of LEO’s affect bureaucratic behavior.
Burden et al. (2013) argued that Republican LEOs created measures that limited ballot access if
their constituencies were majority Democrat. Kimball and Baybeck (2013) also found that
among larger jurisdictions, Democratic officials were more likely to put greater emphasis on
voter access than Republican officials. Unfortunately, I lacked reliable data to conduct an
analysis that included partisanship of LEO, so this endeavor will need to be tackled in a future
research project.
The other possible politically motivated reason for closing precincts that I investigate
involves the racial composition of jurisdictions. Interaction terms are used here because I
hypothesize that the relationship between the racial composition of jurisdictions and poll
closures will be stronger after the Shelby decision, once election officials were able to make
election procedure changes that may have been objected to by the Department of Justice or the
U.S. District Court for D.C. when preclearance was in effect. Three variables – preclearance,
jurisdiction percent Black x preclearance, and jurisdiction percent Hispanic x preclearance –
allow me to explore this possibility. In the 2008-12 model, jurisdictions that were under
preclearance were expected to have smaller values of percentage change in voters per precinct
when compared to jurisdictions that were not under preclearance. This finding is no surprise
given the fact that the preclearance provision was still active. In the 2012-16 model, I find the
complete opposite. In other words, the PCVPP of jurisdictions who were formerly under
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preclearance were roughly 11.44 percentage points higher than jurisdictions that were never
subject to preclearance.

Figure 3-2. Predicted Values of PCVPP by nonPreclearance & Preclearance Jurisdictions
Pre-Shelby (2012)

13.27%

16.35%

7.44%

Post-Shelby (2016)
0%

4%

20.10%
8%

12%

16%

20%

24%

Percentage Change in Voters Per Precinct
Non-Preclearance

(Formerly) Preclearance

To visualize the effects of the Shelby decision on PCVPP in former preclearance
jurisdictions, figure 3-2 above plots the predicted values of both non-preclearance and
preclearance jurisdictions from models 1 and 2 with other variables held at their mean values.
When looking at the pre-Shelby analysis (represented by the first group of bars), the predicted
value of PCVPP in non-preclearance jurisdictions was roughly three percentage points higher
than in preclearance jurisdictions. This makes sense given that the preclearance provision was
still active, making it much more difficult for preclearance jurisdictions to close or change
polling place locations.
Moving to the post-Shelby analysis (represented by the second group of bars), the
opposite relationship held between preclearance and PCVPP. The predicted value of PCVPP
for formerly preclearance jurisdictions was roughly 20 percent, which is more than 12
percentage points higher than the predicted value for formerly non-preclearance jurisdictions.
Additionally, in districts where preclearance had been required prior to Shelby, the predicted
value of PCVPP was roughly eight percentage points higher after Shelby than before it. These
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findings show that without the preclearance provision of the VRA being in effect, jurisdictions
that were formerly under the supervision of the federal government were closing precincts at a
much higher rate than they were when the provision was still active.
Another important effect of the Shelby decision involves the interaction between nonwhite population (Black and Hispanic) and preclearance. As mentioned by the LCEF and other
journalistic outlets, in the wake of Shelby, formerly preclearance jurisdictions with large
Hispanic and/or Black populations seemed to be popular targets for polling place closures. The
results in table 3-5, provide mixed support for the claims made by the LCEF.
To facilitate the interpretation the estimated effects of jurisdiction racial composition
(former) preclearance status on PCVPP, Figure 3-3 shows predicted values of PCVPP vs. the
racial composition variables for preclearance and non-preclearance jurisdictions for each election
analyses. Subfigures A and C deal with the interactions between jurisdiction percent Black and
preclearance and plots B and D deal with jurisdiction percent Hispanic and preclearance. I first
discuss then the former.
Between 2008-12, as the percentage of a preclearance jurisdiction’s Hispanic population
increased, the predicted value of PCVPP also increased significantly. This finding contradicts my
expectations because one would imagine that a preclearance jurisdiction with a particularly large
non-white population would not be able to close many polling places, especially while the
preclearance provision was still active. Turning to the effects of percent Hispanic in nonpreclearance jurisdictions in 2008-12, there was also a slight increase in the value of PCVPP
when the jurisdiction’s Hispanic population increased, but as the slope was not as steep as in
preclearance jurisdictions. The interaction term itself was statistically insignificant.
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Looking at the estimated effect of percent Hispanic in preclearance jurisdictions between
2012-16, I find that the effect is very similar formerly preclearance and non-preclearance
jurisdictions, and that that effect is small in magnitude. As percent Hispanic increases in each
type of jurisdiction, the predicted value of PCVPP also increases, but only modestly. My
expectation was that there would be a significant difference between formerly preclearance and
non-preclearance jurisdictions with large Hispanic populations because the preclearance
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provision was no longer active. Unfortunately, that expectation was not borne out by the
analysis.
Like the coefficient on Hispanic x preclearance, the coefficient on Black x preclearance
in statistically insignificant, but I do find that the directions of some relationships are congruent
with my expectations. For example, between 2008-12, I find that regardless of preclearance or
non-preclearance status, as a jurisdiction’s Black population increases, the predicted value of
PCVPP also increases. However, the non-preclearance jurisdictions saw a more gradual increase
than preclearance jurisdictions as percent Black increases. Given that the preclearance provision
was still active, I would expect that any jurisdictions with large Black populations that
experienced large numbers of closures between 2008-12, would be non-preclearance
jurisdictions. As the figure shows, while the slopes of the two lines are not drastically different,
closures were more likely in non-preclearance jurisdiction at any given value of percent Black.
Moving to 2012-16, I find the relationship between percent Black and PCVPP to be of
the expected sign in preclearance jurisdictions, but the estimated effect of percent Black is not
statistically significant. As percent Black increases in preclearance jurisdictions, the predicted
value of PCVPP also increases. The opposite was true in non-preclearance jurisdictions, although
again, the estimated effect was not statistically significant. While these results do suggest that,
following Shelby, preclearance jurisdictions with large Black populations were predicted to close
precincts more frequently than non-preclearance jurisdictions with large Black populations, the
estimated effects were not large enough to meet the threshold of statistical significance. I return
to the relationships between preclearance and racial composition in the next section.
In terms of my control variables, jurisdictions with larger percentages of people over the
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age of 65 were expected have larger values of PCVPP between 2008-12. The same is true for
jurisdictions with larger percentages of college graduates. Both findings were statistically
significant. When looking at these variables following Shelby, the reverse relationship held, but
was statistically insignificant. The effects of the other control variables were also somewhat
inconsistent across the two models. One constant, however, was jurisdiction partisanship.
Jurisdictions that showed larger support for the Republican presidential candidate were
expected to have larger values of PCVPP in both analyses. This finding might reflect the
partisanship of the election officials in the jurisdictions. For example, in particularly large
voting jurisdictions, Kimball and Baybeck (2013) found that Republican elected officials are in
favor of limiting access to the polls when compared to Democrats. As noted in chapter 2, Texas
(primarily a Republican state with majority Republican local governments) was one of the first
states to attempt to implement stricter election laws following the Shelby court case.23 In short,
the consistency of GOP jurisdictions having larger predicted values of PCVPP in each analysis
was not surprising.
Looking at Some Specific Types of Jurisdictions
Given the large amount of descriptive evidence regarding poll closures in former
preclearance areas with large non-white populations, I felt that an additional analysis was needed
to better understand changes in PCVPP in such areas. How can the observation that polling
places are closing more often in areas with large non-white populations be reconciled with the
insignificant coefficients on the variables capturing the racial and ethnic composition of
jurisdictions in the models shown in Table 3-5 in the previous section?

Brennan Center. 2018. “Texas NAACP v. Steen (Consolidated with Veasey v. Abbott)”. https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/courtcases/texas-naacp-v-steen-consolidated-veasey-v-abbott
23
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One possible answer lies in the decision-making processes of election officials who may
find it politically advantageous to make it more difficult for members of non-white populations
to vote. Imagine a hypothetical jurisdiction encompassing a number of localities, with each
locality having a different percentage of Black residents. Suppose that Black citizens make up
four percent of the population in Locality A, five percent in Locality B, six percent in Locality C,
20 percent in Locality D, and 60 percent in Locality E. If the LEO in this hypothetical
jurisdiction wished to discourage turnout among Black citizens, he or she would presumably be
more likely to close polling places in localities with larger percentages of Black voters than in
localities with smaller percentages. Closing too many polling places may cause an uproar or
violate state law, however, so the number of potential closures may be limited. In which
localities would such an LEO be likely to close polling places?
While Localities B and C each have more Black residents than Locality A, the difference
in racial composition is very small, and the likelihood of the LEO closing a precinct in Locality
B or C would most likely to be similar to or only negligibly greater than the likelihood of closing
a precinct in Locality A. Even if the LEO wished to close a polling place in Locality D, he or she
would likely consider the fact that closing a polling place may also discourage voting among the
80% of the population that is not Black. In contrast, the likelihood of the LEO closing a precinct
in Locality E would presumably be quite large. While this hypothetical example is exactly that –
hypothetical – it seems feasible that any relationships between the racial composition of
jurisdictions and polling place closures may be non-linear, and that if Black and/or Hispanic
citizens are deliberately targeted by decisions to close polls, only localities with particularly large
non-white populations are singled out for closures. If this is the case, using categorical variables
to identify jurisdictions with particularly large percentages of Black or Hispanic residents may be
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more appropriate than including the continuous measures of racial composition employed until
now.
Table 3-6. Types of Jurisdictions
Jurisdiction Type
Non-Preclearance Jurisdictions
Preclearance with Large Black
Populations (> 30%)
Preclearance with Large Hispanic
Populations (>15%)
Preclearance with Neither Large
Black nor Hispanic Populations
Total

Sample Size
1,665
(73%)
212
(9%)
183
(8%)
216
(10%)
2,266
(100%)

To account for the potential importance of jurisdictions with particularly large non-white
populations, I create a categorical variable that categorizes jurisdiction types by non-white
population and (formerly) preclearance status. The first category includes jurisdictions that were
never required to receive preclearance. The second includes (formerly) preclearance jurisdictions
in which Black residents made up at least 30% of the jurisdiction’s total population. The third
includes (formerly) preclearance jurisdictions in which Hispanic residents made up at least 15%
of the jurisdiction’s total population. The last category represents preclearance jurisdictions with
neither Black populations larger than 30% nor Hispanic populations larger than 15% of the total
population. I chose 15% and 30% as the non-white population thresholds because they allowed
me to place a substantial number of jurisdictions into each group and allow for meaningful
comparisons between the four groups. Table 3-6 (above) provides information on sample sizes
for each category.
Table 3-7 presents the same two difference-in-difference regression analyses that were
presented in table 3-5, but the preclearance and non-white population interactions were replaced
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Table 3-7. Regression Results: Predicting PCVPP with
Different Types of Jurisdiction Scenarios.
(1)
(2)
PCVPP
PCVPP
(2012)
(2016)
0.81
18.43*
Large Black Preclearance
(3.19)
(8.10)
2.22
16.59***
Large Hispanic Preclearance
(5.17)
(4.94)
-1.98
7.81*
Neither Large Black nor Hispanic
(2.30)
(3.43)
Preclearance
Δ Early Voting
21.03***
3.90
(4.16)
(11.33)
Δ No-Excuse Absentee
-5.33
-1.82
(3.14)
(11.11)
Δ Voting Centers
4.34
12.02
(4.84)
(10.21)
Median Household Income (per
-0.17
0.22*
$1000)
(0.09)
(0.08)
Elected LEO
-2.03
5.58**
(1.53)
(0.02)
Residents Per Sq. Mile (per 1000)
-1.11*
0.34
(0.53)
(0.42)
% Support for GOP
0.14*
0.18*
(0.08)
(0.07)
% 65 or Older
0.53*
-0.33
(0.22)
(0.19)
% College Degree
-0.07
0.72**
(0.24)
(0.24)
Δ Strict ID Laws
-13.05**
1.17
(4.65)
(2.27)
Constant
-2.94
-0.10
(6.89)
(0.08)
0.04
0.03
R2
Observations
2,266
2,266
Standard Errors in parentheses* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard Errors are
also clustered by county. Non-preclearance is the base category.

with the categorical preclearance variable. When comparing the three preclearance categories to
the non-preclearance category, the results regarding formerly preclearance jurisdictions with
large non-white populations are in line with expectations in a way that the results shown in table
3-5 were not. In the 2008-12 analysis, preclearance jurisdictions with large Black and Hispanic
populations were both predicted to have larger values of PCVPP than non-preclearance
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jurisdictions, but the estimated effect of large non-white populations were relatively minimal,
with preclearance jurisdictions with large Black and Hispanic populations being predicted to
have values of PCVPP of 1 and 2 percentage points larger than non-preclearance jurisdictions,
respectively. These estimated effects were also statistically insignificant. Preclearance
jurisdictions with small non-white populations were predicted to have smaller values of PCVPP
compared to non-preclearance jurisdictions, but the difference was not statistically significant.
In 2012-16 (post-Shelby), the value of PCVPP for formerly preclearance jurisdictions
with large Black populations was predicted to be roughly 18 percentage points higher than
formerly non-preclearance jurisdictions. Similarly, PCVPP in jurisdictions with large Hispanic
populations was predicted to be roughly 17 percentage points higher. Both findings were
statistically significant. In terms of formerly preclearance jurisdictions with small non-white
populations, the predicted value of PCVPP was significantly higher than in areas that were never
subject to preclearance as well. This is also in alignment with my original expectations, and is no
surprise given the predicted value of PCVPP in preclearance jurisdictions following Shelby in the
initial analysis (see figure 3-2).
These findings suggest that preclearance jurisdictions were indeed closing precincts more
frequently than non-preclearance jurisdictions following Shelby, even when controlling for other
important factors, and this was especially true in areas with large non-white populations. It is
important to note that these findings regarding the effects of the racial composition of
jurisdictions are derived from models that control for the relative wealth of those jurisdictions.
As such, it seems unlikely that preclearance jurisdictions were closing precincts for purely fiscal
reasons once they had the opportunity to do so without federal preclearance. Overall, these
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findings are not only congruent with my own expectations, but with the descriptive findings of
the LCEF and other journalistic reports.
Based on the results above, it seems possible that local governments are closing precincts
in formerly preclearance jurisdictions with large Black (or large Hispanic) populations because
they want to discourage members of non-white populations from voting. The estimated effects of
the indicators for jurisdictions with large majority populations are substantively large even when
factors such as income, age, and education are controlled for, which suggests that racial
composition has a more or less direct effect on the number of closures. At the same time, it is
important to explore the indirect effects of racial composition on PCVPP that may arise because
jurisdictions with large non-white populations often share similar socioeconomic characteristics
such as being poorer, less educated, and younger.
Table 3-8a. Average Values of SES in the Four Types of Preclearance/Non-white Jurisdictions in 2012.
SES Variable
Large Black
Large Hispanic
Neither Large
Non-Preclearance
Pop. (> 30%)
Pop. (>15%)
Black nor Hisp.
Median Household
$35,090
$44,950
$43,926
$45,744
Income
(%) Bachelor’s
9.9%
12.4%
11.5%
13.1%
degree
(%) Over the Age of
15.1%
15.6%
15.8%
17.3%
65
Table 3-8b. Average Values of SES in the Four Types of Preclearance/Non-white Jurisdictions in 2016.
SES Variable
Large Black
Large Hispanic
Neither Large
Non-Preclearance
Pop. (> 30%)
Pop. (>15%)
Black nor Hisp.
Median Household
$35,982
$48,107
$45,260
$48,423
Income
(%) Bachelor’s
10.5%
12.8%
12.6%
14.2%
degree
(%) Over the Age of
17.1%
16.6%
17.5%
18.9%
65

Tables 3-8a and 3-8b provide the average values of the SES variables – median income,
jurisdiction percent with a bachelor’s degree, and jurisdiction percent over the age of 65 – in the
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four types of preclearance/non-white jurisdictions. I find that the three types of (formerly)
preclearance jurisdictions had lower levels of income and education and were younger on
average than non-preclearance jurisdictions. Furthermore, (formerly) preclearance jurisdictions
with large Black populations had the smallest average values of each socioeconomic
characteristic. This held across the two election years as well.
Given the results described above, it seems likely that the racial composition of
jurisdictions affected closure rates both directly and indirectly, through associations between the
socioeconomic characteristics and racial composition of jurisdictions. To examine the
importance of the SES covariates, I calculate predicted values of PCVPP from the analyses in
table 3-7 for the preclearance/non-white categories by using their corresponding mean values of
the SES characteristics found in tables 3-8a and 3-8b. For example, when calculating the
predicted value of PCVPP for preclearance jurisdictions with large Black populations in 2016, I
set median income to $35,982, the percentage of college graduates in the population to 10.5%,
and the percentage of the population over the age of 65 to 17.1%. I do this for the other three
hypothetical jurisdictions in both election periods (pre- and post- Shelby) as well. The resulted
predicted values of PCVPP can be seen in Table 3-9 below.
Table 3-9. Predicted Values of PCVPP for Hypothetical Jurisdictions by the Average Values of
SES Characteristics in 2012 & 2016.
Large Black Pop. Large Hispanic
Neither Large
Non(> 30%)
Pop. (>15%)
Black nor Hisp.
Preclearance
Pre-Shelby: 200815.5%
17.2%
13.2%
16.1%
12
Post-Shelby: 201223.8%
24.9%
14.8%
7.20%
16

Beginning with 2008-12, all four types of hypothetical jurisdictions have fairly similar
predicted values of PCVPP. Given that the preclearance jurisdictions have significantly lower
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averages of socioeconomic characteristics compared to non-preclearance jurisdictions, this
finding suggests that the preclearance provision was working effectively; large amounts of poll
closures were not taking place in areas with histories of voter discrimination. However, when we
look at the predicted values of PCVPP in the post-Shelby analysis, the strong association
between lower levels of SES and racial composition become apparent especially with
preclearance jurisdictions with large non-white populations.
For example, preclearance jurisdictions with large Black jurisdictions had a median
income of roughly $35,000 in 2016, that is about $13,000 less than the median income for nonpreclearance jurisdictions. In terms of percent of the population with formal education and over
the age of 65, preclearance jurisdictions with large Black populations also had significantly
lower numbers compared to non-preclearance jurisdictions. Those comparisons of
socioeconomic characteristics were also relatively similar in 2012, but there was only a small
difference between the jurisdictions’ values of PCVPP (15.5% to 16.1%). However, in 2016, the
differences in the predicted values of PCVPP between formerly preclearance jurisdictions with
large Black populations and non-preclearance jurisdictions was roughly 17 percentage points
(23.8% to 7.2%). What this shows is that even though the differences in levels of SES remained
the same in both jurisdictions between 2012 and 2016, the values of PCVPP in preclearance
jurisdictions with large Black populations and non-preclearance jurisdictions changed drastically,
with an increase in the former and a decrease in the latter. There was also a similar relationship
between formerly preclearance jurisdictions with large Hispanic populations and nonpreclearance.
These findings suggest that the racial composition of jurisdictions affected closure rates
both directly and indirectly, through associations between socioeconomic characteristics and the
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racial composition of jurisdictions following Shelby. Based on the predicted values of PCVPP for
the different types of jurisdictions that incorporate the typical socioeconomic characteristics of
those jurisdictions –lower levels of median income, lower levels of college graduates, and lower
percentages of people over the age of 65 – it is clear that polling place closures in former
preclearance jurisdictions with large non-white populations may have resulted in part from those
jurisdictions tending to have socioeconomic characteristics (other than race) that are associated
with lower levels of turnout.
In conclusion, I believe it is important to consider the history of voting rights for nonwhite citizens in the United States when understanding the significance of these findings. For
example, beginning in the period of reconstruction, Republicans attempted to prevent voter
discrimination by sending federal election observers into areas with large Black populations.
However, this was overturned several years later by Southern Democrats.24 Jim Crow ushered in
a new era of discrimination. While in theory, Blacks and members of other non-white
populations could vote in some jurisdictions, they often had to overcome significant obstacles
such as the poll tax and literacy tests. Even with the coverage formula and the preclearance
provision of the VRA, preclearance areas with large non-white populations were still attempting
to create election laws that would discriminate against people of color up until the Shelby case.
As such, any contemporary attempts to reduce turnout among members of minority groups
would not be unprecedented; indeed, such attempts would only contribute to a long history of
voter disenfranchisement in the United States. Although my findings do not demonstrate that

24

Once example was the Enforcement Act of 1870; It was the first comprehensive federal statute that dealt with elections. Acts such as bribery,
interference, false voting, etc. were made federal offenses. Federal judges would visit voting locations to see whether the voting actions warranted
federal offenses. However, most parts of the Enforcement act were overturned by a Democratic Congress following the period of Reconstruction.
To see a comprehensive breakdown of pre-1965 voting rights legislation, please visit:
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI_S4_C1_1_1_1_2/.

88

local election officials were intentionally closing polling places to deliberately hinder people of
color from voting after Shelby, they are consistent with what we would expect to see if an
election official did intend to do so.
Discussion: A small-N analysis
One major methodological issue that I faced in my nation-wide analysis was how to
account for the budgetary constraints faced by jurisdictions. The inclusion of the median
household income allowed me to account for the level of wealth in each jurisdiction to some
degree and served as a proxy for fiscal constraints. However, the median income variable is
limited in at least two ways. The first limitation of the median income variable is that because it
is an aggregate measure of a county’s income, it does not account for variation of income across
different precincts within the county. Although a county may be relatively wealthy based on the
median income variable, the county could still have a good number of poorer precincts, and
fiscal constraints faced by those precincts may not be adequately captured by the median income
variable. In future projects, I believe nation-wide studies of polling place closures should look at
precinct-level data rather than only county-level data. Unfortunately, the availability of precinctlevel data (such as demographic information and turnout figures) is scarce. However, I am
optimistic that as voter technology becomes more advanced, so will the availability of voter data.
The second limitation of the median income variable is that it lacked information on the
election budgets of each jurisdiction, which often play a large part in decisions to close
precincts (Brady and McNulty 2011). Fortunately, I was able to access county election budget
data for counties in Georgia from 2012 and 2016 through the Public Service and Outreach
program at the University of Georgia.
Georgia is perhaps particularly well-suited for analysis here because it is a formerly
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preclearance state with a historically large Black population. Georgia also has characteristics
that may result in for polls being closed for constitutionally valid reasons. For example, it
offers a period of in-person early voting and no-excuse absentee balloting.25 In terms of
finances, Georgia is one of the wealthier states in the South, with a median state income of
roughly $55,390. In terms of selection methods for LEOs, Georgia is unique in that the
decision is up to the jurisdiction on how they select their local election officials. However, most
of the jurisdictions in my sample selected their LEOs by appointment. Based on this description
of Georgia, jurisdictions in the state should have the resources to keep polls open, but it may
also close traditional precincts because it has made alternative voting opportunities available. It
is possible, however, that the racial composition of jurisdictions plays into decision making
regarding reprecincting.
Figure 3-4. Mean % Change in Election Budget and
Mean PCVPP in 2012-16: Largest Black & Largest
white Jurisdictions in GA
30%
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Limitations in the data resulted in my analyses being restricted to only nine Black
jurisdictions and nine white jurisdictions.26 Looking at the first group of bars (representing
large Black populations) in figure 3-4, the average change in election budgets was roughly
10%, which suggests that most large Black jurisdictions saw increases in election budgets.
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As of 2016, the use of voting centers had not yet been adopted.
The full dataset is available in the aAppendix: table B.
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However, the average value of PCVPP did not reflect that. Rather than the average value of
PCVPP being near zero or being negative – which would likely have reflected jurisdictions
adding additional polling places with the additional resources available to them –, the average
value of PCVPP for those jurisdictions was roughly 26%. When looking at the sample of white
jurisdictions (represented by the second group of bars), the average change in election budgets
was almost 18 percentage points higher than in Black jurisdictions at 28%, while the value of
PCVPP, at 16% was much lower than it was in Black jurisdictions.
Based on these figures, from one perspective, it seems that election budgets do matter
when it comes to poll closures. Largely white counties in Georgia saw a significant increase in
their election budgets between 2012-16 and saw smaller values of PCVPP when compared to
the data for the large Black counties.
However, I believe it is also important to note that the data also suggests that closures
take place when there are budget increases as well. For example, the average value of PCVPP
in the largely white counties was still relatively large at 16% (although smaller when compared
to the largely Black counties) even though these counties saw their election budgets grow
between 2012 and 2016. The data surrounding the largely Black counties illustrates this as
well. On average, these counties saw a 10% increase in their budgets between 2012 and 2016,
but average PCVPP was quite large at 26%.
Election budgets decreased in three of the 18 counties in the sample, two of which were
largely white counties. While White County, one of the largely white counties in the sample,
experienced by far the largest budget decrease (33%), the county’s number of voters per
precinct increased by only 4%. In contrast, while largely Black Richmond County experienced
a 9% decrease in its election budget, the number of voters per precinct in that county increased
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by 80%. Not too much should be made of the values of PCVPP in White County and
Richmond County, but large positive changes of 15% or more in the number of voters per
precinct occurred in four of nine largely Black counties, but only two of nine largely white
counties, and this was true despite the fact that budgets increased in five of the six counties
with large positive changes in the number of voters per precinct.
As I mentioned, Georgia does offer alternative voting opportunities (and other factors)
that may explain the large values of PCVPP, but that is difficult to verify within the scope of
this project. I discuss that fact in more detail and describe my plans for future analyses in the
next section.
Conclusion
In recent years, journalistic reports have documented an unusually high number of poll
closures. The authors of many of these reports argue that the large number of closures is due to
the Shelby v. Holder ruling that effectively invalidated the preclearance provision of the Voting
Rights Act (LCEF 2016). The issue with these reports is that they are descriptive. They lack
rigorous statistical analyses that test whether their claims are correct. In this paper, I filled this
“statistical void” by using multiple regression models to understand the causes of The Great
Poll Closure.
Even after accounting for several legal factors that may lead jurisdictions to close
polling places, I find that formerly preclearance jurisdictions saw a significantly larger number
of polling place closures following Shelby than non-preclearance jurisdictions. In the initial
regression analysis (table 3-5), I did not find any significant evidence showing that the
interaction between percent non-white and preclearance played a role in polling place closures.
However, when I employed an indicator that identified jurisdictions with particularly
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large proportions of Black and Hispanic residents, the results surrounding formerly
preclearance jurisdictions with large non-white populations were consistent with my
expectations. For example, in the 2012-16 analysis, preclearance jurisdictions with large Black
populations were predicted to have a value of PCVPP roughly 18 percentage points greater
than non-preclearance jurisdictions. Preclearance jurisdictions with large Hispanic populations
were also predicted to have substantially higher values of PCVPP than non-preclearance
jurisdictions. Both relationships were statistically significant. Looking at these same
jurisdictions in the 2008-12, there were no statistically significant relationships. Based on the
results of the 2012-16 analysis, I conclude that formerly preclearance jurisdictions with large
Black and Large Hispanic populations were closing polling places at much larger rates
following Shelby when compared to both non-preclearance jurisdictions and (formerly)
preclearance jurisdictions with neither large Black nor Hispanic jurisdictions, even when
controlling for other causes of poll closures.
To further highlight this, in the pre-Shelby analysis, most of the significant factors that
led to polling place closures were constitutionally valid factors that are stated in the state’s
election code. For example, jurisdictions that implemented early voting laws between 20082012 were predicted to have larger values of PCVPP. Another constitutionally valid reason for
closures is budgetary constraints. In the pre-Shelby analysis, jurisdictions that were relatively
poor were predicted to see a significantly larger number of poll closures. Neither the enactment
of early voting laws nor lower levels of income were significant in the post-Shelby analysis.
I also examined the effects of additional socioeconomic factors on PCVPP. This is
especially important given the association between lower average socioeconomic status levels
and jurisdictions with large non-white populations. I find that the number of closures may have
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also been due in part to additional socioeconomic characteristics of jurisdictions with large
non-white populations such as age, income, and education. I find that preclearance
jurisdictions with large non-white populations, which have significantly lower median
incomes, fewer college graduates, and fewer people over the age of 65 than that of nonpreclearance jurisdictions, saw fairly similar averages of PCVPP when compared to nonpreclearance jurisdictions prior to the Shelby case. However, following Shelby, I find that
although the differences in SES characteristics remained the same between formerly
preclearance jurisdictions with large non-white populations and non-preclearance jurisdictions,
the values of PCVPP changes drastically with large increases of PCVPP in the former and
large decreases in the latter. These findings suggest that polling place closures in former
preclearance jurisdictions with large non-white populations may have also occurred due to
those jurisdictions having socioeconomic characteristics that are often associated with voter
turnout.
In terms of future work, at least two avenues of research should be explored. First,
although I believe my operationalization of budgetary issues is reasonable given the scope of
this project, I feel a deeper dive into each jurisdiction’s election budget would be ideal for
better understanding the effects of budgetary constraints on poll closures. For example, I
believe a more detailed investigation along the lines of my Georgia case study would be
fruitful. At the same time, analyzing cases in and/or across multiple states with different
election laws and demographics would help add even more nuance to our understanding of the
lasting effects of The Great Poll Closure. If election budget data for all voting jurisdictions
could be gathered, I believe a differenced election budget variable would make sense for a
nationwide analysis (similar to the one I conducted in table 3-5); decreases in election budgets
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would result in decreases in the number of polling places and vice-versa.
Second, I believe my findings in this chapter contribute to studying the lasting effects
of polling place closures, especially with my unique measure of polling place closures –
PCVPP. In the next chapter, I explore the effect of the PCVPP variable on county-level turnout
across the same election years. However, as I will explain in that chapter, I believe the research
should not stop at voter turnout. I believe studying the effect of PCVPP on other forms of
political participation and other political behavior would provide lawmakers with important
objective information to draw upon as they decide whether to replace the coverage formula
and/or revise the preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act in a way that passes
constitutional muster according to Federal Courts.
In conclusion, many political scientists, legal scholars, historians, activists, and citizens
familiar with the history of voting rights in the United States were concerned that the Shelby
decision would result in changes in election administration that would make voting more
burdensome, especially among Black and Hispanic Americans. The analyses in this chapter
suggest that such concerns were well founded. I believe these findings will contribute to the
already growing literature on the implications of the Shelby case. In other words, my findings
illustrate that the “40-year old facts” that the Supreme Court argued were out of date in the
justification of its invalidation of preclearance may not be as outdated as originally thought.
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CHAPTER 4: The Effects of The Great Poll Closure on Turnout
In chapter 2, I provided a legal primer for understanding how and why polling place
closures take place. In chapter 3, I examined the factors that cause voting jurisdictions to close
polling places. However, in this chapter, I am taking a more behavioral approach by analyzing
the effects of The Great Poll Closure on voter turnout in 2016 compared to previous elections
that occurred when the full protection of the Voting Rights Act, including the preclearance
provision, was still in force. Using county-level turnout data from the 2008, 2012 and 2016
presidential elections, I implement difference-in-difference analyses to explore the effect of
changes in polling places on the change in county voter turnout between 2008-12 and 2012-16.
I find that The Great Poll Closure had a significant effect on changes in county-level
turnout in presidential elections between 2012, before the Shelby decision, and 2016, after
Shelby effectively invalidated the preclearance provision of the VRA. In contrast, poll closures
did not have a significant negative effect on the change in turnout between 2008 and 2012,
before the Shelby case took place. Taking together the findings presented in chapter 3 and the
fact that the preclearance provision was still active, this finding makes sense. Although there
were poll closures between 2008 and 2012, the closures took place primarily in jurisdictions
that were never subject to preclearance and unlike the factors associated with closures in
jurisdictions (formerly) subject to preclearance, such as racial composition, the factors
associated with closures in non-preclearance areas were less strongly associated with lower
levels of voter turnout. To that point, in this chapter, I also find that formerly preclearance
jurisdictions with large Black populations saw significant decreases in turnout due to the large
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number of poll closures. This relationship was only significant following Shelby. In short, the
“40-year old facts” that Justice Roberts argued were outdated when invalidating the coverage
formula of the VRA may not be as “outdated” as originally thought.
In addition to general voter turnout literature, I believe the findings of this chapter will
also contribute to the growing literature on electoral procedures and non-white political
participation. One example of an election procedure that has been highly contentious is the
implementation of majority-minority districts. In general, with the implementation of majorityminority districts, Black and Latino representation in Congress has increased significantly
(Lublin 1997). To that point, scholars have also found that Blacks that live in districts with
Black legislators perceive their legislators as being responsive, evaluate their representatives
more favorably, and (in some cases) participate at higher rates than in districts in which
representatives are non-Black (Gay 2001; Tate 2003). In terms of Hispanic voters, Barreto,
Segura, and Woods (2004) found that majority Latino districts significantly increase turnout for
Hispanic voters living in those districts. However, scholars have also found majority-minority
districts to be unhelpful – particularly for the Black community. Gay (2007) found that
majority-minority districts are no more or no less responsive to their constituents than majoritywhite districts. Griffin and Flavin (2007) found that because Blacks score lower on average on
measures of political knowledge, they may be less likely to know if their representatives are
working in their favor. I believe the findings in this chapter surrounding polling place closures
and non-white turnout will add nuance to the discussion of how election procedures affect nonwhite voters.
Do Polling Place Closures Lower Turnout?
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Haspel and Knotts (2005) blazed the trail in “reprecincting” literature. They looked at
two elections in the city of Atlanta. They found that changes in polling places increased voter
turnout throughout Atlanta. However, the authors attribute their surprising results to two factors.
First, local election officials sent out reminder postcards to all the voters roughly 30 days prior to
the election so the voters would not forget that their polling place had changed. Second, the city
of Atlanta added eight precincts from the first to the second election, giving more voters places
to vote. Essentially, Haspel and Knotts showed that adding more precincts (which changes where
people vote) had a positive influence on voter turnout.
Brady and McNulty (2011) looked at the effect of poll closures in the 2003 gubernatorial
recall election in Los Angeles County, CA. They found that citizens who had their polling place
moved were 1.85 percent less likely to vote than those whose polling place remained the same.
Originally, Brady and McNulty found this 1.85 percent to be much higher, but part of the
original figure was offset by accounting for absentee and early voting. In other words, they
concluded that moving or closing a precinct does result in people not turning out to vote, but it
also increases the chances of engaging in non-traditional forms of voting (i.e. voting by absentee
ballot and early voting).
Brady and McNulty also found that the effect of closures was different for Democratic
and Republican voters. Democrats were more sensitive to polling place changes than
Republicans. While these effects did not determine the outcome of the election in question, they
are worrisome enough “to make it possible for someone to affect outcomes by more extensive
manipulation of polling place locations” (Brady and McNulty 2011 115).
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Amos, Smith, and Ste. Claire (2017) took this partisan concern to the next level by
studying reprecincting as a partisan act. In their experiment, they looked at a 2014 midterm
election in Manatee County, Florida. They chose this location because the local election official
prior to this election was a Democrat, and the one during the election was a Republican. They
found that when the Republican LEO was in office, precincts in Manatee County that were
predominately non-white, younger, and Democratic were the most likely to be consolidated or
closed. When looking at voter turnout, residents with those demographic characteristics were
also the least likely to cast a ballot. In short, Amos, Smith, and Ste. Claire (2017) provided
evidence that polling changes can be a partisan act that is detrimental to democracy in America.
In the most recent publication, Clinton et al. (2020) analyzed poll closures throughout the
whole state of North Carolina across three general elections (2008, 2012, and 2016). They found
that voters who had their polling places shut down or relocated were less likely to vote than those
whose polling places remained the same, but this finding was completely offset when they
accounted for the increase in early voting. In other words, when a person’s polling place
changes, it discourages them from turning out on election day, but not from voting entirely; they
just vote earlier. One limitation of these findings is that the state of North Carolina offers a
period of early voting in each county; isolating the effects of polling place closures in areas with
no early voting has yet to be done, and when early voting is not an option or involves significant
costs, polling place closures may result in reduced turnout.
The contributions made by the scholars mentioned above have advanced our
understanding of the relationship between poll closures and voter turnout. Specifically, citizens
whose polling places have been changed are less likely to vote than citizens whose polling places
did not change. However, two important questions remain unanswered: first, does that pattern
99

hold on a national level, especially when controlling for variation in state election laws? Second,
did the effect of closures on turnout become stronger following Shelby? Before I explain my
expectations, I believe it is necessary to explain why polling place closures decrease turnout.

Theoretical Explanations
There are at least three direct mechanisms that might explain the decrease in turnout
caused by polling place closures: transportation costs, lack of information (or search costs), and
the increase in wait time. The first mechanism, transportation costs, has been explored multiple
times by scholars of electoral administration (Brady and McNulty 2011; Dyck and Gimpel 2005;
Gimpel and Schuknecht 2003; Haspel and Knotts 2005; Cantoni 2016; Amos, Smith, and Ste.
Claire 2017). The expectation with regard to this mechanism is that those citizens who had their
precinct moved would be less inclined to vote if their new precinct location was farther away
than the previous one. The transportation costs mechanism has received little empirical support.
In their North Carolina sample, Clinton et al. (2020) found an average difference of less than 5
minutes for those voters who had their polling place changed.
The second mechanism seems to be the most widely agreed upon factor that explains the
effect of precinct closures on voter turnout (Amos, Smith, and Ste. Claire 2017; Clinton et al.
2020). Scholars argue that a precinct change may “require voters to expend resources seeking out
information about where their polling place has moved to and how to travel to it” (Clinton et al.
2020 5). These resources are things like the ability to get to city hall or having a permanent
mailing address at which information about polling place changes can be received. Local election
officials (those in charge of making changes) are required to notify constituents of precinct
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changes by a certain number of days before the election. Most LEOs notify citizens by mail or
post the information at the county courthouse or city hall. Not having access to this type of
information can hurt someone’s chances of participating in elections.
As past research has shown, “any additional hurdle to voting, however small or large, can
have a substantial impact on the likelihood of voting – especially among low-propensity voters”
(Hajnal et al. 2017 366). For example, Hajnal et al. (2017) found that strict voter ID laws (must
show a picture ID to vote) disproportionately reduce turnout among minorities, the poor, and
younger citizens.27 Unfortunately, members of non-white populations, citizens with low income
levels, and younger citizens also tend to have lower levels of political resources and are among
the types of citizens least likely to vote (Leighley and Nagler 2014; Verba et al. 1995).
In addition to members of these groups (non-whites, the poor, young citizens, and those
with lower levels of education) having difficulty overcoming hurdles to vote when their polling
places have been relocated, the findings described in chapter 3 also suggest that members of
these groups will also be more likely to face poll closures. For example, I found that formerly
preclearance jurisdictions with large non-white populations were expected to see the largest
amounts of poll closures following the Shelby election when compared to formerly nonpreclearance jurisdictions. I also found that other socioeconomic characteristics played into this
relationship as well. Not only does race play a factor in poll closures following Shelby, but so do
other socioeconomic characteristics of jurisdictions that are closely associated with race, such as
low education levels, high poverty rates, and high percentages of young people. In short, the
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Some scholars have questioned Hajnal et al’s findings. Gelman (2018) describes the controversy here:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/06/11/a-new-controversy-erupts-over-whether-voter-identification-laws-suppressminority-turnout/.
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citizens who are most likely to lack the resources to find new polling place locations are also the
citizens who experience poll closures more frequently.
The last mechanism – the effect of voter wait time – has not received as much scholarly
attention as the previous two mechanisms when it comes to the possible reasons polling place
closures can cause a decrease in turnout. Suppose a voter’s precinct was consolidated with a new
precinct across town that is roughly 3 miles away by car. This new precinct now must house the
original voters from previous years along with the voters from the precinct that was consolidated
with the original precinct. If the new combined precinct lacks the proper equipment and the
appropriate amount of poll workers, the wait time to vote could increase significantly. Another
factor affecting voter wait-times are the check-in stations. These can also cause voters to wait for
long periods of time, especially if equipment or the number of workers is inadequate. Barreto et
al. (2009) found that voter turnout was significantly lower in Los Angeles precincts with longer
lines and check-in times. In short, because polling place closures can result in the over-crowding
of new polling places, the length of lines at check-in stations and voting booths may increase
significantly, resulting in people leaving those lines and not casting ballots.
Expectations
Based on the previous literature, and by way of the theoretical mechanisms just
described, polling place closures do decrease the likelihood of individuals casting votes. I expect
this negative relationship between closures and turnout to hold at the county level as well.
However, in my research, I will not be estimating the effect of the raw number of polling place
closures on turnout because I believe the effect of the raw number of precinct closures should
vary by jurisdiction size. For example, take two hypothetical counties - one with 400 voters and
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the other with 4,000 voters - both with ten closures; I would imagine that turnout in the former
county would be much more strongly affected by the closing of 10 precincts than the latter. To
account for the population size problem, each county (in each election year – 2008, 2012, and
2016) is measured by the number of voters per precinct (or VPP). This value is the citizen voting
age population divided by the total number of traditional polling places.
To illustrate the relationship between the number of voters in a precinct and voter turnout
at a given point in time, I regressed county-level turnout in the last three presidential elections

(2008, 2012, and 2016) on the number of voters per precinct.28 Figure 4-1 plots predicted values
of turnout vs. VPP based on those results. I find that there was a significant negative relationship
between VPP and county-level voter turnout in all three elections. Jurisdictions with larger
numbers of voters per precinct were predicted to have lower levels of turnout in each year. These
findings were to be expected given the theoretical mechanisms explained in the section above.

28

The regression models include several control variables for both state-level election laws and county demographics. The full analyses are in
Table C in the appendix. The controls are the same variables used in chapter 3’s analyses (see chapter 3 data & methods section for more
information).
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Despite being congruent with my expectations, the analyses illustrated in figure 4-1 are only a
starting point, as they account for neither the endogeneity issues one faces with the study of
election changes nor the complexity of the effects of the Shelby decision.
Election scholars have found that endogeneity issues can be important when doing
research on the net effects of election changes (Bowler, Brockington, Donovan 2001; Erikson
and Minnite 2009; Giammo and Brox 2010; Hamner 2009; Leighley and Nagler 2009; Burden et
al. 2014). When studying whether political behavior that may be influenced by some sort of
election law change, it is important to consider the fact that election law changes “might be
shaped in part by that behavior” (Burden et al. 2014, 105). To account for this problem, scholars
suggest using difference-in-difference estimation (Bowler, Brockington, and Donovan 2001;
Erikson and Minnite 2009; Giammo and Brox 2010; Hanmer 2009; Leighley and Nagler 2009;
Burden et al. 2014). In this chapter, I utilize the same differenced variable from chapter 3, which
I referred to as the “percentage change in voters per precinct” or PCVPP. PCVPP is calculated
by finding the percentage change in voters per precinct (VPP) between the former and latter
election. In my analyses, there will be two PCVPP variables: 2008-12 and 2012-16 (see
Appendix I for more details). In sum, those voting jurisdictions with significant numbers of poll
closures (openings) between elections will have positive (negative) values of PCVPP. I expect
jurisdictions with higher values of PCVPP to see a larger decrease (or smaller increase) in
county level turnout as compared to jurisdictions with lower values of PCVPP in both election
analyses.
I believe the effects of increases in PCVPP on turnout will be particularly apparent when
comparing preclearance and non-preclearance jurisdictions across the different election analyses.
Recall that in the Shelby decision, the Court ruled that the coverage formula of the VRA was no
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longer valid. This eliminated required federal preclearance of election law changes in areas with
histories of voter discrimination. Based on the descriptive findings of the LCEF, in 2016, there
were over 800 polling place closures in formerly preclearance jurisdictions alone. Referring to
figure 3-2 in chapter 3, I also found statistically significant evidence that preclearance
jurisdictions were closing polling places at a much higher rate following Shelby.
For example, the mean value of PCVPP in non-preclearance jurisdictions was roughly
three percentage points higher than in preclearance jurisdictions before Shelby. This made sense
given that the preclearance provision was still active, which made it much more difficult for
preclearance jurisdictions to close or change polling place locations. Moving to the post-Shelby
analysis, the opposite relationship held between preclearance and PCVPP. The mean value of
PCVPP in formerly preclearance jurisdictions was roughly 20 percent, which is more than 12
percentage points higher than the mean value in formerly non-preclearance jurisdictions.
Additionally, comparing preclearance to formerly preclearance jurisdictions, the mean value of
PCVPP was roughly eight percentage points higher in the former than in the latter. Based on
those findings, without the preclearance provision of the VRA, jurisdictions that were formally
under the supervision of the federal government were closing precincts at a much higher rate
than they were when the provision was still active.
In addition to the large values of PCVPP in formerly preclearance areas, the population
characteristics of these jurisdictions provide another reason that high values of PCVPP are
particularly detrimental for turnout in those areas. Preclearance jurisdictions became
“preclearance” states or counties because of their histories of discrimination against non-whites
in their states and counties. These areas tend to have large non-white populations. As noted in the
literature review, people of color are less likely to have the resources necessary to overcome
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obstacles to voting; adding another obstacle by closing polling places is likely to further reduce
turnout.

To illustrate this relationship, figure 4-2 shows the predicted values of PCVPP for
different combinations of jurisdictions with different characteristics in terms of preclearance and
non-white populations from the analyses conducted in chapter 3.29 Based on the figure, one can
tell that the values of PCVPP in formerly preclearance jurisdictions with large non-white
populations were much higher in the 2012-16 (post-Shelby) analysis than in the pre-Shelby
analysis even when holding factors such as median income fixed. For example, preclearance
jurisdictions with large Black populations (> 30%) were predicted to have a PCVPP value of
26% in 2012-16, which was roughly 9 percentage points higher than in 2008-12. This was
relatively similar in formerly preclearance jurisdictions with large Hispanic populations (> 15%).
Interestingly, predicted values of PCVPP for formerly preclearance jurisdictions with small non-

29

These predicted values are based on the analyses in Table 3-7 in chapter 3. All other variables are held at their means.
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white changed minimally following Shelby. This ultimately shows that among preclearance
jurisdictions, those with large non-white populations were closing significantly more polling
places following Shelby than those with smaller non-white populations. In conclusion, based on
these predicted values, I expect the largest effects of PCVPP on the change in turnout will be
found in preclearance jurisdictions with large non-white populations.
Data & Methods
To analyze the relationship between polling place closures and county voter turnout, I use
county-level election returns from three elections: 2008, 2012, 2016. I obtained this data from
Dave Leip’s Election Atlas. Each county’s voter turnout is measured as a percentage of the
voting-age population. The voting-eligible population would have been the more ideal measure,
but it was not available at the county-level.
For data on polling places, I used the Election Administration and Voting Survey
(EAVS), which is a biennial survey that collects data on a wide variety of election
administration topics across voting jurisdictions in the U.S. I analyze the number of voters per
precinct by utilizing data collected by the Election Administration Commission (EAC). After
each midterm and general election, the EAC creates the Election Administration and Voting
Survey (EAVS). It polls each voting jurisdiction across the United States on election
administration procedures and voting registration. In this survey, the EAVS asks three
questions about the total number of polling places in a jurisdiction: (1) physical polling places
other than election offices, (2) election offices, and (3) other (see Appendix I for more
information). For my research, I tallied up the three answers and used that as the total number
of election day polling places in jurisdictions for 2008, 2012, and 2016.
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One issue with the EAVS is that states and their local jurisdictions are not required to
complete the survey, and thus some states are missing from the dataset. Alaska, New York, Utah,
Illinois, Wisconsin, New Mexico, and Virginia failed to complete the survey in at least one of the
three years. I omitted Colorado, Washington, and Oregon because they do not have traditional
polling places; all their elections are administered by mail. Altogether, I gathered precinct data
for 40 states plus Washington, D.C. which equates to roughly 2,270 voting jurisdictions.
County-Level Turnout. For the purposes of my analyses, I employ two dependent
variables that measure the change in county voter turnout; the first captures change from 200812 and the second captures change from 2012-16. To create these variables, I subtracted countylevel voter turnout rate in 2012 (2016) from turnout in 2008 (2012). The average change in
turnout from 2008-2012 was roughly -2%, whereas in 2012-2016 it was +1%. The histogram in
figure 4-3 illustrates the differences in turnout. As evident in the figure, the median county saw a
decrease in turnout from 2008-12, while the median county saw an increase in turnout between
2012-16.
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Polling Place Closures. To measure the change in polling places between elections, each
county’s number of voters per precinct is measured, and equals the total number of active voters
divided by the total number of traditional polling places. To compare polling place closures
between elections, I create a differenced variable referred to as the “percentage change in voters
per precinct” or PCVPP. PCVPP is calculated by finding the percentage change in VPP between
the former and latter election. In my analyses, there are two PCVPP variables: one for 2008-12
and one for 2012-16 (see Appendix I for more details). In sum, those voting jurisdictions with
significant amounts of poll closures (openings) between elections will have a positive (negative)
value of PCVPP. In terms of expectations, I predict that jurisdictions with large values of PCVPP
will see significant decreases (or significantly smaller increases) in county turnout between both
2008-12 and 2012-16 compared to those with smaller values.
The Effects of the Shelby Decision. There is a two-step process when it comes to
interpreting and understanding the effects of Shelby on the change in county-level turnout. First,
I create two important county-level variables that interact whether a jurisdiction was formerly
under preclearance and with the percentages of a county’s population that is Black and Hispanic.
I refer to these variables as jurisdiction percent Black x preclearance and jurisdiction percent
Hispanic x preclearance. I include these variables in the model specification that includes all
independent variables. I expect to see formerly preclearance jurisdictions with large Black (and
large Hispanic) populations to see a decrease in county-level turnout between 2012-16 and a
slight increase (or an insignificant decrease) between 2008-12. The reason for this expectation is
that the preclearance provision was still active in the latter election analysis, thus ensuring no
new discriminatory election procedures would be employed to hinder voting among non-whites.
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Second, to better understand the effects PCVPP, preclearance, and racial composition
have on turnout, I create predicted values of county-level turnout for hypothetical jurisdictions
with various characteristics and values of PCVPP.30 There are a total of four scenarios: nonpreclearance jurisdictions, preclearance jurisdictions with large Black populations (>30%),
preclearance jurisdictions with large Hispanic populations (>15%), and preclearance jurisdictions
with neither large Black nor large Hispanic populations. My expectations are that setting the
value of PCVPP to a relatively high value will result in preclearance jurisdictions with large nonwhite populations seeing a significant decrease in predicted turnout, particularly following the
Shelby case.
Election Law Controls. Clinton et al. (2020) found that although polling place changes
did result in citizens not turning out to vote, if a state offers more relaxed early voting laws, the
effect of poll closures is offset. Based on that finding, I believe it is imperative to control for
early voting opportunities, specifically in-person early voting and no-excuse absentee balloting.
Another voting law that may influence the effect of closures on turnout is the implementation of
voting centers. Voting centers are “polling locations that are open to all voters in a county rather
than geographically restricted precincts” (Stein and Vonnahme 2012 291). Given that voting
centers are created to mitigate the hassle of finding a traditional polling place, I expect that the
effect of closures on turnout will be weaker in states that implement voting centers.
The final state election law that may affect county turnout that I account for here is a
strict voter identification requirement. Hajnal et al. (2017) found that the enactment of strict
voter ID laws (i.e. photo ID required) caused a significant decrease in turnout among minorities

30

These predicted values of PCVPP are drawn from figure 4-2.
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in states that enacted those requirements. I code this variable as 1 if a state requires voters to
show photo ID at the polls and 0 if a state does not require a photo ID.
County Demographics. According to scholars of voting behavior, demographics play a
large role in determining voter turnout (Verba et al. 1995; Leighley and Nagler 2014). The
demographic patterns identified by these scholars are often associated with voter turnout
analyses at the individual-level. With that being said, I believe it is important to control for these
demographics at the county-level as well. Using the 5-year American Communities Survey
(ACS) provided by the U.S. Census, I control for the following county demographics: % Black
% Hispanic, percentage of adults with a college degree, percentage of citizens 65 or older,
median jurisdictional income, and population density.31
Model Specification. I estimate linear regression models predicting the percentage
change in county voter turnout from 2008 to 2012 and from 2012 to 2016. These models are also
difference-in-difference (DID) models. DID models estimate the effects of explanatory variables
(and changes of those variables) on the over-time change in an outcome variable. In the models, I
observe the change in voters per precinct between two election years (2008-12 and 2012-16).
Because I am using difference-in-difference estimation, I also must account for the differences in
my independent variables. For example, I take my dummy variables for state laws and create
differenced variables for both the 2012 and 2016 models. In other words, in my 2012 (2016)
analysis, the early voting variable is accounting for those states who implemented (or eliminated)
an early voting period between 2008 (2012) and 2012 (2016). I also created differenced variables
for the absentee and voting center dummies. However, variables such as jurisdiction Black

31Being

that population density (persons per square mile) and VPP (voters per precinct) may be very similar and maybe highly
correlated, I ran a Pearson correlation test. I found no significant correlation between the two variables.
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population and Hispanic population (and other demographics) evolved to slowly over the fouryear comparison and the difference would have little effect on the dependent variable.
Another important aspect of model specification for these analyses is the standard errors.
In most analyses where there is mixed-level modeling, the standard errors are normally clustered
at the aggregate level. For example, if there is county and state level data in the model, the
standard errors should be clustered at the state level. However, in terms of my analyses, this is
not the case. If I were just implementing cross-sectional analyses (rather than DID), I could
cluster the standard errors at the state level, but because I am using DID, clustering the standard
errors at the state level would not account for the county-level correlated errors over time (Primo,
Jacobsmeier, & Milyo 2007; Burden et al. 2014; Burden et al. 2017). In other words, because
each county is observed at two points in time (i.e. election cycles – 2008 to 2012 & 2012 to
2016), the standard errors must be clustered at the county level.
Findings
To estimate the effect of the change in voters per precinct on the change in county-level
turnout, I estimate a total of four models (1-2 for 2008-12 and 3-4 for 2012-16).32 Before I
discuss the results, it is important to describe the interpretation of the coefficients. Because the
dependent variable is the difference in turnout, each coefficient represents the predicted effect of
a unit change on turnout, with the units of turnout being percentage points. For example, if there
is a coefficient of 0.09 on one of the dummy variables, the predicted change in turnout between
the two election years is roughly 0.09 percentage points higher in counties where the variable
takes on a value of 1 than in counties where that variable takes on a value of 0.

32

For additional analyses that compare preclearance to non-preclearance jurisdictions between 2008-12 and 2012-16, please see table D in the appendix.
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As shown in table 4-1, model 1 is a bivariate regression analysis between PCVPP and
change in county-level turnout between 2008-2012. I find that jurisdictions with higher values of
PCVPP were predicted to see more negative changes in turnout between 2008-12 than those with
Table 4-1. Difference-in-Difference Models of Change in County-Level Turnout
2008 to 2012
2012 to 2016
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
PCVPP
-0.003
-0.002
-0.003**
-0.003**
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.001)
Preclearance X % Black
0.040***
-0.056***
(0.010)
(0.012)
Preclearance X % Hispanic
0.036**
0.008
(0.014)
(0.015
Preclearance
-0.185
1.812***
(0.321)
(0.345)
% Black
0.016*
-0.060***
(0.008)
(0.009)
% Hispanic
-0.021**
0.001
(0.007)
(0.009)
-0.523
-0.520
Δ Early Voting
(0.421)
(0.572)
0.059
-1.684**
Δ No-Excuse Absentee
(0.347)
(5.47)
-1.415***
-0.827
Δ Voting Centers
(0.272)
(0.452)
-1.126***
-1.399***
Δ Strict ID Laws
(0.141)
(0.234)
Median Income
0.046***
-0.010
(0.009)
(0.010)
Pop. Density
0.118
0.298***
(0.206)
(0.063)
% Over 65
0.174***
0.056**
(0.017)
(0.018)
% College Degree
-0.093***
-0.040**
(0.017)
(0.018)
% Voted for GOP
0.006
0.004
(0.007)
(0.007)
Constant
-0.002***
-0.067***
0.008***
0.012
(0.001)
(0.007)
(0.001)
(0.009)
R2
0.01
0.15
0.01
0.22
N
2,262
2,262
2,262
2,262
Standard errors in parentheses* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors are also clustered at the county-level.

lower values of PCVPP. However, that relationship was insignificant. Taking together the
findings presented in chapter 3 and the fact that the preclearance provision was still active, this
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finding makes sense. Although there were poll closures between 2008 and 2012, the closures
took place primarily in jurisdictions that were never subject to preclearance and unlike the
factors associated with closures in jurisdictions (formerly) subject to preclearance, such as racial
composition, the factors associated with closures in non-preclearance areas were less strongly
associated with lower levels of voter turnout.
When looking at Model 3 – which shows the bivariate relationship between PCVPP and
turnout between 2012-16, I find a similar relationship to the one found using Model 1, but this
time PCVPP has a significant effect on change in turnout. Jurisdictions with higher values of
PCVPP were predicted to see roughly a -0.003 percentage point change in turnout between 201216 when compared to those with lower values of PCVPP. This finding is significant at the 99%
confidence level.
When accounting for a variety of additional factors (in Models 2 and 4), I find the same
results as I did with the bivariate models. Jurisdictions with higher values of PCVPP were
expected to see decreases in turnout between both sets of elections, but the effect was only
significant in the 2012-16 analysis. These findings are congruent with existing literature in that
PCVPP had a negative effect on change in turnout in both election analyses.
Models 2 and 4 account for the effects of Shelby using two different interaction terms –
preclearance x jurisdiction percent Black and preclearance x jurisdiction percent Hispanic.
Between 2008-12, turnout levels in preclearance jurisdictions were predicted to significantly
increase when the jurisdictions’ Black populations were relatively high. I also find a similar
relationship when looking at the interaction between preclearance and % Hispanic. These
findings are not surprising given that the preclearance provision was still active. In other words,
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these two findings suggest that the preclearance provision was working properly – encouraging
political participation by non-whites.
However, in the 2012-16 analysis, I find that the effect of a jurisdiction being formerly
under preclearance was negative and significant when that jurisdiction’s Black population was
large. I did not find this same effect for formerly preclearance jurisdictions with large Hispanic
populations. In fact, I found that the opposite effect held, although the estimated effect was not
statistically significant. The estimated effect of the jurisdiction percent Black and preclearance
interaction is noteworthy for two reasons. First, Barack Obama being on the ballot in 2012 could
have been the reason for the significant increase in turnout between 2008-12. However, given the
context of the 2016 election and the candidates who ran (Donald Trump and Hilary Clinton),
overall Black voter turnout significantly decreased between 2012-16.33 This could be one
potential reason for the decrease in turnout in formerly preclearance areas with large Black
populations, although it would not explain why turnout in formerly preclearance jurisdictions
with large Black populations decreased more than turnout in non-preclearance jurisdictions with
large Black populations. Another reason for the decrease in turnout, however, could be attributed
to poll closures and the effects of the Shelby decision.
To further evaluate this possible explanation, table 4-2 shows predicted values of turnout
for various hypothetical jurisdictions while setting values of PCVPP to their predicted values
found in chapter 3 (also shown in figure 4-2 in this chapter). Non-preclearance jurisdictions’
values of PCVPP were set to 16% between 2008-12 and 7% between 2012-16. PCVPP was set to
14% for preclearance jurisdictions with small non-white populations for the 2008-12 analysis
and to 15% for the 2012-16 analysis. PCVPP was set to 17% for preclearance jurisdictions with

33

https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/05/12/black-voter-turnout-fell-in-2016-even-as-a-record-number-of-americans-cast-ballots/
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large Black populations for 2008-12 and to 26% for 2012-16. Finally, preclearance jurisdictions
with large Hispanic populations were assigned PCVPP values of 18% and 24%. I set all other
variables (outside of non-white population size34) to their respective means.
When looking at preclearance jurisdictions with large Black populations, I find that the
predicted value of change in turnout decreased significantly following the Shelby case. Between
2008 and 2012, the predicted change in turnout was an increase of roughly only a hundredth of a
Table 4-2. Predicted Values of Change in Turnout for Hypothetical Jurisdictions Using Predicted
Values of PCVPP from Chapter 3.
Preclearance
Preclearance
Preclearance
NonLarge Black Pop. Large Hispanic
Neither Large
Preclearance
(> 30%)
Pop. (>15%)
Black nor Hisp.
2008-12
+0.01%
-1.74%
-1.89%
-2.74%
2012-16
-2.63%
+2.25%
+1.43%
+0.66%
N
212
183
216
1,655

percentage point, whereas between 2012-16, the predicted change was a decrease of almost three
percentage points. These findings suggest that PCVPP played a major role in turnout in formerly
preclearance jurisdictions with large Black populations. Interestingly, in comparing the other
scenarios in both analyses, formerly preclearance jurisdictions with large Black populations were
the only type to see a predicted decrease in turnout between 2012-16. Specifically, formerly
preclearance jurisdictions with large Hispanic populations were predicted to see a two percentage
point increase in turnout between 2012-16. Like the literature surrounding majority-minority
districts on non-white turnout (Gay 2007; Griffin and Flavin 2007; Barreto, Segura, and Woods
2004), the effects of PCVPP also varied among the two racial groups with Black turnout
significantly decreasing, while Hispanic turnout significantly increasing.

34

In terms of non-white population size, the values were the average sizes in each of the four categories used in chapter 3. For example, I set the preclearance
jurisdictions with large Black populations to 50%, preclearance jurisdictions with large Hispanic populations to 40%, preclearance jurisdictions with neither large
Black nor Hispanic to 15% and 10%. Finally, I set non-preclearance jurisdictions to 5% for both Hispanic and Black populations.
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To conclude the results section, I will discuss the important effects of the control
variables in Models 2 and 4 from table 2. The implementation of in-person early voting, voting
centers, and strict voter identification laws for the 2012 election were associated with more
negative changes in county-level turnout compared to 2008. The in-person early voting and strict
ID laws findings are both congruent with previous literature (Burden et al. 2014; Hajnal et al.
2017). The finding regarding voting center laws, however, was not. Stein and Vonhamme found
in their 2008 analysis that voting centers improved voter turnout. Their results were found at the
individual level only. One reason for my contradictory findings could be that voting centers are
still relatively new, and people who are traditional precinct voters may still not understand how
voting at voting centers works.35
In the 2012-2016 analyses, I find results similar to those for the 2008-2012 model. For
example, states that implemented in-person early voting between 2012-16 saw more negative
changes in county-level turnout than states that did not. States that enforced strict identification
laws also saw predicted negative changes in county-level turnout of about 1.4 percentage points
between 2012 and 2016.
Two results related to my jurisdictional controls are worth a brief discussion. First, in
both analyses, younger and less educated jurisdictions were predicted to see larger decreases in
county-level turnout. These findings are not surprising given the large amounts of literature on
voter turnout indicating that older and more educated people are more likely to vote (Verba et al.
1995). Second, it appears that poorer jurisdictions saw a decrease in turnout between 2008-2012,
but not 2012-2016. I also find that less densely populated areas were predicted to see larger
decreases in turnout between 2012-2016, but not 2008-2012. I believe these findings suggest

35

Based on my data in 2012, only 12% of the states allowed voting centers, whereas in 2016 that number only jumped to 17%.
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further research is needed, especially concerning election outcomes and the legacy of
preclearance.
Although the findings in this chapter imply that PCVPP caused a significant drop in
county-level turnout, I think it is important to understand that the effects of PCVPP may not be
the same across all states. For example, some states have more people, and thus have more
polling places that are close to other polling places. When polling places close in a state such as
New York, the average distance between the new and old locations may be very small. However,
if you look at a state that is less densely populated, a polling place relocation may mean voters
have to travel many miles further to vote. As an illustration of this point, the Brennan Center for
Justice found that 32% of the Native American voters in South Dakota did not vote because of
the long distances to the newly located polling places in the 2018 midterm elections. For some
indigenous voters, the total distance to the polls was over 150 miles.36 When interpreting the
results of this chapter, it is imperative to understand that the effects of PCVPP on turnout may
not be identical across all contexts.
Discussion
As described in the previous section, I find that polling place closures do have a negative
impact on voter turnout at the county-level. I also find that The Great Poll Closure – the
significant amount of polling place closures following Shelby – had a significant effect on the
change in turnout between 2012-16. This significant negative effect was not found between
2008-12 before the Shelby case took place. To further highlight the effects of post-Shelby on
polling place closures on voter turnout, I find that due to the high values of PCVPP in formerly
preclearance areas in 2016, especially those with large Black populations (>30% Black), counties

36

To see full article, please visit: https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/state-native-american-voting-rights
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formerly subject to preclearance saw a significant decrease in turnout between 2012-2016. This
relationship was not found when looking at these same jurisdictions prior to Shelby.
In conclusion, while Justice Roberts wrote in the Shelby decision that the coverage
formula (and, by extension, preclearance) was based on “40-year-old facts having no logical
relationship to the present day,” many observers were concerned that in jurisdictions formerly
subject to preclearance, reprecincting and other changes to electoral rules would lead to reduced
electoral participation in those jurisdictions. The analyses in this chapter suggest that such
concerns were well founded. In using a unique nation-wide study of the effects of the precinct
closure phenomena on voter turnout, I find that polling place closures do have detrimental effects
on voter turnout at the county level. This chapter’s findings suggest that at the time that the
preclearance provision of the VRA was effectively invalidated, it was still needed to prevent
certain jurisdictions from creating election procedures that might hinder voter turnout.
Moving forward, a great deal of research could be conducted on the relationship between
poll closures and the lack of federal oversight of election procedures. For example, it would be
interesting to estimate the effects of PCVPP on turnout in the 2020 presidential election (or any
election following 2016). If the goal of the Voting Rights Act is to protect the voting rights of all
citizens and patterns like those described in this chapter continue, required federal preclearance
of changes in electoral procedures in areas with histories of discriminatory election
administration may be key to the VRA achieving its goals. Preclearance, however, cannot return
unless either Congress updates the coverage formula in a manner that meets constitutional
muster, or the Supreme Court drastically alters it’s thinking as put forth by Justice Roberts in
Shelby Court v. Holder. Outside of the election administration and voter turnout literatures, my
findings in this chapter also contribute to the growing literature on the lasting effects of Shelby
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(Hajnal et al. 2017; Schuit & Rogowski 2017; Ang 2019). That literature suggests that
congressional revision of the VRA or the passage of new voting rights legislation may be
necessary if the levels of electoral participation made possible by the Voting Rights Act are to be
maintained..
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CHAPTER 5: Conclusion
The research described in this dissertation suggests that The Great Poll Closure had a
negative impact on non-white citizens – especially Black citizens – living in areas that were
formerly under preclearance. As shown in chapter 3, jurisdictions formerly subject to
preclearance that had large Black populations saw the largest number of closures following
Shelby. In chapter 4, I also found that these former preclearance jurisdictions with large Black
populations experiences a significant decrease in turnout following the Shelby ruling. The
findings in this dissertation strongly suggest the re-instatement of the coverage formula and
preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act would increase turnout, particularly among
former preclearance jurisdictions with large Black populations.
This research contributes to the discipline of political science in at least three unique
ways. First, in conducting my research I drew from, synthesized, and added to the literature in
three major areas of scholarship in political science: constitutional law, political institutions, and
political behavior. Second, although research on poll closures has been conducted in the past, I
believe the research described in this dissertation provides one of the first nation-wide studies of
the effects of poll closures - specifically closures leading up to the first presidential election
without the full protection of the VRA. Lastly, I believe my measure of polling place closures,
PCVPP, is an important innovation and may be useful for future research. This concluding
chapter summarizes each substantive chapter’s findings and then provides a short case study to
contextualize those findings. In concluding, I discuss the real-world implications of this
dissertation and some potential directions for future work.
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Chapter 2
Chapter 2 has three main takeaway points. First, it provides a “legal primer” on nonwhite voting rights in the U.S., beginning with the period of Reconstruction, and concluding with
the Shelby v. Holder case. I believe it was necessary to describe the progression of voting rights
for minorities before discussing the process of reprecincting and other election administration
processes. Second, it describes how election administration works and how local, state, and
federal governments are connected in the process. Lastly, it describes four criteria by which
states’ reprecincting laws can be compared: authorization, time limits, precinct size, and state
regulation. The goal of this chapter was to not only provide the reader with some background on
reprecincting but also to help make sense of the findings for my final two quantitative chapters
regarding precinct changes since Shelby.
Chapter 3
In recent years, journalistic reports have documented an unusually high number of poll
closures. Many of the authors of these reports argue that the large number of closures is due to
the Shelby v. Holder ruling that eliminated the preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act
(LCEF 2016). While important, these reports are largely descriptive in nature and in some cases
anecdotal. They lack rigorous statistical analyses that test whether the claims made are correct.
In this chapter, I filled this “statistical void” by using multiple regression models to understand
the causes of The Great Poll Closure.
After accounting for several constitutionally valid factors that may result in the closure
of polling places, I found that formerly preclearance jurisdictions saw a significant number of
polling place closures following Shelby when compared to non-preclearance jurisdictions. In
the original regression analysis (table 3-5), I did not find any significant evidence that the
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interaction between percent non-white and preclearance (the Shelby effect) played a factor into
polling place closures. However, when I employed a categorical variable that identified
jurisdictions with particularly large proportions of Black and Hispanic residents, the results
matched my expectations. For example, in the 2012-16 analysis, preclearance jurisdictions
with large Black populations were expected to have a value of PCVPP roughly 18 percentage
points greater than non-preclearance jurisdictions. Preclearance jurisdictions with large
Hispanic populations were also expected to have similarly large values of PCVPP. Both
relationships were statistically significant. Looking at these same jurisdictions in the 2008-12
analysis, there were no statistically significant relationships between the racial composition of
districts, preclearance, and PCVPP. Based on these findings in the 2012-16 analysis, I
conclude that formerly preclearance jurisdictions with large Black and Large Hispanic
populations were closing polling places at much higher rates following Shelby when compared
to formerly non-preclearance jurisdictions.
I also found it necessary to examine the effects of additional socioeconomic factors on
PCVPP, especially given the association between lower SES and jurisdictions with large nonwhite populations. I found that the number of closures may have also been due to additional
socioeconomic characteristics that are common in jurisdictions with large non-white
populations, such as age, income, and education. I found that preclearance jurisdictions with
large non-white populations that are home to fewer college graduates and fewer people over
the age of 65 saw significant increases in the value of PCVPP following Shelby. I also found
that non-preclearance jurisdictions with similar socioeconomic characteristics saw decreases in
the value of PCVPP following Shelby. These findings suggest that polling place closures in
former preclearance jurisdictions with large non-white populations may have also occurred due
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to socioeconomic factors that are often associated with low voter turnout.
In conclusion, many political scientists, legal scholars, historians, activists, and citizens
familiar with the history of voting rights in the United States were concerned that the Shelby
decision would result in changes in election administration that would make voting more
burdensome, especially among Black and Hispanic Americans. The analyses in this chapter
suggest that such concerns were well founded. I believe these findings will contribute to the
already growing literature on the implication of the Shelby case. In other words, my findings
illustrate that the “40-year old facts” that Justice Roberts argued were out of date in the
justification of its invalidation of preclearance may not be as outdated as originally thought.
Chapter 4
Chapter 4 took a more behavioral approach in studying the effects of The Great Poll
Closure. In this chapter, I implemented difference-in-difference analyses to explore the effects
of changes in polling places on changes in county voter turnout between 2008-12 (pre-Shelby)
and 2012-16 (post-Shelby). My findings suggest that polling place closures have a negative
impact on voter turnout at the county-level. I also found that the Great Poll Closure had a
significant effect on changes in county-level turnout between 2012-16. This significant
negative effect was not found between 2008-12, before the Shelby case took place. To highlight
the effect of post-Shelby on polling place closures on voter turnout, I showed that due to the
high values of PCVPP in formerly preclearance areas in 2016, those jurisdictions, especially
those with large Black populations, saw a significant decrease in turnout between 2012-16.
This relationship was not found when looking at these same jurisdictions prior to Shelby.
In short, while Justice Roberts wrote in the Shelby decision that the coverage formula
(and, by extension, preclearance) was based on “40-year-old facts having no logical relationship
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to the present day,” many observers were concerned that in jurisdictions formerly subject to
preclearance, reprecincting and other changes to electoral rules would lead to reduced electoral
participation in those jurisdictions. By using a unique nation-wide study of the precinct closure
phenomena on voter turnout, I found that those concerns were warranted in that polling place
closures do have detrimental effects on voter turnout at the county-level. This chapter’s findings
suggest that the preclearance provision of the VRA was still needed to prevent certain
jurisdictions from creating election procedures that might hinder voter turnout.
In conclusion, while the statistical results in this dissertation do not definitively establish
that election officials closed precincts with the intent of lowering voter turnout among members
of non-white populations, they are consistent with what we would expect to see if an election
official did intend to do so.
Contextualizing My Substantive Findings
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby v. Holder, jurisdictions that had been
subject to the constant scrutiny of the federal government when proposing changes to election
procedures could now make changes with ease. In invalidating the coverage formula, however,
the Court noted that that the VRA provides for other ways to challenge changes to election laws
that seem to have discriminatory intent or effects. Section 2 of the VRA, for example, prohibits
the use of any voting practices or procedures that may be discriminatory
While challenges to election procedures under Section 2 can be filed, as chapter 2 pointed
out, lawsuits filed by the federal government against states or jurisdictions may take years to
work their way through the court system. Kousser (2015) also found that when looking at
election law objections under the VRA from its conception until after Shelby (1957 to 2014),
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over 93% of those objections took place in covered jurisdictions through sections 4b and 5 of the
VRA. Another important aspect of Kousser’s findings was that he considered the effects of
demographic differences between non-preclearance and preclearance jurisdictions on the number
of objections. In comparing covered and non-covered jurisdictions in which white citizens make
up less than 80% of the population, covered jurisdictions were five times more likely to face an
objection to an election law. His findings suggest that although the VRA provides for other ways
to prevent voter discrimination, the coverage formula and preclearance are the act’s most
effective and important provisions.
Another reason the Court invalidated the coverage formula was that the justices signing
the majority opinion felt that the formula was outdated and that jurisdictions no longer created
laws to deliberately discriminate against people of color. However, within hours of the Shelby
ruling, Texas and North Carolina, two states in formerly preclearance areas, passed strict voter
ID laws.37 Furthermore, the evidence presented in this dissertation suggests formerly
preclearance states and counties were closing precincts at much higher rates than they were in
previous years before Shelby. Along with research by other scholars, findings described in this
dissertation suggest that the majority’s belief that state and local officials no longer attempt to
discriminate against non-white voters may not be well-founded.
To further illustrate this, I describe a case in which a (formerly) preclearance state
proposed an election law change that was objected to by the DOJ when preclearance was in
effect, but then implemented that change following Shelby. In this case, the change was proposed
by the state of Louisiana rather than by a specific jurisdiction. For background purposes,
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This link provides more information on this: https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/effects-shelby-county-v-holder.
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Louisiana was one of the states originally subject to preclearance when the VRA was passed in
1965. As I explained in chapter 2, being a preclearance state meant that a state had a history of
voter discrimination and had historically low voter turnout among minorities. Louisiana has the
fifth highest percentage of Black residents in the United States, at roughly 30%. Because of its
large Black population and its history of significant voter discrimination, Louisiana was the
“poster-state” for preclearance. According to Bullock, Gaddie, and Wert (2016), between 1995
and 2005, the Bayou State received the largest number of election proposal objections from the
Department of Justice, with 19 objections being made. As mentioned above, instead of objecting
to states’ or jurisdictions’ election proposals, the DOJ can also ask for more information by
issuing more information requests (or MIR). According to Fraga and Ocampo (2016), between
1990 and 2006, Louisiana also received 983 MIRs. The most frequent type of election proposal
that was responded with an MIR involved precinct boundary formation. Based on this
information about Louisiana and its history with preclearance, the state was no stranger to
receiving objections and MIRs from the DOJ.
In 2008, the state of Louisiana attempted to edit their precinct boundary formation law
across the whole state. They wanted to extend the precinct boundary “freeze” from one year to
four years. In other words, they wanted to keep the precinct boundaries the same for multiple
years at a time. In 2008, the Louisiana state law stated that no precinct should be changed
between January 2009 and December 2010. In their 2008 election change proposal, Louisiana
wanted to extend the freeze on voting precinct boundaries from January of 2009 to December of
2013.
The DOJ objected to this election proposal in part because they determined that the new
law would be a large departure from the original law. Another was that the DOJ felt that the
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freeze would not allow for local election officials to make adjustments to precinct boundaries
(and polling place locations) that might strengthen non-white voter turnout. In short, the state of
Louisiana’s precinct boundary law was rejected by the DOJ because they were afraid that the
freeze would not allow for LEOs to readjust boundaries if non-white voting was diluted in the
previous precinct formation.38
The boundaries of precincts in counties (referred to as parishes in Louisiana) are often
affected by the redistricting that takes place after each census. As such, the extended precinct
boundary freeze that Louisiana wished to propose only really matters when the end of a decade is
near. For example, the 2008 proposal was made because the 2010 census was approaching. In
2008, the preclearance provision of the VRA resulted in the proposed law not going into effect.
As 2020 approached, however, due to the Shelby decision, preclearance was no longer required.
In 2018, Louisiana passed a nearly identical law and it went into effect. The revision to the state
of Louisiana’s election code reads that “no election precinct shall be created, divided, abolished,
or merged or the boundaries thereof otherwise changed between December thirty-first of any
year of which the last digit is nine and January first of any year of which the last digit is three.”39
In the state of Louisiana, which has a clear history of voter discrimination, the precinct freeze is
now four years instead of two. The election law that the DOJ had objected to in 2008 because of
its potentially discriminatory effects is now written into law.
Table 5-1. Large Black Jurisdictions (>30%) in Louisiana
Years
PCVPP
Change in Turnout
Pre-Shelby (2008-12)
2%
0%
Post-Shelby (2012-16)
5%
-1%

38
39

The full objection letter can be found at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/05/30/l_090810.pdf.
Louisiana. Stat. § 532.1(4D.1a) 2018.
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To utilize the findings of this dissertation and to show how this law regarding precinct
changes can be a major problem, I tabulated the values of PCVPP and change in turnout in
Louisiana jurisdictions with large Black populations from 2008-12 and 2012-16 in table 5-1. The
mean value of PCVPP was roughly three percentage points higher in these jurisdictions in 201216 than in 2008-12. The change in turnout was also different; change over the 2012-16 period
was roughly -1%, whereas there was essential no change over the 2008-12 period. This suggests
that following Shelby, jurisdictions in Louisiana with large Black populations saw a significant
increase in polling place closures followed by a significant decrease in turnout. This was not the
case pre-Shelby.
Implications
This research described in this dissertation has two important real-world implications.
First, I believe my findings can encourage local government officials to become more aware of
the implications of closing polling places. Obviously, local election officials with small election
budgets will be more likely to close the polls because they have no choice but to do so, but I
believe with the information provided in this dissertation, LEOs may be more attentive to the fact
that any change in location of the polls can deter someone from voting, and that people of color
may be particularly likely to be deterred. I believe my description of the reprecincting process in
chapter 2 could be useful for state and local government that wish to enact laws that may prevent
intentional, politically motivated closures.
Another useful aspect of this research is that it demonstrates that the coverage formula of
the Voting Rights Act was important in providing citizens with ample opportunities to vote. I am
not the only scholar who has expressed concern over the lasting impacts of Shelby. Schuit and
Rogowski (2017) found that members of Congress who were representatives of a preclearance
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district were more likely to favor civil rights legislation compared to representatives of nonpreclearance districts. Other political scientists, such as Hajnal et al. (2017), found that certain
states or specific counties are still in need of federal preclearance when making voting and
election laws because state officials continue to find ways to alienate or discourage members of
certain groups from voting. For example, Hajnal et al. found that states, who generally vote more
Republican (based on past presidential votes) deliberately use stricter voter ID laws to narrow the
voting population and leave it with a larger percentage of affluent, white voters.
Some lawmakers have recently shown interest in revisiting the coverage formula. In
2019, members of the House of Representatives drafted a bill, the John Lewis Voting Rights Act,
which would replace the VRA’s coverage invalidated formula with a (potentially)
constitutionally valid one and essentially reinstate the preclearance provision. The bill died in the
Republican led Senate. In the current Congress, the House has yet to bring the bill the floor for a
re-vote. According to Representative Terri Sewell of Alabama, the House plans to bring the bill
to a vote in September 2021. However, Sewell expects the bill to receive the same lack of
support from Senate Republicans as it did in 2019. I believe my research and other research on
similar topics surrounding the impacts of Shelby can shed light on the negative effects of the
Shelby decision on voter turnout and how the revision of the coverage formula and resumption of
the preclearance process would likely lead to greater political participation, particularly among
members of non-white populations.
Future work
This dissertation also suggests two important avenues for future research. First, I believe
a deeper dive into the politics of local government may provide more evidence that preclearance
jurisdictions were closing precincts at a much higher rate following Shelby for politically
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motivated reasons. For example, a small-N case study comparing preclearance and nonpreclearance jurisdictions using the same variables that I used for my large-N observational
analysis may be a useful direction to pursue. Following this route, researchers could study the
budgetary aspects of reprecincting in more detail as well as the effects of the partisanship of the
local election officials on polling place closures. I believe this type of research would pair nicely
with the research that I present in this dissertation.
Second, the 2020 general election took place during the COVID-19 pandemic, which
seriously hindered the availability of in-person traditional polling places. Most jurisdictions
made alternative voting much easier than in had been in years past. I believe this would be an
excellent opportunity to study the interjurisdictional differences in numbers of polling places.
For example, did the closure phenomena continue? Or was everyone closing precincts due to the
pandemic? I believe this would be an interesting avenue to pursue once precinct data for the
2020 election become readily available.
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APPENDIX I – Coding Instructions
Percentage Change in Voters Per Precinct (PCVPP)
MAJOR COMPONENTS
Citizen Voting Age Population
I consulted the 5-year American Communities Survey dataset for the citizen voting age
population for each jurisdiction in my sample. The citizen voting age population (CVAP) is
defined as the population of the United States that is over the age of 18.
Traditional Election Day Polling Places
To collect data for election day polling places for each jurisdiction, I consulted the Election
Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) by the Election Assistance Commission. The EAC
sends this survey out following every midterm and general election to compile data on election
administration across the United States. In terms of polling places, they ask each jurisdiction to
list the number of election day polling places. However, they create three categories: (1) physical
polling places, (2) election offices, and (3) other. Because they ask a separate question for early
voting, I decided to use the sum of the three election day categories as my polling place value for
each jurisdiction. I did this for 2008, 2012, and 2016 election years.
FORMULA
PCVPP = (# voters ’16 / # precincts ’16) – (# voters ’12 / # precincts ’12) X 100
(# voters ’12 / # precincts ’12)

Based on the formula above, to get the PCVPP, I am taking the difference between the voters
perprecinct in 2016 and the voters per precinct in 2012 and then dividing it by the voters per
precinct in 2012. To get the percent change, I just simply multiplied the change in VPP by 100.
CVAP ’12

Precincts ’12

CVAP ’16

Precincts ’16

PCVPP

Autauga County, AL

23,909

28

24,661

17

69%

Allen County, IN

146,505

327

145,787

338

-3%

Jurisdiction

In Autauga County, AL, due to the closings of 11 precincts and the increase in voter
population, the jurisdiction had a 69% increase in voters per precinct in 2016 compared to
2012. In Allen County, IN, due to the openings of 11 precincts and the decrease in voter
population, the jurisdiction had a 3% decrease in voters per precinct in 2016 compared to 2012.
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APPENDIX II – Supplementary Graphs, Figures, & Tables
Table A - Breakdown of Each State’s Reprecincting Law
State

Code

Authorization

Time Restrictions

Boundary & Size
Limitations
Boundaries defined by
Census; No more than
2,400 voters per
precinct.

Regulation

Alabama

17-6-6

County Governing
Authority

Not Specified

Alaska

15.10.020

Chief Election Officer of
the State

No Later than 40
days of an election

Boundaries defined by
Census; Not Specified

Not Specified (but
reprecincting is
conducted by the
CEO)

Arizona

16.411 &
16.412

County Governing
Authority

March 1st of
Election Year

Not Specified

Secretary of State

Arkansas

7-5-101

Local Election Official

Less than 60 days
before election; if
there are more than
3,000 in a precinct,
that change must be
made no less than
120 days before an
election

Boundaries defined by
Census; No more than
3,000 voters per precinct

Secretary of State

California

12-260

Local Election Official

Not Specified

Not Specified

Not Specified

Colorado

1-5-101

Local Election Official

Not Specified

Not Specified
(although needs
approval from the
county governing
body)

Connecticut

9-169

Township Governing
Body

Less than 90 days
before an election

In counties that use
paper ballots, the county
clerk and recorder,
subject to approval by
the board of county
commissioners, shall
establish at least one
precinct for every six
hundred active eligible
electors, with boundaries
that take into
consideration municipal
and school district
boundary lines whenever
possible. However, the
county clerk and
recorder, subject to
approval by the board of
county commissioners,
may establish one
precinct for every seven
hundred fifty active
eligible electors.
Boundaries defined by
Census; Less than 200
voters per precinct

Delaware

4102, 4103,
& 4105

Local Election Official

March 1st of
Election Year

Boundaries defined by
Census; minimum of 500
and maximum of 3,000
voters

State Election
Commissioner

Legislative
Committee

Not Specified
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District of
Columbia

1001-05

County Governing Body
& Local Election
Official

Every 5 years

Boundaries defined by
Census; at least 350
voters per precinct

Not Specified

Florida

100-101

County Governing Body
& Local Election
Official

Not Specified

Boundaries defined by
Census; Not specified

Secretary of State

Georgia

21-2-60 to
21-2-63

County Governing Body

less than 60 days
before an election;
30 days before a
special election

Boundaries defined by
Census; less than 200
voters & no more than
2,000 voters

Secretary of State

Hawaii

11-0092

Chief Election Officer of
the State

Less than 90 days
before an election

Not Specified

Not Specified (but
reprecincting is
conducted by the
CEO)

Idaho

34-3-01

County Governing Body

No Later than
January 15th of an
election year

No county shall have
less than 2 precincts

Secretary of State

Illinois

11-0003

Local Election Official

Within 90 days after
an election

Boundaries defined by
Census; No more than
600 actual voters

Not Specified

Indiana

3-11-0001

County Governing Body

Not Specified

Boundaries defined by
Census; No more than
2,300 voters

Not Specified

Iowa

49-3, 49-7,
&, 49-8

County Governing Body

If done following
the census, less than
90 days or October
15th of the
following year; If
done in the years not
following census,
than 99 days before
an election

Boundaries defined by
Census; No more than
3,500 voters

State Election
Commissioner

Kansas

26-A-01 to
26-A-05

Local Election Official

No later than four
months prior to
Primary Election
and the succeeding
General Election

Boundaries defined by
Census; Not Specified

Secretary of State

Kentucky

117.0551,
117.0552, &
117.0553

Local Election Official

Not Specified

Boundaries defined by
Census; Not Specified

State Board of
Elections

Louisiana

532 & 532.1

Parish Governing
Authority

No later than
December thirtyfirst of any year of
which the last digit
is nine and January
first of any year of
which the last digit
is three

Boundaries defined by
Census; No more than
2,200 voters and no less
than 300 voters

Secretary of State

Maine

631

Municipal Governing
Authority

At least 90 days
before an election

Not Specified

Secretary of State

Maryland

2-303

County Governing Body

At least 13 weeks
prior to the primary
election

Boundaries defined by
Census; Not Specified

State Election
Board
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Massachusetts

54-6

Township Governing
Body

No later than the
June 15th following
a census year

Boundaries defined by
Census; No more than
4,000 voters

Secretary of State

Michigan

168.658

Local Election Official

No later than 60
days before a
primary or general
election

Boundaries defined by
Census; No more than
5,000 active voters

Not Specified

Minnesota

204B.14.

County Governing Body

At least 10 weeks
before the date of
the next election

Boundaries defined by
Census; Not Specified

Secretary of State

Mississippi

23-15-283

County Governing Body

No later than the last
day of September of
the year ending in
eight

Boundaries defined by
Census; not specified

Secretary of State

Missouri

115.113

Local Election Official

Not Specified

Boundaries defined by
Census; not specified

Not Specified

Montana

13-3-102

County Governing Body

Not within 100 days
before any primary
or between a general
and the primary for
that election

Boundaries defined by
Census; not specified

State Election
Official

Nebraska

32-903

Local Election Official

Not Specified

Boundaries defined by
Census; Not less than 75
nor more than 1,750
registered voters

Not Specified

Nevada

293.205

Local Election Official

No later than the
third Wednesday in
March of every
even-numbered year

Boundaries defined by
the Census; Not
Specified

Not Specified

New Hampshire

662A-4

Local Election Official

Not Specified

Boundaries defined by
the Census; Not
Specified

Secretary of State

New Jersey

19:4-3

County Governing Body

No later than 75
days before the
primary for the
general election

Boundaries defined by
the Census; No more
than 750 and no less than
250 registered voters

Secretary of State

New Mexico

1.3.5

County Governing Body

No later than 4
months prior to a
statewide election

Boundaries defined by
the Census; No more
than 750 voters and less
than 100 voters in last
general election

Secretary of State

New York

4-100

Local Election Official

No later than
February 15th of a
calendar year

Boundaries defined by
the Census; No more
than 950 (or with special
permission 1150)

State Board of
Elections

North Carolina

163A-1045

Local Election Official

No later than 45
days prior to
primary election

Boundaries defined by
the Census

State Board of
Elections
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North Dakota

16.1-04-01

County Governing Body

No later than
December thirtyfirst of the year
immediately
preceding an
election and not later
than 70 days before
a special election

Boundaries defined by
the Census; Not
Specified

Not Specified

Ohio

2.1.04B

Local Election Official

No later than 25
days before the
primary or general
election

Boundaries defined by
the census; No more
than 1,400 registered
voters

Secretary of State

Oklahoma

3-115, 3-116,
& 3-118

Local Election Official

Not permitted
between January 1
of any year which
last digit is nine and
December 31 of any
year which last digit
is zero.

Boundaries defined by
the Census; Not
Specified

State Board of
Elections

Oregon

545.171

Not Specified

Not Specified

Not Specified

Pennsylvania

5. 501, 5.502,
& 5.506

County Board of
Directors
County Governing Body

Not Specified

Boundaries defined by
the Census; No more
than 1,200 and no less
than 100 registered
voters

Not Specified

Rhode Island

17-11-01

County Governing Body

No later than the
60th day preceding
an election

Boundaries defined by
the Census; No more
than 3,000 and no less
than 500 voters

State Board of
Elections

South Carolina

7-7-710

Local Election Official
& County Governing
Body

Not Specified

Not Specified; No more
than 750 voters per
precinct

State Election
Commission

South Dakota

12-14-1 &
12-14-4

County Governing Body

Not Specified

Not Specified

Not Specified

Tennessee

2-3-102, 2-3103, & 2-3104

Local Election Official

Not Specified

Boundaries defined by
Census; No more than
6,000 registered voters

Local Governing
Authority

Texas

4-42-01 to 442-010

County Governing Body

No later than May
1st of an even
numbered year

Boundaries defined by
Census; No more than
5,000 and no less than
100 registered voters

Secretary of State

Utah

20a-5-303

County Governing Body

No later than
January 1 of a
general election year

Boundaries defined by
Census; No more than
1,250 registered voters

Not Specified

Vermont

2501

County Governing Body

No later than 40
days before an
election

Not Specified

Not Specified

Virginia

24.2-305 &
24.2-307

County Governing Body

No later than 60
days before the
general election

Boundaries defined by
Census; No more than
5,000 and no less than
100 (for counties) and
500 (for cities) registered
voters

State Board of
Elections

Washington

29A.16.040

County Governing Body

no precinct changes

The number may be less
than the number

N/A
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may be made during
the period starting
fourteen days prior
to
the first day for
candidates to file for
the primary election
and
ending with the day
of the general
election
No later than 90
days before an
election

established by law, but
in no case may the
number exceed one
thousand five hundred
active registered voters

Boundaries defined by
Census; Any urban
precinct shall contain not
less than three hundred
nor more than one
thousand five hundred
registered voters. Any
rural or less thickly
settled area shall contain
not less than two
hundred nor more than
seven hundred registered
voters.

Secretary of State

West Virginia

3-1-5 & 3-17

County Governing Body

Wisconsin

5.15-01

Township Governing
Authority

No later than April
1st following a
Census year

Boundaries defined by
census

Not Specified

Wyoming

22-7-101 to
22-7-105

County Governing Body

No later than May of
an election year

Not Specified; No more
than 30 precincts in the
whole state

Secretary of State
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Table B. Small-N Sample Statistics: Georgia Counties
Top 9 Largest
White Populations
in GA

% White

PCVPP

Election
Budget ‘12

Election
Budget ‘16

Budget
Difference

Towns County

0.94623

7%

75,000

96,000

28%

Dade County

0.94089

18%

123,600

186,200

51%

Union County

0.940857

5%

158,240

155,774

-2%

Pickens County

0.937394

4%

265,288

337,269

27%

Dawson County

0.925976

5%

236,504

266,279

13%

White County

0.925316

4%

50,593

34,064

-33%

Haralson County

0.913077

1%

55,000

126,717

130%

Walker County

0.911679

1%

304,104

403,580

33%

Lumpkin County

0.908133

100%

181,075

192,069

6%

Top 9 Largest
Black Populations
in GA
Dougherty County

% Black

PCVPP

Election
Budget ‘12

Election
Budget ‘16

Budget
Difference

0.70752

-2%

363,170

369,385

2%

Calhoun County

0.626356

0%

35,000

34,905

0%

Randolph County

0.621803

4%

82,578

106,945

30%

Clay County

0.611647

100%

31,646

35,095

11%

Terrell County

0.611443

-2%

90,000

100,503

12%

Macon County

0.609883

0%

75,719

93,756

24%

Taliaferro County

0.58473

15%

45,867

51,665

13%

Richmond County

0.582137

80%

549,750

499,860

-9%

Bibb County

0.559438

32%

758,000

845,700

12%
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Table C. Regression Results: VPP on County Turnout in 2008, 2012, & 2016
2008
2012
2016
**
**
VPP
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001**
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
% Black
0.003
0.014
-0.011
(0.055)
(0.063)
(0.018)
% Black x Prec.
0.137*
0.184**
0.094
(0.057)
(0.066)
(0.025)
% Hispanic
-0.254***
-0.297***
-0.300***
(0.045)
(0.043)
(0.021)
% Hisp. x Prec.
0.107
0.173*
0.203***
(0.064)
(0.066)
(0.046)
Preclearance
-2.238
-3.015
-1.127
(1.733)
(1.611)
(1.481)
% 65 or Older
0.690***
0.841***
0.808***
(0.076)
(0.088)
(0.083)
Pop. Density
-1.433***
-1.279***
-0.934**
(0.254)
(0.347)
(0.313)
Median Income
0.310***
0.347***
0.328***
(0.049)
(0.055)
(0.049)
***
***
% Bachelors
0.599
0.508
0.397***
(0.059)
(0.061)
(0.069)
% GOP Support
-0.062
-0.049
-0.017
(0.032)
(0.045)
(0.410)
In-Person Early
-3.650
-4.893
-3.834
(1.835)
(2.786)
(2.111)
No-Exc. Absent
1.791
3.598
4.095*
(1.633)
(2.163)
(1.877)
Strict ID
-0.819
-1.038
-2.211
(2.483)
(1.714)
(1.456)
Voting Centers
-1.237
-0.276
-0.444
(1.163)
(1.796)
(1.473)
Constant
32.873***
26.986***
26.919***
(3.497)
(3.555)
(3.198)
N
2274
2270
2270
Statistics in parentheses* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard Errors clustered at the state-level.
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Table D. Difference-in-Difference Models of Change in County-Level Turnout by Preclearance and NonPreclearance
2008-12
2008-12
2012-16
2012-16
Non-Preclearance
Preclearance
Non-Preclearance
Preclearance
PCVPP
-0.005
-0.001
-0.002
-0.002
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.001)
% Black
0.021*
0.034
-0.054***
-0.143***
(0.009)
(0.018)
(0.009)
(0.024)
*
% Hispanic
-0.017
-0.010
0.002
-0.011
(0.00760)
(0.0159)
(0.009)
(0.019)
% Old
0.136***
0.145***
0.063**
0.050
(0.019)
(0.032)
(0.019)
(0.040)
Pop. Density
0.001
-0.001
0.001***
0.001*
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
Median Inc.
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
% Bachelors
-0.039
-0.010*
-0.072***
0.032
(0.021)
(0.040)
(0.020)
(0.051)
% GOP
0.027**
-0.020
0.012
-0.027
(0.008)
(0.019)
(0.008)
(0.025)
Δ Early
-0.821
-0.102
-0.423
------(0.399)
(0.301)
(0.532)
Δ No-Exc. Abs.
0.122
--------1.782**
------(0.322)
(0.587)
Δ Strict ID
-1.462***
1.567*
-2.322***
-0.876**
(0.112)
(0.822)
(0.522)
(0.322)
***
*
*
Δ Vote Cent.
-2.645
-0.986
-0.987
------(0.401)
(0.432)
(0.511)
Constant
-0.080***
-0.033
0.006
0.058
(0.010)
(0.022)
(0.011)
(0.030)
N
1656
606
1656
606
R2
0.118
0.225
0.444
0.362
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard Errors clustered at the countylevel.
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